BORDERLAND-RELATED CRIMES AND SECURITY THREATS IN KENYA

National Crime Research Centre
2018
### BORDERLAND - RELATED CRIMES

#### Major Borderland-related crimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smuggling of illicit goods</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal migration</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Smuggling of illicit goods (51.7%)
- Drug trafficking (48.2%)
- Illegal migration (46.5%)

**Border-point corruption**
- 38.8%

**Cross-border Robbery/theft of Motor Vehicle/Cycle**
- 39.0%

**Cross-border stock theft/cattle rustling**
- 36.7%

**Smuggling of counterfeit goods**
- 34.7%

**Illegal possession of forest products** (e.g., charcoal, sandal wood)
- 32.4%

**Tax evasion**
- 28.9%

**Use of unauthorized fishing techniques and/or equipment**
- 22.9%

**Cross-border kidnapping and/or abduction**
- 22.5%
# Major Border Points for the Most Prevalent Borderland-related Crimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Border Points</th>
<th>Most Prevalent Borderland-related Crimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya-Uganda border region</td>
<td>unauthorized fishing techniques and/or equipment 63.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya-Somalia border region</td>
<td>cross-border terrorism 40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya-Indian Ocean border region</td>
<td>Drug trafficking 38.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya-Tanzania border region</td>
<td>cross-border robbery of motor vehicle/cycle and/or parts 26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya-Ethiopia border region</td>
<td>cross-border terrorism 15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya-South Sudan border region</td>
<td>cattle rustling 4.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>THINGS INVOLVED IN SMUGGLING</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sugar</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>![Sugar icon]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>48.8%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Alcohol and/or illicit brews</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>![Alcohol icon]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>28%</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Illegal drugs (including cocaine and heroin)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>![Cocaine icon]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>25.2%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cereals</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>![Cereal icon]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>23%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clothes, shoes and hand bags</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>![Cloth icon]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>12.8%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Charcoal/coal</strong></td>
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<td>![Charcoal icon]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>12%</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Wheat and maize flour</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>![Wheat icon]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>11.3%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Body jelly oil</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>![Body jelly icon]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>8.2%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cigarettes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>![Cigarette icon]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>7.4%</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Firearms (e.g guns)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>![Gun icon]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>7.2%</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cooking oil</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>![Cooking oil icon]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>7.2%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Timber</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5.6%</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Potential borderland security threats

- Terror attacks and terrorism: 16.9%
- Bandits/Cattle rustling/Raiders: 14.1%
- Attack's and theft of properties: 11.2%
- Drug smuggling, peddling and usage: 10.9%
- Smuggling of goods: 10.4%
- Organized criminal gangs: 7.0%
- Conflicts over natural resources: 5.5%
- Uncontrolled border points/porous border: 5.4%
- Illegal immigration/influx of immigrants: 5.0%
- High levels of unemployment: 4.0%
- Harassment of traders by the security officers along the borders: 3.8%
- Abduction and kidnapping: 3.7%
- Illegal fishing activities: 3.5%
Manifestations of borderland security threats

- Easy accessibility to guns by gangs (such as Dofus, Jije, Toposa) in neighboring country (21.3%)
- Upsurge in crime (18.8%)
- Idle youths with no employment (16.0%)
- Organized criminal activity (13.2%)
- Cross border attacks (7.0%)
- Proliferation of illegal arms (7.0%)
- Commodities/contrabands from neighboring countries (5.1%)
- Smuggling of counterfeit goods (5.1%)
- Neighboring country police harass local fishermen (7.4%)
General classification of perpetrators of borderland-related crimes and security threats

- Unemployed youthful men: 22.2%
- Business people: 21.9%
- Wayward government officials: 17.0%
- Cross-border communities: 10.7%
- Foreigners from bordering countries: 14.1%
- Terror groups and especially the Al-Shabaab: 12.0%
Role Representation of Perpetrators by Gender

