

# ISIOLO COUNTY

## CRIME AND VIOLENCE RAPID ASSESSMENT






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# Contents

Foreword .....	v
Acknowledgements .....	vi
Acronyms .....	vii
1 Introduction .....	1
Crime and Violence Prevention in Kenya .....	3
Crime and Violence Prevention Training .....	4
County-Level Crime and Violence Prevention .....	4
Framework for Analysis .....	7
Goals of the Rapid Assessment .....	9
Methodology .....	9
2 Background: Crime and Violence Trends in Kenya .....	13
Boda-Boda-Related Crime and Violence .....	14
Alcohol and Drug Abuse .....	14
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence .....	16
Violence against Children .....	16
Radicalization and Recruitment into Violent Extremism .....	17
3 Rapid Assessment of Isiolo County .....	19
County Overview .....	19
Cross-Cutting Drivers of Crime and Violence .....	21
Dynamics of Crime and Violence .....	32
Security Interventions .....	52
Crime and Violence Prevention Activities .....	56
Conclusion .....	62
References .....	65

## Appendixes . . . . .73

A	Crime and Violence Baseline Rapid Assessment Methodology . . . . .	74
B	General Framework for In-Depth Interviews and Focus Group Discussions . . . . .	75

## Figures

1.1	Kenya's New System of Devolved Government . . . . .	5
1.2	County-Level Security Actors . . . . .	6
1.3	The Socioecological Framework . . . . .	7
1.4	Community Crime Prevention Actions. . . . .	8
1.5	Sectors Represented by Questionnaire Respondents in Isiolo County . . . . .	10
3.1	Public Perceptions of Causes of Conflict in Isiolo County . . . . .	22
3.2	Perceptions about Frequency of Crime. . . . .	33
3.3	Commonly Mentioned Crimes in Isiolo County, 2016 . . . . .	34
3.4	Outcomes of Road Traffic Accidents in Isiolo 2014–16 . . . . .	45
3.5	Injuries Due to Road Traffic Accidents and Other Causes in Isiolo . . . . .	45
3.6	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence by Age in Isiolo County . . . . .	49
3.7	Teenage Pregnancies in Isiolo County by Age, 2016 . . . . .	49
3.8	Importance of Various Institutions in Addressing Crime and Violence. . . . .	55

## Maps

3.1	Isiolo County, Showing Subcounties . . . . .	20
3.2	Isiolo County Showing Isiolo Holding Ground and Movements of People and Arms . . . . .	23

## Tables

1.1	Overview of Fieldwork in Isiolo County . . . . .	11
3.1	Subcounties and Wards in Isiolo County . . . . .	20
3.2	Enrollment by Gender in 2015 . . . . .	31
3.3	Transition and Completion Rates by Gender in 2015. . . . .	31
3.4	Crimes in Isiolo County 2015 and 2016 (Police Records) . . . . .	35
3.5	Rates of Physical and Sexual Violence by Partner or Spouse in Isiolo County . . . . .	46
3.6	Economic Activities Among Youth and Related Challenges . . . . .	56
3.7	Interventions and Programs Addressing Youth Unemployment . . . . .	57





# Foreword

A rapid assessment was carried out in Isiolo County, Kenya in June 2017 under the Crime and Violence Prevention Training (CVPT) project of the Kenya Accountable Devolution Program. KADP is funded by governments of Denmark, European Union, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.

The assessment explored the dynamics of crime and violence, risk and protective factors, and potential for their prevention. The research sought to inform the CVPT, a month-long course that has been held annually in Kenya since 2011 as a collaborative project between United States International University-Africa and the Kenya School of

Government, and recently joined by the National Crime Research Centre. During its first five years, the project was sponsored by Open Society Initiative East Africa as part of its Crime and Violence Prevention Initiative in the region, and it is now sponsored by the World Bank through KADP. Coffey International has also been a funding partner. The project has evolved over time to equip a wide range of relevant actors at the county level in response to Kenya's devolved government structure since 2013. County assessments now precede training courses to contextualize the training curriculum and provide common ground for discussion and learning.



# Acknowledgements

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# Acronyms

ADR	alternative dispute resolution
AK-47	Avtomat Kalashnikova (assault rifle)
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
CPA	County Policing Authority
CVPT	Crime and Violence Prevention Training
FGM	female genital mutilation
G3	Gewehr 3 (battle rifle)
km <sup>2</sup>	square kilometer
Kshs	Kenyan shillings
LAPSSET	Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport
NGO	nongovernmental organization
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SCORES	Sensitization of Communities on Radicalization and Empowerment Solutions
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WHO	World Health Organization





Photo: Kennedy Mkutu | World Bank

# 1. Introduction

Across the globe, high rates of crime and violence are undermining growth, threatening human welfare, and impeding social development, with the poor and vulnerable particularly affected. One in five people worldwide has been the victim of violence or crime (UN-Habitat 2013).

The term *crime* means different things to different people. As Haskell and Yablonsky (1983) point out, to members of the legal profession, a crime is an illegal act, but some social scientists equate the term with any behavior injurious to society (Haskell and Yablonsky 1983). Crime refers to behavior, either by act or omission, defined by statutory or common law, that is deserving of punishment.

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as:

“the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.”<sup>1</sup>

There are various classifications of crime and violence. Crimes can be classified based on the potential penalty, such as felonies and misdemeanors, or based on subject matter, such as crimes against persons or property.

<sup>1</sup>. For more on definitions and typologies of violence, see [www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/definition/en](http://www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/definition/en).

Violence can be classified based on its agents, such as gangs, youths, or collective groups; victims, such as women, children, or minority groups; the relationship between aggressor and victim, such as interpersonal or unrelated; perceived causality, such as psychopathological, situational, or learned; and type of harm, such as physical, psychological, or sexual.<sup>2</sup>

Root causes of crime and violence include rapid urbanization, persistent poverty and inequality, social exclusion, and postconflict cultures. Urban residents, the poor, and those living in marginalized neighborhoods must cope with particularly high levels of crime and violence. Many African countries are growing increasingly concerned with soaring levels of crime and violence, which take a variety of forms, including youth violence; gender-based violence; and generally high rates of criminal victimization by robbery, assault, and theft (World Bank 2009).

The costs associated with crime and violence are significant. Direct costs can include the immediate destruction of public infrastructure as well as ongoing physical and mental health care. Indirect costs can include productivity losses, population displacement, and overall welfare (World Bank 2009). Social multiplier effects portend far-reaching ramifications for crime and violence, measuring the impact of an erosion of social assets, an intergenerational transfer of violence, a reduction in the quality of life, and a decrease in the public's confidence in the government and its institutions.

A preventive approach to crime and violence has been gaining increasing international recognition, as demonstrated in recent years

by its enactment in violence prevention laws and its promotion as part of an efficient and effective response to the ravages of crime and violence. As the WHO, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the United Nations Development Programme assert:

"Crime prevention strategies not only prevent crime and victimization, but also promote community safety and contribute to sustainable development of countries. Effective, responsible crime prevention enhances the quality of life of all citizens. It has long-term benefits in terms of reducing the costs associated with the formal criminal justice system, as well as other social costs that result from crime." (WHO, UNODC, and UNDP 2014)

Crime and violence prevention efforts involve taking a detailed look at both risk and protective factors. Based on a growing evidence base, the WHO and its partners have identified seven key strategies to help to prevent crime and violence:

1. Develop safe, stable, and nurturing relationships between children and their parents and/or caregivers;
2. Develop the life skills of children and adolescents;
3. Reduce the availability and harmful use of alcohol;
4. Reduce access to guns and knives;
5. Promote gender equality to prevent violence against women;
6. Change cultural and social norms that support violence;

Promote victim identification, care, and support programs (WHO, UNODC, and UNDP

2. For more on definitions and typologies of violence, see [www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/definition/en](http://www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/definition/en).