1. Role of men in perpetration of borderland-related crimes and security threats

Main participants in planning and facilitation of crimes

- Stealing/theft/robbery: 17.9%
- Smuggling of goods/weapons: 16.8%
- Cattle rustling: 6.2%
- Drug trafficking: 5.7%
- Consumption and use of drugs and illicit brew: 4.5%
- Distribution of illicit drugs in the localities: 4.4%
- Uniting group members of organized criminal gangs: 3.8%
- Harassment and brutality acts of beating people: 3.7%
- Carrying out terror attacks on highways: 3.5%
- Illegal charcoal burning/smuggling and illegal fishing: 3.4%

2. Role of women in perpetration of borderland-related crimes and security threats

- Concealing the information of their partners in crime: 26.1%
- Spying and giving information to the male members: 19.9%
- Brewing and selling illicit drinks: 14.4%
- Smuggling of goods: 13.5%
- Transporting smuggled goods: 11.1%
- Hiding animals and smuggled goods in their houses: 8.6%
- Trafficking of drugs: 8.3%
- Consuming trafficked goods: 5.6%
- Preparing meals for the criminals: 3.6%
Role representation of perpetrators by Age

Categorization of perpetrators by Age

by Age

- 54.8% 15 - 30 yrs
- 31.7% 31 - 45 yrs
- 5.2% 46 - 60 yrs
- 2.5% Below 15 yrs
- 0.6% Above 60 yrs
- 5.2% All ages

1. Role of children in perpetration of borderland-related crimes and security threats

- Smuggling and transporting illegal goods 34.8%
- Conducting surveillance, spying and smuggling drugs 20.4%
- Theft/stealing of items 6.4%
- Being used as users and/or buyers of illicit drugs 7.5%
- Preparing meals for the criminals 8.3%
- Illegal fishing and conducting raids 4.8%
- They are radicalized and trained for future terror attacks 13.1%
- Being used to bait or as baits 10.1%
2. Role of youth in perpetration of borderland-related crimes and security threats

- Main perpetrators of crimes: 26.0%
  - Planning and executing crimes: 11.5%
  - Cattle theft/stealing/robbery: 13.7%
  - Conducting raids/attacks with guns: 6.6%
  - Conduct terror attacks and being radicalized: 3.8%
  - They are drug peddlers/distributors: 6.2%
  - They give direction to the criminal friends: 3.2%
- Consumers of drugs e.g. cocaine: 11.6%
- Transportation of contrabands and/or smuggled illegal goods across the border: 10.4%
- Main smugglers of illegal goods: 8.8%
- Fish using illegal fishing tools and boats: 2.8%
- Consumers of illicit brew: 3.0%
3. Role played by the elderly in perpetration of borderland-related crimes and security threats

Coordinate the smuggling, stocking and selling of smuggled goods 30.1%

Give bad advice and incite the youth to commit crimes 20.2%

They cover the criminals and benefit from the smuggled goods 16.2%

Protect the children who are offenders 6.9%

Role of public officials in perpetration of borderland-related crimes and security threats

Take bribe and allow illegal items to cross the border 63.6%

No actions taken even in the case of reported insecurity issues 19.9%

They are the organizers of crimes 16.8%

Oathing of warriors to go out to raid 12.9%
Categorization of victims by Population Age categories
Youth (56.2%) followed by persons above youth age but not elderly (45.2%), the elderly (24.5%) and children (23.4%).
Mode of Transport used in Smuggling

- Boda bodas/Motorcycles: 45.2%
- Vehicles: 37.8%
- Boats (Including speed boats): 23.0%
- By foot: 20.7%
- Donkey carts: 14.2%
- Bicycles: 4.5%
- Aeroplane: 0.7%
Time of the day when most borderland-related crimes are likely to occur

- 23.7% No specific time
- 22.1% Early night (7pm - 11:59pm)
- 14.6% Mid night (12am - 12:59am)
- 13.2% Morning (6am - 11:59am)
- 11.6% Late night (1am - 3:59am)
- 6.3% Early morning (4am - 5:59am)
- 4.3% Evening (4pm - 6:59pm)
- 2.4% Noon (12pm - 12:59pm)
- 1.7% Afternoon (1pm - 3:59pm)