2014). Holtmann (2011) describes this process as “building protective social layers,” which contributes to resilience against both victimization and offending behaviors. It is a multifaceted endeavor calling for extensive planning and strategizing. Successful prevention techniques target the underlying causes of violent behavior: spatial environments, family structures, and education. Referring to South Africa, Holtmann argues, “We can only expect safety when we take collective responsibility for rebuilding our social system to mitigate the ravages of the social engineering of the past” (Holtmann 2011). Such an argument could apply to much of the African continent. The often-cited root causes of crime and violence include rapid urbanization, persistent poverty and inequality, political violence, post-conflict cultures, the more organized nature of crime, and the emergence of illegal drug use and drug trafficking—all of which may require national strategies to combat (World Bank 2003).

Multiple agencies must be involved in crime and violence prevention efforts, which if well-coordinated, could contribute a variety of perspectives, resources, and skills to utilize as efficiently, cost-effectively, and sustainably as possible. Partners for such efforts can be from many different sectors. Efforts would involve national and local levels of government, which have different mandates and areas of expertise; as well as nonstate actors, particularly civil society groups and traditional authorities, to ensure local ownership at every stage—a key aspect of any successful approach. The media, with its powerful positive and negative potential to foster changes in attitudes and to disseminate information, plays an important role in a multiagency approach. Private sector players have an interest in the issue and can participate in prevention efforts, such as with the growing use of public-private partnerships

for the provision of services and by reducing opportunities for crime through situational crime prevention programs and environmental design. Lastly, academia and research institutions can direct and support crime prevention initiatives through valid research and publication of findings.

## Crime and Violence Prevention in Kenya

The Kenyan government often adopts a traditional approach to law enforcement and criminal justice in addressing the country's crime and violence problem. Official and public discourse around crime and violence call for more aggressive policing and stiffer penalties against perpetrators (Reisman and Ruteere 2010). The government has responded to threats of crime and violence by establishing new police units and elite squads with more firepower, such as an antiterrorism police unit to address the terrorism issue, and by enacting laws to enhance the punishment of perpetrators of violent crime, such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012) and the Security Amendment Act (2014). Forceful disarmament operations have been carried out in cattle rustling areas but with little impact, except to harden resistance and strengthen the illegal supply chain of arms (Muhereza, Wairagu, and Kimani 2011). Such approaches fail to consider the underlying causes of crime and violence in society. They also fail to deal with hidden crime and violence, such as household violence—which leads to societal breakdown and hence to an increase in crime. The lack of available quantitative and qualitative data due to limited police capacity, security, and access (Hills 2009) presents a key challenge.

There has been little public debate or policy discourse about the prevention of crime and violence. Community policing has received



some attention in Kenya over the past two decades, but benefits were never felt, partly due to a poor understanding of the concept, a lack of real partnership with communities, and a persistently repressive police culture (Ruteere and Pomerolle 2003). Therefore, Kenya urgently needs to develop alternative thinking and practices to replace repressive policing and must move its focus from securitization toward safety.

## Crime and Violence Prevention Training

In 2011, through its Crime and Violence Prevention Initiative, and in collaboration with United States International University-Africa and Kenya School of Government, the Open Society Institute East Africa sponsored the Crime and Violence Prevention Training (CVPT), convening representatives from government, civil society, and academia to learn about crime prevention in Kenya. The training sought to:

- Promote policy and public discourse on crime and violence prevention and safety in Kenya;
- Explore strategies, tools, and methods of crime and violence prevention in Kenya;
- Facilitate the emergence of a multisector group of public, private, and civil society actors engaged in crime and violence prevention in Kenya; and
- Equip stakeholders of crime and violence prevention with adequate skills to conceptualize, design, implement, and monitor crime and violence prevention programs and interventions at the national and county level.


Subsequent trainings built on the aims and successes of the first, widening the audience and expanding the curriculum. In response to the devolution of many functions to county governments in 2013 (according to Kenya's 2010 constitution), CVPT has been brought to the county level, training county-level actors and entering into dialogue with participants about county-specific challenges. The ongoing training aims to continue the momentum in terms of building the capacity of people and promoting discourse around crime prevention and fostering an integrated approach to the issue.

The training has been a success in multiple ways. First, given the mounting evidence of the effectiveness of prevention strategies, an important next step would be to intensify and expand violence prevention awareness among decision makers (WHO 2010), which is exactly what CVPT does. Second, CVPT workshop sessions enhance the capacity of nonstate and state actors to design, implement, and manage effective sustainable crime and violence reduction programs. Third, while security management has traditionally remained a preserve of the state and its machineries, and a relationship of mistrust, fear, and suspicion has existed between members of civil society and Kenya's law enforcement agencies, CVPT promotes understanding and partnerships between the actors.

## County-Level Crime and Violence Prevention

Under the 2010 constitution's new dispensation, Kenya now has 47 county governments, each with its respective county governor. (see figure 1.1). The 2010 constitution restructured

**Figure 1.1. Kenya's New System of Devolved Government**



Red = new government organs; blue = existing government organs.

existing security institutions, for example, the former Kenya Police Service became the National Police Service, and created new institutions, including the National Intelligence Service and the Kenya Defence Forces. The Provincial Administration, which comprised provincial commissioners and various administrative tiers down to chiefs at the ground level and which had previously coordinated security at the local level was restructured and renamed the National Government Administration Office. County commissioner positions were created to oversee county-level coordination of security their role as chair of their respective county security committee (see figure 1.2).

In addition to the restructuring of security functions, devolution has the potential to influence security in other ways. Abdille and Abdi (2016) note that the devolution of funds for county development has frequently led to political and ethnic competition—and even conflict—at the county level as new majorities and minorities seek to control and benefit from the funding. At the same time, large-scale national and regional infrastructural development projects have raised the stakes for political power and brought the well-recognized dynamics of land conflict and other adverse social and environmental impacts. Development and urbanization bring benefits as well as risks, including new forms of crime and violence.




County governors are responsible for controlling drugs and pornography, firefighting and disaster management, transport, control of public nuisances, trade development and regulation, early childhood education and health, and overall county planning and development. While conventional “security” provisions, such as police and intelligence, remain under the purview of the national government, overseen by county commissioners, the role of the county government is nonetheless vital to managing issues that have a bearing on security, including employment, development, and planning. Governors thus have the opportunity to improve their county’s security over the medium to long term, and possibly even over the short term. One area of potential conflict, however, is that the national police has to enforce county laws (Burbidge 2017), which it may be unwilling to do if the county law is at odds with a national one.