Day (s) of the week when most borderland-related crimes are likely to occur

- All Days of the week: 73.7%
- Saturday: 9.9%
- Friday: 10.6%
- Sunday: 11.9%
- Monday: 4.1%
- Wednesday: 4.0%
- Thursday: 4.6%
- Tuesday: 4.9%

Pie chart showing the distribution of the days of the week.
**Time of the month when most borderland-related crimes are likely to occur**

- All time of the month: 65.4%
- End of the month: 19.8%
- Mid-Month: 7.2%
- Beginning of the month: 2.1%
- Muslim Ramadhan period: 3.0%

**Time of the year when most borderland-related crimes are likely to occur**

- December: 32.7%
- Anytime of the year: 29.5%
- Rainy Seasons: 23.2%
- Holydays: 10.8%
- Drought seasons: 5.1%
- April: 6.0%
- September: 2.5%
- During Ramadhan: 2.5%
- October: 2.3%
- February: 2.2%
- January: 4.0%
- Rainy Seasons: 3.2%
- Holydays: 4.1%
- November: 4.7%
- May: 4.8%
- July: 4.8%

**Time of the month**

- All time of the month
- End of the month
- Mid-Month
- Beginning of the month
- Muslim Ramadhan period
Factors promoting borderland-related crimes and security threats

- Poverty and unemployment: 89.3%
- Poor relations between the community and law enforcement agencies: 68.8%
- Poor coordination and information sharing among border control and management agencies: 59.9%
- Presence of organized criminal gangs in neighbor countries: 52.1%
- Cultural similarities or differences across the border: 50.7%
- Corruption among some members of state and non-state agencies: 71.2%
- Political instability and weak law and order enforcement: 62.9%
- Competition and conflicts over natural resources: 59.2%
- Proliferation of illicit arms and weapons: 47.9%
Contributors of acrimonious co-existence between cross-border communities

- Competition over water resources 23.0%
- Fishing activities in shared border land waters 19.3%
- Land and land-related issues 18.3%
- Disagreement over territorial boundaries 17.4%
- Cattle rusting and raids 14.2%
- Competition over pastures 15.1%
- Cultural differences 12.4%
- Trading sanctions for Kenyans across the border 3.8%
- Border police harassment 3.6%
- Political instability and weak law and order enforcement 62.9%
Shared cross-border natural resources contributing to borderland-related crimes and security threats

- lakes and rivers: 69.3%
- pasture/grazing land: 36.6%
- Indian Ocean: 13.0%
- Forests: 7.6%
- Islands: 5.6%
- No man’s land: 5.0%
Consequences of borderland-related crimes and security threats

- Loss of life/lives: 41.2%
- High levels of poverty: 27.8%
- High level of insecurity and fear of terror attacks: 26.5%
- Destruction of property: 22.0%
- Low investment and business growth: 15.1%
- Conflict among the borderland communities: 12.6%
- High levels of school dropout: 6.9%
- Poor health: 7.0%
Existing measures to address borderland related crimes and security threats

Deployment of security physical infrastructure and human resource  46.8%

Nyumba kumi Initiative  20.6%

Public peace building and border security meetings  20.2%

Integration and or rehabilitation of offenders  10.4%

Community policing initiative  2.4%

Improvement of market infrastructure and streetlighting  0.8%
Inter-state collaborative measures for addressing borderland-related crimes and security threats.