Furthermore, echoing the constitutional requirement for increased participation by communities regarding decisions that affect them, the National Police Service Act of 2011, establishes a County Policing Authority (CPA)

for each county, headed by the respective county governor and comprising 13 representatives of county-, national-, and local-, and community-level security interests, including 6 laypersons. CPAs are responsible for monitoring trends and patterns of crime; developing proposals on the priorities, objectives, and targets for police performance; monitoring progress and achievements; overseeing and promoting community policing initiatives; facilitating public participation; and providing financial oversight over the budget for policing. Regular briefings by the CPA are intended to inform the county security committee, which is responsible for day-to-day security management and police deployment. However, guidelines to operationalize CPAs have not yet been created, which has slowed the implementation of this vital structure for crime and violence prevention.

Some governors have pushed to assume a greater role in policing, arguing that such responsibilities should be devolved. They cite the essential part they play in mitigating intra-ethnic, interethnic, and communal conflicts, as well as the need for security provision to better

**Figure 1.2. County-Level Security Actors**



fit with local development plans. These governors also contend that, despite the hundreds of lives being lost, the national government has left them side-lined with regard to security issues (Mosuku 2015). Opposing views include concerns that localized control of security could allow governors to use security forces to manipulate political events and interethnic tensions to their advantage.

### Framework for Analysis


In analyzing the dynamics that drive crime and violence in Isiolo and that shape local prevention capacity, this work draws on the socioecological framework that has been widely used in crime and violence research and literature (Dahlberg and Krug 2002; Moon, Patton, and Rao 2010; Moore et al. 2014; Cramer and Kapusta 2017) (see figure 1.3). The framework helps to identify risk and protective factors whose complex interplay influences the likelihood of involvement in crime and violence

(Moser and McIlwaine 2006). In so doing, it also suggests avenues for intervention.

Social cohesion, internal ties, and community identity are critical to crime prevention at the community level, and community organizations play a crucial role in promoting them (figure 1.4). This approach draws from social disorganization theory, which identifies particular characteristics of a community that shape opportunities for crime and for prevention (Bursik 1988; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). Dense internal ties, interpersonal trust, and shared expectations allow community members to trigger shared norms through social controls. Norris et al. (2008) notes that communities have used dense internal ties to prevent crime from taking root.

Communities can directly contribute to the prevention of crime and violence in multiple ways. Past assessments conducted in other countries demonstrate that it is common to

Figure 1.3. The Socioecological Framework



Source: Adapted from Dahlberg and Krug 2002.

**Figure 1.4. Community Crime Prevention Actions**



Source: Berg and Carranza 2015.

find several community-based organizations working on different issues relevant to crime and violence prevention with no coordination of efforts and sometimes in competition with one another. While these organizations might be doing good work, they often lack the capacity and resources to sustain their efforts or to expand into new areas. Strengthening and integrating community groups is therefore a crucial strategy.

Criminological research in North America and Europe shows that crime tends to be concentrated in geographic “hot spots” (Groff, Weisburd, and Yang 2010). The “routine theory” examines how patterns of individual behavior lead to the salience of hot spots where perpetrators cluster, such as malls, movie theaters, specific streets, and public spaces (Cohen and Felson 1979). Related to this is situational crime prevention literature, which focuses on the physical environment that affects the cost and benefit of perpetrating crime by facilitating surveillance or deterring criminal acts (Clarke 2008). This theory is currently being applied in Kenya. In Mombasa and Nairobi, the police are making use of closed-circuit television cameras

to combat crime and violence and are implementing an integrated command control and communication system in urban areas. The use of surveillance through what is called Crime Prevention through Environmental Design looks for changes in the physical environment that might reduce the opportunity for crime, such as street lighting (Cozens and Love 2017).

Lastly, the work considers violence in a broad sense, that is, not only manifest physical violence but also structural violence as identified by Galtung (1969), whose work extends violence to include psychological hurt and, in turn, alienation, repression, and deprivation (Galtung 1991). According to Rylko-Bauer and Farmer (2017), who define structural violence simply as “the violence of injustice and inequity” structures include pervasive

“cultural and political-economic structures such as caste, patriarchy, slavery, apartheid, colonialism, and neoliberalism, as well as poverty and discrimination by race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and migrant/refugee status.”

Structural violence not only leads to victimization but also perpetuates and reproduces violence through the marginalization of people and communities (Winter and Leighton 2001). Several studies have applied the concept of structural violence to explain the link between social problems, including crime and violence associated with poverty and social suffering (Dahlberg and Krug 2002; Mukherjee 2007; Peña 2011).

In urban contexts, deprivation as inequality is the most common form of structural violence, resulting in the reactionary violence that is prevalent in Kenya. Such deprivation includes income disparities and lack of access to basic social services; the absence of universal state security protection; the severe corruption, inefficiency, and brutality that generally hits the poor the hardest; and the lack of social cohesion. These living conditions heighten the potential for the emergence of conflict, crime, and violence (Vanderschueren 1996). Rylko-Bauer and Farmer (2017) note that a structural violence framework provides a holistic approach to identifying the root causes of crime and violence by focusing on historical forces as well as social, economic, and political processes that shape risk and local reality, which is critical to developing effective approaches to counter crime and violence.

## Goals of the Rapid Assessment

Since the training moved to the county level, crime and violence assessments have been carried out in preparation for the training. Such assessments assist in the tailoring of the curriculum to the specific challenges of the county, provide common ground for discussion among participants, and help identify participants from whom the training might be a useful investment. Drawing from the theory

on crime and violence prevention, questions addressed by the assessment include:

- What are the main challenges in the county regarding crime and violence?
- What risk factors—drivers and enabling factors—as well as protective factors are visible?
- Who are the players in terms of managing crime and violence, and what are their capacities?
- What kinds of prevention activities and partnerships are already in place?

The rationale for choosing Isiolo County is that it is a specific area of interest to the World Bank, as it is among the counties participating in the Bank's North-Eastern Development Initiative program, which considers conflict sensitivity to be vital in the context of the expected rapid development resulting from Kenya's Vision 2030. It is one of six counties that have been included to date in the county-level Crime and Violence Prevention Training (CVPT), which has sought to maintain a rural-urban balance. The assessment findings have informed the creation of the new Isiolo County Integrated Development Plan for 2018–23 and is a useful reference for participants to use in their work and as a starting point for further data collection.

## Methodology


The rapid assessment relies on desk-based research and five days of fieldwork by the team in each county. It is a rapid assessment consisting of quantitative and qualitative information as well as primary and secondary data, triangulated to enhance reliability. Primary data were collected using questionnaires, interviews, and focus group discussions, using purposive sampling, convenience sampling,

and snowball sampling with all tiers of society, including key security actors, civil society workers, and local community members. The assessment's general approach is to prearrange focus group discussions with chiefs and ward administrators, as well as interviews with key informants, to gain an overall view of the county and to explore specific issues in greater detail. Snowball sampling is then employed to follow important leads. Focus group discussions with community members, including women and youth, ensure that local voices are heard. Secondary data was sourced from civil society and donor reports, academic papers, official records, and reports by national and county governments, including the health and education departments (see list

of references). The assessment assumes that many incidences of crime and violence are never reported to the police due to low police presence; the existence of alternative justice mechanisms; stigma; and lack of access to and mistrust of the police and the judiciary due to past experiences of harassment, corruption, and long delays. Therefore, in addition to police data, other sources of information are needed to gain a fuller picture of crime and violence in the county.

Purposive sampling of informants took place during: (1) 14 scheduled focus group discussions with women; youth; transport operators; elders; members of civil society, peace groups, and interfaith groups; chiefs; and

### Isiolo 1.5. Sectors Represented by Questionnaire Respondents in Isiolo County



Source: Isiolo County Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment.

administrators; and (2) 25 individual in-depth interviews, with some interviewees reached through a snowballing process. Areas visited included all three subcounties of Isiolo County, including four of the five wards in the town of Isiolo, ensuring an accurate representation of the various livelihood zones (pastoral, agro-pastoral, and urban-based) (see table 1.1 and figure 1.5).<sup>3</sup> To triangulate and complement qualitative findings, a questionnaire exploring perceptions of crime and its management was

completed by 114 respondents representing a range of sectors (see figure 1.5) and areas.


Limitations included budgetary constraints, insufficient time to visit every constituency, and insufficient time to conduct a community victimization assessment. Further, there were security concerns in some parts of Isiolo, and the process was somewhat hampered by political campaigns. The problem of illiteracy was overcome by offering to help people complete the assessment verbally. In the given time, the information gained was maximized by the use of key informant interviews and focus groups discussions with respondents

3. About two-thirds of the sample is male because the survey was distributed to multiple officials, most of whom are men. Over 50 percent of respondents had a secondary level of education or higher, which is uncharacteristic of Kenya as a whole, reflecting the particular sectors from which most came.

**Table 1.1. Overview of Fieldwork in Isiolo County**

Type of Fieldwork	Subcounty/Ward		
	Isiolo/Wabera, Ngare Mara, Bulla Pesa, and Burat	Merti/Chari	Garbatulla/Kinna
<b>In-depth interviews with key informants</b>	Deputy governor, county director for education, county health department personnel, county secretary for tourism, director, Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture, other county government officials, county commissioner, other national government administrators, ward administrators, officer manning gender desk, boda boda association chairs, boda boda operators, SCORES, Interfaith Organization members, member of the media, and conservancy staff member	Ward administrator	Ward administrator, <i>mzee wa kijiji</i> (village elder), and Administration Police officer
<b>Focus group discussions or group interviews</b>	14 comprising ward administrators; chiefs; women, youth, and boda boda operators; National Police reservists		
<b>Questionnaires administered</b>	114		
<b>Secondary data obtained at source</b>	Police data, hospital data, data from Isiolo County Planning Office, data from the director of education, and County Integrated Development Plan		

Note: *Boda boda* = motorcycle taxi; SCORES = Sensitization of Communities on Radicalization and Empowerment Solutions.



who were thought to have a broad or specific understanding of the dynamics and impacts of crime and violence. Further, some of the respondents came from outside of the constituency from which they were sampled. The authors were able to gain access to security

and administration personnel by virtue of their governmental connections (KSG and NCRC being governmental agencies).





## 2. Background: Crime and Violence Trends in Kenya

Kenya has experienced an increased incidence of crime and violence in the recent past, greatly affecting its growth and development. The nature and extent of the problem varies according to setting—urban or rural—and the prevailing conditions of a particular area. The Crime and Safety Report identifies road safety and crime as the greatest threats to security in Kenya (OSAC 2017). It further identifies car-jacking, burglaries, and home invasions as the most serious crimes in Kenya. Police data for 2016 reveals that, by far, the highest number of reported crimes are in the assault category, followed by stealing, house break-ins and burglary, other offenses, and offenses against morality (mainly defilement).

The crime mapping survey conducted in 2016 by the National Crime Research Centre identifies the top 10 most commonly mentioned crimes: stealing, possession of illicit alcohol, assault, house break-ins and burglary, murder, rape, robbery, stock theft, defilement, and drunk and disorderly behavior (NCRC 2016). However, because it was not a victimization survey as such, certain crimes, such as gender-based violence and violence against children are probably underreported. Importantly, there is a great variation among counties in the incidence of crimes such as stock theft and associated violence, smuggling, and female genital mutilation (FGM).

High-profile and troubling incidences of crime and violence in Kenya include large-scale terrorist attacks as well as persistent smaller-scale attacks in the country's northern counties; gang killings and other gang crimes; political violence, such as the postelection violence of 2007–08; and police violence against citizens. On a day-to-day basis, however, serious incidents of crime and violence are normalized or repeatedly suffered because the victims are not in a position to report them. Incidents include corruption, gender-based violence, violence against children, and crimes or violence resulting from or flourishing due to a poor police presence and ineffective criminal justice mechanisms. This chapter provides useful contextual information on some of the issues raised by this rapid assessment, which are not limited to the participating subcounties.

## Boda-Boda-Related Crime and Violence

There are an estimated 500,000 motorcycle taxis (*boda bodas*) on Kenyan roads (Omondi 2015). They play a major part in enhancing access to rural areas and unplanned urban settlements where road networks are poor. The boda boda subsector is a key contributor to business development and to the economy (Omondi 2015), and it is a crucial contributor to youth employment in Kenya. However, in addition to such benefits, boda bodas are renowned for their risks, particularly of road traffic accidents and severe injuries (NTSA 2014). Several factors may contribute to this problem, such as careless driving, poor training, lack of protective gear and reflectors; traffic congestion; poor urban and highway planning, including lack of pavements and lights; the use of alcohol; speeding to maximize customer base, and poor condition of

vehicles. In addition, the motorbikes (and parts) are not always genuine.<sup>4</sup> While laws cover age (over 18) licensing, and protective gear (helmet and reflective clothing), enforcement is generally poor and bribery common. Importantly, scholars point out that Africa's road safety record is a function of larger structural inequalities and problems in transport planning and development that fail to protect the most vulnerable (Khayesi and Peden 2005; Lamont 2010). New mega projects in the country threaten to dispossess rural people from their land and increase the number of poor and underage youths attempting to make a living driving a boda boda (Mkutu and Mkutu 2019). The boda boda sector is also an important context for crime, with operators being both victims and perpetrators or accomplices. Operators are also frequently mobilized for political campaigns and can become actors in political violence.

## Alcohol and Drug Abuse

Alcohol consumption has been identified as a public health concern in Kenya (Ndeti et al. 2016). According to a survey conducted by the National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse in 2012, alcohol is the most frequently abused substance in the country and poses the greatest harm to Kenyans (NACADA 2012).

The most common traditional alcoholic brews, such as the *chang'aa* spirit and the milder *busaa* beer, is widespread among poor families due the easy availability of needed ingredients, including maize, sorghum, and sugar (NACADA 2012; Kinoti, Jason, and Harper 2011). Legal instruments include the

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4. Focus group discussion with Maendeleo ya Wanawake, January 8, 2015.

Alcoholic Drinks Control Act 2010, which permits the production and consumption of chang'aa as long as certain rules are adhered to: that the drink is manufactured, packed, sold, and distributed in glass bottles of a capacity of not less than 250 milliliters and is not sold to anyone under the age 18 (Muturi 2014). However, the effectiveness of the law has been questioned (Opiyo and Omanga 2010). The restrictions imposed on the manufacture and consumption of traditional brews, such as chang'aa, may indirectly provide a ready market for second-generation alcohol: alcoholic drinks made by mixing neutral spirit—food grade ethanol, water and, flavoring (Otieno 2015). These drinks, which are simple to produce, inexpensive, and easy to access, are popular among many drinkers with low income levels. However, sometimes these spirits are adulterated with toxic substances, which has led to the deaths of hundreds of people and the permanent loss of vision among many survivors (Kihuria 2014).