Cross-border Committee peace meeting  36.5%

Cross-border security intelligence exchange  27.2%

Cross-border Security checks and immigration controls  15.8%

Inter-State local administration forums  4.6%

East African Community agreements  7.4%

Deployment of KDF in Somalia for peace keeping  3.4%
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Perception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Government Administration Office</td>
<td>95.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Revenue Authority (especially Customs Department)</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police Service</td>
<td>93.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Department</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Intelligence Service</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Wildlife Service</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Government</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Forest Service</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health (that is, hospitals and dispensaries)</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Maritime Authority</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Intelligence Service</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Wildlife Service</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Community-based Organizations (CBOs)</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Management Committees (of Border Control and Operations Coordination Committee)</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
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Challenges faced in addressing borderland-related crimes and security threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequately resourced security agencies</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption among some public security personnel in border areas</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels of unemployment among the youths</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate collaboration between members of public and security agencies</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels of poverty and cost of living</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of organized criminal gangs, terror activities and fear among border communities</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of goodwill among regional leaders, inadequate inter-state cooperation and non-implementation of resolutions</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long porous borderline (which is hard to monitor)</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of education</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Respondents’ suggestions on solutions to challenges faced in addressing borderland-related crimes and security threats

- **Enhanced facilitation of borderland security agencies** 34.8%
- **Job creation and youth empowerment** 18.6%
- **Sensitization of community members to embrace dispute resolution, change the culture of impunity and avoid crime** 14.0%
- **Enhanced coordination, involvement and information sharing** 11.7%
- **Strengthening the Nyumba Kumi Initiative** 11.7%
- **Scaling up the fight against corruption including dismissal of corrupt border security and other officers** 14.7%
- **Instituting stiff penalties and prosecution** 6.2%
- **Community leaders’ participation in peace mediations and dispute resolutions** 6.0%
Key Recommendations

1. Development and implementation of policy, management operation, infrastructure and training initiatives through the establishment and enhancement of human capital, financial and infrastructural resourcing of border control and management institutions by the Government and development partners through: enhanced remuneration, recruitment and deployment of additional personnel, expanded specialized teams and rapid response capabilities by way of specialized skills development training; and enhanced budgetary allocations for recurrent expenditure (that is, personnel emoluments, operations and maintenance) and development expenditure for infrastructure development (including construction of decent and secure offices and acquisition of modern state-of-the-art border control equipment and aids). Specifically, the study recommends that the Government and its development partners identify human and other resource needs for effective border management and consider:

   (i) Undertaking a meticulous border control and management system audit to identify the gaps that enable borderland-related crimes to continue unabated.

   (ii) Establishment of border control and management institutions (such as the Border Management Committees) where they do not exist.

   (iii) Enhancement of human capital through improved remuneration, recruitment and deployment of additional personnel in keeping with the labour provisions of an eight-hour working day and to ensure adequate staff strengths during night times, weekends, public holidays and festive seasons.

   (iv) Expanding specialized teams and rapid response capabilities by way of specialized skills development training on counter-terrorism, anti-counterfeiting and smuggling for border control officers to handle the dynamic and intricate nature of borderland-related crimes and security threats.

   (v) Maximizing security through appropriate balance of personnel equipment, technology, communication capabilities and tactical infrastructure by way of building a strong modern management infrastructure initiative on enhancement of infrastructural resourcing. Enhancement of infrastructural resourcing (through development funds) of border control and management institutions for the construction of decent and secure offices, acquisition of modern state of the art border control equipment (such as communication gadgets, screening scanners, surveillance equipment (such as CCTV cameras), gun and drug detectors) and aids (such as night vision aids and sniffer dogs) is paramount.
(vi) Improved budgeting, financial process and policy for enhancement of budgetary allocations for operation and maintenance expenses such as fuel for regular patrols, communication and intelligence gathering.

2. Fighting of border-point corruption and related malpractices by: use of a total cashless payment system; online computerized accounting and document verification; regular vetting of border control staff; curtailing unexplained accumulation of wealth; dismissal and/or prosecution of corrupt officials; and aggressive citizen awareness campaigns against corruption and related malpractices spearheaded by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC).