Alcohol abuse is well recognized as a cause of crime and violence, including murder, rape, and domestic violence. Media reports have highlighted extreme incidents of women mutilating or even killing their alcohol-abusing husbands. Children are consuming alcohol and engaging in risky sexual behavior and impulsive crimes such as arson.

Closely connected to the problem of alcohol consumption is the issue of drug abuse. Commonly abused drugs in Kenya include tobacco (not illicit), *bhang*, *miraa*, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine ("meth"), and MDMA ("ecstasy") (Kahuthia-Gathu et al. 2013). Bhang is the most easily available illicit drug in Kenya and its recreational use has about a 1.2 percent prevalence, while that of cocaine is 0.1 percent (NACADA 2012). Bhang

is sourced from the *Cannabis Sativa* plant and can either be smoked or consumed as a beverage. Rates of use are high among Kenyan urban youth, who usually smoke it, although new modes of consumption are emerging, including the lacing of confectioneries such as cakes, cookies, and sweets (NACADA 2015).

*Miraa* refers to the leaves and young shoots of the *Catha Edulis* flowering shrub, which is native to East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. It is a mild stimulant with a slight euphoric effect that has been widely used as a recreational drug by the indigenous people of East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Middle East since the 13th century (NDIC 2008). *Muguka* is a slightly stronger variety of the same drug. The Ministry of Health in Kenya recently classified miraa as being dangerous to human health, (contradicting the move by the Kenyan government to petition the United Nations to remove it from the international list of psychoactive drugs, which would allow its export (Gathura 2017). Despite the health and socioeconomic impacts, production, sale, and consumption of these substances remain unregulated in Kenya (Michuki and Kivuva 2013; Carrier 2008). A study focusing on the five counties of Kwale, Isiolo, Marsabit, and Kitui found that current usage of *khat* is 54 percent. Apart from the health issues associated with its use, from a socioeconomic point of view, consumption of khat results in idleness, irresponsibility, crime, wastage of household resources, and addiction (Michuki and Kivuva 2013).

Drugs can have severe community-level repercussions, particularly in low-income urban areas. They are integral to many forms of local-level violence, including gang warfare (controlling the drug market), robbery and assault (when money for drugs is scarce), the murder

of drug addicts by social cleansing groups and constant (often violent) quarrels in the home. Winton (2004) notes,

“At their most extreme, drug groups can dominate the institutional structure of entire communities, with the drug trade creating a structure so embedded in some communities as to become normal ... In addition, the problem of drugs, if unchecked, results in imposing its own system of justice and social norms which are linked to the erosion of institutions and emergency of alternatives.”

Drug factions can become a recognized sociopolitical force at the local level (Dowdney 2003). However, this has less to do with the power of the drug factions and more to do with the absence of state-provided services, providing an opportunity to drug groups to fill the gap (Leeds 1996).

“The existence of drug lords in communities is often made legitimate through a complex but mutually beneficial relationship. The drug lord is given anonymity and freedom to carry out business, and the community in return receives internal security and other services.” (Winton 2004)

Therefore, simply strengthening state institutions may weaken the power of the illicit groups that are fueling the drug problem.

## Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Gender-based violence, mostly against women, is common in Kenya, but it is under-reported and normalized. Importantly, some cultural traditions in Kenya legitimize physical and sexual violence within marriage, although this is becoming less prevalent due with

increased education and economic status (KNBS 2014). The 2014 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KNBS 2014) finds that almost half of women and men (45 and 44 percent, respectively) aged 15 to 49 have experienced some form of physical violence since age 15. Interestingly, while the main perpetrators against women are husbands; men are more likely to suffer at the hands of their parents, teachers, or others. Sexual violence has affected a smaller number of people overall, but women are more vulnerable than men (14.1 versus 5.9 percent). The most likely perpetrator for either men or women is their current or former spouse. Women are more often affected by physical or sexual spousal violence than men (39 percent versus 9 percent respectively, of those currently or previously married).

## Violence against Children

In terms of violence against children, a survey commissioned by the World Health Organization finds that around 31 percent of girls and 18 percent of boys in Kenya have been victims of sexual violence (including unwanted sexual touching, forced sex, and attempted forced sex or sex under pressure). With regard to forced sex, this was claimed by 7.1 percent of girls and 1.4 percent of boys. In most cases, the perpetrator was a boyfriend or girlfriend, sometimes a neighbor, and less often a family member; in one third of cases, the perpetrator was at least 10 years older than the victim (UNICEF and GOK 2012). Although the 2006 Sexual Offences Act created tighter laws against defilement<sup>5</sup> and sexual assault, implementation remains weak.

5. *Defilement* is the legal term for sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 18, subject to punishment of life imprisonment if the child is 11 years old or younger.



There are physical, psychological, and social implications for victims of sexual violence, including potential unintended pregnancies, pregnancy complications, unsafe abortions, gynecological disorders, complex pain syndromes, chronic pelvic pain, HIV, and other infections, (WHO, UNODC, and UNDP 2014: 14–16) anxiety, depression, stigma, and poor performance at school. Importantly, economic, educational, and social barriers impede most women from accessing timely help after experiencing sexual violence. And because it is usually not feasible to collect forensic evidence within 24 hours after an incident, as required, most cases never reach the formal justice system, instead being handled out of court by traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, if at all (FIDA Kenya 2013).

## Radicalization and Recruitment into Violent Extremism

Kenya has experienced horrifying and high-profile terrorist attacks on the public in recent years, and it continues to suffer ongoing incidents against police posts and the public near its border with Somalia. Al-Shabaab has taken responsibility for most such attacks (Nzes 2014). Especially since losing territory in Somalia after the offensive by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012, efforts to recruit and build local support within Kenya through its affiliate Al-Hijra, have been persistent and successful (Anderson and McKnight 2014; Nzes 2014). A 2011 United Nations report roughly estimates that there are 200 to 500 Kenyan fighters, mostly Muslim youth who have joined Al-Shabaab's campaign against AMISOM forces in Somalia or who have taken part in terrorist attacks within Kenya (UN Security Council 2011: 140–44). A later estimate put the figure at around 2,000 Kenyan

fighters—roughly one quarter of Al-Shabaab's 7,000–9,000 forces (Burridge 2014). In 2014, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims estimated that around 700 “returnees” (mostly between the ages of 18 and 45) were living in Kenya, having returned from Somalia where they had trained and fought with Al-Shabaab (SUPKEM, IOM, and GOK 2015).

*Radicalization* can be understood as the propensity to carry out acts of violence in the name of a political cause; *recruitment* can be usefully considered in terms of “enlistment,” whether voluntary or forced to some extent; importantly, one can occur without the other (Borum 2011). Push and pull factors are often used to conceptualize radicalization or recruitment (Hassan 2012). *Push factors* are negative aspects of social surroundings that are likely to propel a vulnerable individual on a path to recruitment and radicalization. *Pull factors* relate to perceived benefits of joining an extremist organization. The United States Agency for International Development also usefully refers to *enabling factors*—contextual elements that allow such activities to take place (USAID 2009).