3. Whole of trade, business and property management approaches to addressing smuggling and trafficking-related borderland-related crimes and security threats through: harmonization of commodity prices and tax regimes in the region; regulation and regular inspection, monitoring and surveillance of warehouses, guest and rental houses and exclusive and private villas and beaches; formation of county-specific associations of owners and/or operators of warehouses, guest and rental houses and exclusive and private villas and beaches; and strengthened import and export goods tracking protocols. Specifically, the study recommends that:

(i) The East African Community Common Market Protocol and the inter-state Chambers of Commerce and Industry institute measures to harmonize commodity prices and taxes within the region.

(ii) Relevant regulatory institutions regulate and conduct regular impromptu inspection, monitoring and surveillance of goods’ containers at ports, warehouses, guest and rental houses and exclusive and private villas and beaches. For instance, all guest and rental houses must at all time keep a clear and true record and identity information of their visitors or lodgers while warehouses must maintain an inventory of stored goods which can be scrutinized by relevant government agencies.

(iii) Business and property owners and operators assist the government in addressing borderland-related crimes and security threats through the formation of county-specific associations of owners and/or operators of warehouses, guest and rental houses and exclusive and private villas and beaches with clear codes of conduct.
(iv) In order to minimize incidents of concealed and/or illegal goods entering or leaving the country, an import and export tracking protocol needs to be worked out and/or strengthened by relevant government agencies. This formula will entail importers and exporters declaring and communicating well in advance the contacts of the parties involved (that is, the owners and source individuals and/or companies), specifications of the goods and the specific ports or border points through which the goods will enter and exit the country (and without which the goods will not be allowed to enter or exit). This will ease the process of verification and identification of the likely spots where illicit goods join the conveyor belt of the licit goods. It will also minimize the incidents of unknown or obscure owners when illegal goods are confiscated or when prosecution is to be undertaken.

4. Adoption and implementation of the concept of ‘Community Asset Management in Security, Crime and Violence Prevention’ which entails a programme for community members and leadership participation in borderland security, crime and violence prevention through: community-driven acquisition, installation and maintenance of basic security infrastructure; improved community-policing relations; and the concept of ‘Volunteer Border Control and Management Officer’ to improve on neighbourhood security watch. Specifically, it is recommended that:
   (i) Strategies to enhance citizen participation in the effective management of borderland-related crimes and security threats with a special focus on enhancing intelligence programmes and improving intelligence-driven operations especially through the Nyumba Kumi and Community Policing Initiatives in Kenya and similar outfits across the borders are put in place.
   (ii) Border communities and leadership are sensitized on border security and management and the need to abandon the culture of impunity and avoiding crime.
   (iii) Local community members are encouraged to acquire, install, share, manage and maintain on a self-help basis security infrastructure such as outdoor flood and street lights, security and crime reporting booths in hotspot areas and smuggling routes, and making and repair of all-weather borderline roads to facilitate transport (including through the use of its offenders placed under the court sanction of Community Service Orders).
   (iv) The local community identifies and vets its trusted members who are ready to volunteer and be engaged as ‘Volunteer Border Control and Management Officers’ to improve on neighbourhood security watch and be the link between the community and relevant government agencies in border control and management matters.

5. Establishment and implementation of a comprehensive community livelihood programme targeting the different population segments
gadgets, screening scanners, surveillance equipment (such as CCTV cameras),
institutions for the construction of decent and secure offices, acquisition of
and smuggling for border control officers to handle the dynamic and
labour provisions of an eight-hour working day and to ensure adequate staff

(iii) Enhancement of human capital through improved remuneration,
offices and acquisition of modern state-of-the-art border control equipment
infrastructure development (including construction of decent and secure
emoluments, operations and maintenance) and development expenditure for
enhanced budgetary allocations for recurrent expenditure (that is, personel
operation, infrastructure and training initiatives through the establishment and

1. Development and implementation of policy, management
formation of county-specific associations of owners and/or operators of
in addressing borderland-related crimes and security threats through the

(ii) Relevant regulatory institutions regulate and conduct regular
harmonize commodity prices and taxes within the region.

(i) The East African Community Common Market Protocol and the
addressing smuggling and trafficking-related borderland-related crimes
(EACC).

2. Fighting of border-point corruption and related malpractices by: use

gathering.

(iv) The local community identifies and vets its trusted members who are
hotspot areas and smuggling routes, and making and repair of all-weather
outdoor / flood and street lights, security and crime reporting booths in
manage and maintain on a self-help basis security infrastructure such as

5. Establishment and implementation of a comprehensive community
border control and management matters.

be the link between the community and relevant government agencies in

(iv) The local community identifies and vets its trusted members who are
working with community members (especially men, women, youth, children and the elderly) and economic
sub-sectors (especially business operators/traders, fishermen and pastoralists) with a direct stake in borderland-related crimes and security threats either as perpetrators or victims.

6. Putting in place engagement mechanisms for local and international
stakeholders and partners, strengthening of inter-state and cross-border
community collaboration, leveraging the expertise, capabilities and
human resources of border agencies, building of bridges initiatives and
scaling up of interventions in regional peace and security initiatives by way
of joint cross-border peace and security meetings, deployment of joint
security infrastructure, goodwill ambassadors, conflict mediation and
peace keeping and security forces. Specifically, the study recommends that:

(i) A full implementation of the East African Community protocols by all
member states be prioritized.

(ii) Kenya scales up interventions in regional peace and security
initiatives by way of joint cross-border peace and security meetings,
deployment of goodwill ambassadors, conflict mediation experts and
peace keeping and security forces.

(iii) Relevant government agencies work with cross-border communities
to undertake regular cultural cooperation and exchange activities such as
peace marathons and caravans, music and cultural festivals.

(iv) Because security infrastructure is expensive to install, bordering
countries consider joint security installations and maintenance of infrastruc-
ture such as borderline roads, One Stop Border Posts, night vision
equipment, un-manned geo-aerial vehicles (especially drones), patrol
vehicles, communication masts, surveillance equipment and scanners.

(v) Border control and security management institutions of bordering
countries create a shared law enforcement culture amongst themselves,
leverage their expertise, capabilities and human resources and enhance
their cooperation, information and intelligence sharing.

(vi) Harmonized training curriculum and joint trainings, workshops and
seminars for border control and management officials of bordering
countries be prioritized.

(vii) Clear inter-state boundary demarcations and amicable resolution of
inter-state boundary and resource disputes be undertaken.
institutions for the construction of decent and secure offices, acquisition of equipment, technology, communication capabilities and tactical infrastructure. Smuggling for border control officers to handle the dynamic and strengths during night times, weekends, public holidays and festive seasons.

Recruitment and deployment of additional personnel in keeping with the development partners identify human and other resource needs for effective and aids. Specifically, the study recommends that the Government and its infrastructure development (including construction of decent and secure enhancement of human capital, financial and infrastructural resourcing of.

1. Development and implementation of policy, management

lodgers while warehouses must maintain an inventory of stored goods. For instance, all guest and rental houses must at all time impromptu inspection, monitoring and surveillance of goods' containers export goods tracking protocols. Specifically, the study recommends that:

3. Whole of trade, business and property management approaches to (EACC).

Criminal Investigations and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission unexplained accumulation of wealth; dismissal and/or prosecution of offenders placed under the court sanction of Community Service Orders).

(ii) Kenya scales up interventions in regional peace and security initiatives by way of organized crime actors.

(iii) Relevant government agencies work with cross-border communities to improve on neighbourhood security watch and ready to volunteer and be engaged as ‘Volunteer Border Control and management and the need to abandon the culture of impunity and pastoralists) with a direct stake in borderland-related crimes and security sub-sectors (especially business operators/traders, fishermen and

(iv)  Local community members are encouraged to acquire, install, share, and management and the need to abandon the culture of impunity and intelligence-driven operations especially through the Nyumba Kumi and making and repair of all-weather borderline roads to facilitate transport (including through the use of its intelligence gathering agencies with a view to enhancing collaboration between the national and county levels of government, between Border Management Committee agencies and between criminal justice system agencies.