Mlula, Ruzkiewicz, and Shirley (2015) list commonly identified factors related to a rise in violent extremism in Kenya, including: the spillover of Salafi ideology, fighters, and resources from Al-Shabaab's occupation of Somalia; external actors who have exploited this instability; a burgeoning Muslim youth population; socioeconomic disparities; and lack of political representation.

Western governments often speak of the importance of combatting poverty to undermine radicalization, but this view is controversial; literature from many countries does not appear to support such an approach (Kessels

and Nemr 2016; Piazza 2011), although Kfir (2008) notes that East Africa has not been examined sufficiently. In a study by Botha and Abdile (2014), 27 percent of 88 former Al-Shabaab combatants in Somalia identify “economic reasons” as the primary push factor for their recruitment; 39 percent cite economic reasons as the “catalyst” to their joining. Several other scholars echo the observation that people join because they are offered money or a salary (Amble and Hitchens 2014; Bradbury and Kleinman 2010). Organizations that support terrorism may also provide essential services and assistance (von Hippel 2004; Kfir 2008). Further, inequality—rather than poverty per se—may lead to alienation and frustration, which recruiters can then exploit (Piazza 2011). A large study carried out in Kenya by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2017) finds that economic factors represent a source of frustration for youths, making them vulnerable to narratives that inviting them to channel their grievances into acts of violent extremism.

The influence of low educational levels on recruitment and radicalization is also a controversial topic, partly because some terrorist organizations deliberately favor the educated as prospective recruits (Bueno de Mesquite 2005), although this does not appear to be the case with Al-Shabaab, which represents the majority of Kenyan recruits (SUPKEM, IOM, and GOK 2015).

In addition, the UNDP study identifies a lack of parenting and an unhappy childhood as common threads in the stories of youths who had been radicalized (UNDP 2017). It further examines the role that religion plays, determining that, for the most part, it is used by recruiters to frame other grievances. Recruits, it found,

generally have low levels of understanding of religious texts but still feel that their religion is “under threat.” Mlula, Ruszkiewicz, and Shirley (2015) point to the growing influence of extremist forms of Islam in the country funded through external sources, however non-Muslims are also being recruited (Mkutu, Marani, and Ruteere 2014).

Importantly, 71 percent of respondents in the UNDP study say that government actions “tipped” them into recruitment. Botha (2014) and Van Metre (2016) among others, argue that stigmatization, harassment, and marginalization by the Kenyan state and security forces contribute to recruitment efforts. As a result, efforts to combat terrorism often have the opposite of the intended effect.

Returnees are youths who have returned back to Kenya after training or fighting with Al-Shabaab in Somalia; many live in Kenya’s coastal area. Some are disillusioned by promised pay that never materialized;<sup>6</sup> some returned out of fear or because of the weakness of or conflict within Al-Shabaab;<sup>7</sup> and some returned intending to carry out violent extremist activities in Kenya. The phenomenon of foreign fighters returning home from Syria and other parts of the world has become a major issue (Barrett 2016; De Bie, de Poot, and van der Leun 2015). These returnees, having witnessed extreme violence, have become hardened and have acquired skills in the use of weapons and explosives as well as networks with jihadists (Byman 2015). In addition, the policies of home and host states are crucial to the reintegration of foreign fighters (Malet 2015).

6. Interview with SCORES personnel, Isiolo, May 12, 2017.

7. Interview with county commissioner, Isiolo, May 9, 2017.



## 3. Rapid Assessment of Isiolo County

### County Overview

Isiolo County is located close to the center of Kenya, 285 kilometers north of Nairobi. Its capital, the town of Isiolo, lies along the main highways traveling to Moyale, Ethiopia, as well as to Somalia. The county is not densely populated: an estimated 192,000 people live in approximately 25,605 square kilometers, with over half in rural areas. The main towns include Isiolo (32 percent of the county's population), Merti (5 percent), Kinna (3 percent), and Garbatulla (3 percent). The county is divided into several administrative units, or wards (see table 3.1).

Isiolo County is inhabited by multiple ethnic groups, including the predominant Borana, the Somali, the Meru, the Turkana, and the Samburu (Saferworld 2015). Immigrant communities from other counties constitute a minority population (Isiolo County 2013). Islam and Christianity are practiced in the county, but the inhabitants are largely Muslim.

Isiolo County has a mostly arid climate, with some semiarid areas (Isiolo County 2013). Its economy is poor and the county is economically marginalized (Adano et al. 2012). Pastoral livelihoods predominate; and 80 percent of the land is communally owned and held




**Table 3.1. Subcounties and Wards in Isiolo County**

Subcounty	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Wards
Isiolo	3,269	Wabera Bulla Pesa Burat Ngaremara Oldonyiro
Merti	12,612	Chari Cherab
Garbatulla	9,819	Kinna Garbatulla Sericho
Total	25,700	10

Source: Isiolo County 2013.  
km<sup>2</sup> = square kilometers.

under trust by the county government (Isiolo County 2013). Agropastoralism is practiced in some areas, including Kinna (See map 3.1). Other important economic activities include small-scale business and tourism. Intensive dairy farming, while less common, is slowly gaining traction. The majority of the population relies on livestock farming, but there are no livestock-related industries in the county. Small-scale businesses include trade in farm produce; miraa; and livestock products, such as milk, beef, and skins; as well as *jua kali* work (outdoor casual work) and artisan work.

**Map 3.1. Isiolo County, Showing Subcounties**



Source: World Bank.

There are three game reserves in the county that are tourist attractions: Shaba, Buffalo Springs, and Bisanadi. There are also several hotels, including one five-star establishment, as well as campsites that can accommodate tourists. The potential for mining in the county is huge. Geological surveys indicate that the county has unexploited deposits of minerals, including sapphire, ruby, limestone, biromix, oil, and gas (Isiolo County 2013). The small-scale mining of blue sapphire is currently being undertaken by youths in Duse, Kinna Ward and sand is being harvested in the county in an environmentally unsustainable manner.

## Cross-Cutting Drivers of Crime and Violence

The participants of the rapid assessment identified numerous drivers of crime and violence, including poverty, unemployment, land and boundary disputes, proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), radicalization and violent extremism, cultural practices, illiteracy, conservancies, drug and substance abuse, ill-equipped police, drought (climate change/variability), ethnopolitics, inter- and intra-communal conflicts, devolution, large-scale development projects, the weakening of the family unit, and social media. The Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies found that the Isiolo public views competition over natural resources as the most significant driver of conflict, followed by ethnic hatred and political competition (see figure 3.1).

## Socioeconomic Marginalization and Unemployment


Residents of Northern Kenya, including Isiolo County, feel that the area has been marginalized for a long time, and that this has contributed to economic decline and high

levels of poverty and inequality, which has fueled regional crime and violence (IRIS 2015). Participants of this rapid assessment concurred that political violence and intercommunal violence is related to the social, political, and economic exclusion of certain sectors of the population.