9. That the Executive and Legislative Arms of Government put in place and/or strengthen instruments and structures for effective coordination and integration of border management programmes including placing command structure to improve on coordination and service delivery and establishing Standard Operating Procedures at all entry and exit points.

10. A multi-agency team comprising the Ministry of Interior, agencies in the criminal justice system and other relevant institutions involved in border issues put in place strategic interventions to deal with the problem of organized criminal gangs and crime hotspots and routes in borderlands. Specifically, the study recommends that:

(i) The Ministry of Interior and other relevant agencies in the criminal justice system undertake effective profiling, identification, arrest, prosecution and sentencing of organized crime kingpins, politicians, business people and wayward and corrupt government officials who support and/or collaborate with organized criminal groups would, to a large extent, destabilize organizational leadership and network structures of the groups.

(ii) The Ministry of Interior and other relevant agencies in the criminal justice system give special attention to improved identification and targeting of terrorists along with their weapons and other transnational organized crime actors.

(viii) A regularly updated directory (with telephone and other contacts) and a forum (for instance, joint public peace and security meetings and social media platforms such as Whatsapp walls) for cross-border grassroot administrators (especially Village Headmen, Assistant Chiefs and Chiefs) in borderline areas of both countries be activated to facilitate communication and regular review of border control issues in their jurisdictions including on dismantling safe havens for criminals who take advantage of straddled communities.

7. Regulation and random and incognito inspection, monitoring, surveillance and crackdowns by relevant agencies of the modes of transport used in borderlands especially boda boda motorcycles, vehicles, water vessels, bicycles, donkey carts and persons crossing borders on foot.

8. Improved collegiality between the national and county levels of government, between Border Management Committee agencies and between criminal justice system agencies.

6. Putting in place engagement mechanisms for local and international cooperation, information and intelligence sharing.

countries create a shared law enforcement culture amongst themselves, leverage their expertise, capabilities and human resources and enhance intelligence-driven operations especially through the Nyumba Kumi and border issues put in place strategic interventions to deal with the problem of organized criminal gangs and crime hotspots and routes in borderlands. Specifically, the study recommends that:

(i) The Ministry of Interior and other relevant agencies in the criminal justice system undertake effective profiling, identification, arrest, prosecution and sentencing of organized crime kingpins, politicians, business people and wayward and corrupt government officials who support and/or collaborate with organized criminal groups would, to a large extent, destabilize organizational leadership and network structures of the groups.

(ii) The Ministry of Interior and other relevant agencies in the criminal justice system give special attention to improved identification and targeting of terrorists along with their weapons and other transnational organized crime actors.
(iii) The Committee on Citizen Participation in Security (Nyumba Kumi Initiative) should play a leading role in changing criminal youth to a youth dividend and improving community-police relations and enhanced community participation in security so as to provide the earliest opportunities to security agencies to identify organized criminal gangs.

(iv) The Ministry of Interior undertakes: routine gazettlement and publication of names of organized criminal groups, organized crime kingpins, politicians, business people and wayward government officials who support the groups; and continuous and effective mapping, surveillance and policing of organized criminal groups hotspots.

(v) Synergies be built within the crime research, investigation and intelligence gathering agencies with a view to enhancing collaboration and information sharing of crime data and information which would lead to relevant and effective pragmatic policy and programme interventions for tackling organized criminal groups. A special focus also needs to be on the risk factors facilitating the emergence, spread and crimes of organized criminal gangs.

(vi) County Commissioners and their line officers together with other security agencies in counties harbouring at least 2 organized criminal groups need to give special focus to the problem of proliferation of the groups in their respective counties.

(vii) Strategic deployment of security and other relevant personnel to manage the hotspots and routes especially during night times, weekends, end and mid-month, public holidays and festive seasons (especially in the month of December) towards countering borderland-related crimes.

11. The Ministry of Interior curtails the proliferation and use of illicit arms and weapons by way of fresh licencing, registration and calibration of arms held by private citizens.