According to the Office of the Controller of Budget, Isiolo County is marginalized and underdeveloped (GOK 2016); the poverty prevalence index is 71.3 percent compared with a national average of 45.9 percent. The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index for Isiolo County is 0.25, compared with the national average is 0.23 (UNDP 2014). According to Kumssa and Kiriti-Ngángá (2016), poverty levels are higher in the county's rural parts due to the lack of markets for livestock and to drought. Further, communal ownership of land makes it difficult to obtain loans for business development due to lack of collateral. The road network is poor, and many areas are seasonally inaccessible. Electricity only reaches about 8 percent of homes. The Human Development Index is 0.45 compared with the national average of 0.52 (UNDP 2014). Inequality is fairly low, as in most northern counties (KNBS and SID 2013). A majority of inhabitants live in places where adequate medical facilities are out of reach; the doctor-patient ratio is 12 to 100,000 (KNBS and Isiolo County 2015). There are two level-four hospitals: Isiolo and Garbatulla. The fertility rate is 4.9 compared with the national average of 3.9 (KNBS 2014); the infant mortality rate is an estimated 43 per 1,000 live births,<sup>8</sup> and the under-five-mortality rate is an estimated at 56 per 1,000 live births. HIV prevalence is 3.8 percent compared with the national average is 5.2 percent (NACC 2016).

8. See <http://www.crakenya.org/county/isiolo/>.

**Figure 3.1. Public Perceptions of Causes of Conflict in Isiolo County**



Source: CHRIPS 2017.

Isiolo County's population has a high proportion of youth: in 2012, 44.4 percent were 14 years old or younger.<sup>9</sup> There are high levels of unemployment in the county. About 70 percent of youth (aged 15 to 35), who constitute almost a half of the county's population, are unemployed (although many are engaged in informal employment). Approximately 80 percent of those who are not formally employed engage in pastoral livelihoods; some operate small, urban-based businesses (Kumssa and Kiriti-Ngángá 2016). Wage earners are mainly employed in the hotel industry or the public sector.

9. Information from the County Planning Office.]


A lack of opportunities has contributed to increased antisocial behavior, such as crime, violence, alcoholism, drugs, and substance abuse, as well as cases of depression and suicide.<sup>10</sup> While the advent in recent years of large-scale development projects may be seen as a potential solution, it has also brought new problems and threats.

### Land

The allocation of land and land tenure security are of vital importance to contemporary African rural communities because of inequalities under the colonial and the postcolonial regimes, population increases, agricultural

10. Information from the County Planning Office.]

**Map 3.2. Isiolo County Showing Isiolo Holding Ground and Movements of People and Arms**



expansion, increasing investor interests, and resettlement schemes (Moyo 2007). Most of the land in Isiolo County is communal—i.e., unregistered land held under trust by the county government. Since land is communally owned, the landless are mainly found in the urban areas of the county, where the poor from outside the county cannot purchase land or have not been allocated plots (Isiolo County 2013). While 10 percent of the land is government land, the remaining 10 percent is privately owned (Moyo 2007). Less than 1 percent of land is titled, which until laws are enacted permitting group titling for community land users, renders communities vulnerable to

displacement if the county or national government decides to make changes to land use and hampers the process of compensation when they are required to leave.

Sharamo (2014) highlights a “scramble for land by elites, investors and communities from both pastoral and agricultural regions of Samburu, Baragoi, Marsabit, Meru, and other parts Kenya to the strategic Isiolo area,” which has resulted in land scarcity in Isiolo County and has fueled conflict. Rates of speculative land grabbing have been particularly high since devolution and the advent of megaprojects, discussed in more detail later in this report.

In the subcounty of Isiolo, Kula Mawe, Bulla Pesa; Todoruba; and Wabera have been affected by disorderly development and irregularities in the allocation of plots to residents through a flawed ballot process. The development of the Isiolo International Airport brought similar problems to Mwangaza, Chechelesi, and Kiwanjani, complicated by a leadership change under devolution from Isiolo's county council to the Isiolo County government. A ballot process was used to compensate the displaced residents (Kibugi, Makthimo, and Mwathane 2016). However, initial estimates of those displaced swelled, and the situation became increasingly complicated. An administrator offered an example:

"The initial 700 were to be relocated to Mwangaza, but the number increased over time to 1,500. As a result, some of the people were relocated to Kiwanjani location (Wabera Ward) but there were only 450 plots and 50 squatters already occupying the area, so approximately 400 in number were to move to Chechelesi, which had 1,900 plots. However, although the ballot was done, no land has yet been given out. Tension resulting from political interference and the change of leadership meant that even the Mwangaza area has not yet been occupied by the allocated people .... It's now more than politics and has turned into a blame game."<sup>11</sup>

Another respondent pointed to the presence of militia groups and employed chiefs who exerted some control over the Mwangaza land. He noted:

"I am a victim from Mwangaza. I had two plots for which I am currently paying. A widow and several others have lost land

because of speculation and development. The county government took advantage of the situation."<sup>12</sup>

Chiefs and ward administrators argued that land conflicts are not really about the airport, but rather the state's failure to perform its duty. This is related to devolution, which duplicated county and national government roles. The chiefs and ward administrators believed that the state is exacerbating the problem by dividing affected people along ethnic lines with the airport expansion, which could lead to ethnic conflicts. They further claimed that the county government grabbed and consolidated 10 to 20 plots that were balloted, and later prepared a new fake map to facilitate the sale or gift of the plots to cronies, especially in the Chechelesi area. Those who had balloted and paid Kshs 6,000 (approximately US\$60) were left with nothing. A cleric warned of the potential for displaced pastoralists to react, emphasizing that "People are no longer using *rungus* (sticks) to fight, but arms."

Another area rife with land conflicts is the Isiolo Holding Ground, a 124,000-acre area of government-owned land next to the town of Isiolo created during the colonial era for the purposes of quarantining and vaccinating animals. Since the 1980s, the holding ground has been used as a grazing area managed by a holding ground users association, where people can graze their livestock for a fee; however, poor management has led to much conflict. Activities taking place on the land include several boreholes and the construction of an abattoir. However, there are many players and significant competition over the land. To illustrate, part of the area known as Kipsing has been taken over by elites; other parts have been taken over by the military for training grounds; squatters have established farms

11. Interview, former Isiolo county councillor, Wabera, Isiolo Town, May 10, 2017.

12. Interview, county government official, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

and a local conservancy known as Nasuul; and armed herders graze their animals in the area.<sup>13</sup>

## Megaprojects

Respondents identified large-scale development projects, or *megaprojects*, planned under Vision 2030 and currently under implementation, as sources of concern. Projects include the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor project (a road, rail, and oil pipeline link across Kenya's northern counties), Isiolo Resort City, an oil refinery, the Isiolo International Airport, a dam project to serve the resort city, and a new abattoir. Such projects typically address historical marginalization and portend development and prosperity for the region, but they also threaten to increase inequality and insecurity. The chair of the Interfaith Network argued that the alleged benefits of the megaprojects have been exaggerated; that the cost is very high, and that neither local participation nor social and environmental impact assessments were adequately done. The general consensus among the participants was that most people lack vital information about the projects. Interestingly, however, the then deputy governor of Isiolo County believed that the focus of the national government has been the Standard Gauge Railway rather than the oft-mentioned development projects, such as the resort city and the airport), which were the priorities of a previous government. He asserted that the resort city project had almost been forgotten.

While on the surface, conflicts and violence in the county appear to be the usual competition over grazing land among pastoral communities, dominant political and economic interests emanating from devolution are often involved.

The deputy governor acknowledged that the projects raised a lot of issues, including boundary disputes with neighboring counties, especially Meru County, and land speculation by elites who have already acquired title deeds. He revealed that companies were investing in candidates who were vying for political offices in the county government so that they could influence politics and in turn, investment within the region.<sup>14</sup> He gave an example of a candidate running for office who used on average Kshs 10 million per day (approximately US\$100,000), for campaigns. A civil society consultant concurred that the land on which the resort city was to be built had been grabbed and titles issued.<sup>15</sup>

A top county official described the impact of the already opened Isiolo–Ethiopia highway, which opened up the region and brought in new investment. However, wealthy elites rushed to acquire plots, edging out members of the local community. The official alluded to the political dimension of the megaprojects, cryptically stating that “three of the [members of the county assembly] in Isiolo are from other counties, including an MP, What do you expect?” He added that outsiders were uniting to protect their interests and to take over political power in the county.<sup>16</sup>

In early 2013, The National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation announced plans to construct a megadam complex on Ewaso Ng'iro River in Isiolo County. These twin dams, which will be set up at Crocodile Jaw and Ngerendare, are principally meant to provide water to the proposed resort city at Kipsing Gap. Members of the county assembly in Isiolo opposed the project,

13. Interview with the director of the Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

14. Interview with the former deputy governor, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

15. Interview with the chairman of minorities of Interfaith Organization, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

16. Interview (name withheld), May 2018.

fearing it would spell doom for the pastoralists residing downstream who depend on the river and the periodic flooding that allows vegetation to thrive.<sup>17</sup> One respondent stated that if the river is intercepted, the residents will perish and that it would likely result in “World War III.” Clear information is lacking, and several rumors are in circulation. While residents of Laikipia, Isiolo, and Samburu counties have been assured that the dam would not deplete the river (Jebet 2016), local leaders and civil society organizations have insisted that it would. Residents have protested the lack of consultation.

An abattoir with the capacity to slaughter 400 cattle and 1,000 goats per day is being constructed in the subcounty of Isiolo North. County planning is critical to ensure a constant supply of livestock to the abattoir to avoid a situation where the abattoir becomes a risk factor of armed cattle rustling for profit.<sup>18</sup>

A local administrative assistant to a chief likened the megaprojects to a “bad tsunami.” He raised concerns about the resort city, which would border the wards of Ngare Mara, Burat, and Oldo Nyiro and which would, in turn, be affected by major in-migration, outnumbering the estimated local resident population of 150,000. Compensation, he feared, would be difficult due to the delay in group titling (under the 2016 Community Land Act). The health department raised concerns about the population increase, which would strain health services and increase the cost of living.<sup>19</sup>

The founder of one local community-based organization, the Pastoralist Empowerment Network, noted concern over the lack of qualified personnel within the county to work

on the megaprojects, which is likely to result in the influx of outsiders and the political and economic marginalization of indigenous communities.

## Conservation

Conservancies are a relatively new development in Kenya, emerging as a presence over the past 20 years. The Wildlife Conservation and Management Act of 2013 defines a conservancy as “land set aside by individual landowner, body corporate, group of owners or a community for purposes of wildlife conservation.” The Northern Rangelands Trust, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that is spearheading the formation of many community-owned conservancies, defines a *community conservancy* as a

“community-owned and community-run institution, which aims to improve biodiversity conservation, land management and the livelihoods of its constituents over a defined area of land traditionally owned, or used, by that constituent community.”<sup>20</sup>

The Northern Rangelands Trust, whose main headquarters is in Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, was set up in 2004 by a coalition of local leaders, politicians, and conservation interests. It supports five community conservancies in Isiolo County, including Biliqo-Bulesa, Mpus-Kutuk/Kipsing, Leparua, Nasuulu, and Nakuprat Gotu.<sup>21</sup>

Ward administrators in Isiolo County noted that conservancies had brought some benefits to the region, including income from tourism, a livestock market, livelihood projects, bursaries for schools, construction of boreholes,

17. Interview (name withheld), May 2018.

18. Interview with the director of the Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

19. Interview with county health department personnel, May 9, 2017.

20. See <https://www.nrt-kenya.org/>

21. Interview with the county secretary for tourism, Isiolo Town, May 10, 2017.



construction of classrooms, and other corporate social responsibility projects. Three classrooms were built in Ngoto and a dormitory was built for Ngare Mara Girls High School. The community conservancies also play an important role in conflict resolution and peace building. One conservancy staff member noted that the model assists communities in managing water and pasture resources. Another advantage is that it allowed the members to sell their animals; 1 percent of the proceeds go to the conservancies to be used for bursaries.<sup>22</sup> Funds are managed by a management board within each conservancy.

One county official remarked on the difficulty in determining the benefits derived from the conservancies due to the lack of investments in them. He described the conservancies as free rangeland with a lot of wildlife but no facilities. He claimed that the absence of investments in and revenue from the conservancies has led to the perception that the area is insecure, and argued for the development of infrastructure as well as small and micro businesses.<sup>23</sup>

Some see conservancies as massive “land grabs” of pastoralist communities by well-heeled people, mostly foreigners with local connections; and they think that the conservancies prioritize wildlife over humans and livestock (Mkutu and Boru 2019). Saferworld (2015) research also reveals mixed reactions, with some communities supporting the establishment of the conservancies, and others believing that the conservancies were created to deny community access to grazing areas. The study attributes the latter with a lack of information-sharing between those who are establishing conservancies and the

surrounding communities. Another major problem cited by the study is human-wildlife conflict in areas where a conservancy borders a human settlement. The security dynamics around conservancies and wildlife areas are discussed in more detail in the Security Interventions section on [page \[XX .\]](#).

## Pastoral Conflict

Pastoral conflicts in Isiolo County are associated with and fueled by animosities among the Borana, Gabra, Samburu, Rendille, and Somali communities in Isiolo and Meru counties over water, grazing rights, and boundaries (Limiri 2014). Conflicts also arise between pastoralists and farmers along River Isiolo when pastoralists allow their livestock to graze on the farms.<sup>24</sup> According to Sharamo (2014), the following factors are at play in Kenya:

“The proliferation of deadly SALWs; climate change; competition over shrinking grazing lands and water resources as a result of increased human settlements and emergence of zoned wildlife parks/conservancies; and politicization of communal relations. Additionally, due to weakened traditional governance systems, breakdown of inter-communal social contracts, elders’ loss of control over the youths, the persistence of moran (warrior) culture, and politicization of peace-making processes, pastoral conflicts have become quite intractable. Porous borders coupled with insurgency and counter-insurgency forces supported by neighboring states add a regional security dimension to Kenya’s conflict situation.”

Details of pastoral conflicts are described in the section on dynamics of crime and violence. The Borana have a very prominent traditional

22. Interview with staff member of a conservancy, May 10, 2017.

23. Interview with the county secretary for tourism, Isiolo Town, May 10, 2017.

24. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017

system of governance, the *Gada* system of power succession, which also extends to rangeland management. The system relies on rules to limit exploitation of natural resources, such as water sources, pastureland, and forests, to preserve them for the benefit of all. Sometimes consultation and negotiation between the Borana and other ethnic groups over land access is possible but at other times, conflicts can erupt.

### Ethnopolitical Conflict

Conflicts in the region have been politicized since the advent of multiparty politics in Kenya. However, devolution has enhanced the benefits derived from political office, increasing inter- and intraclan competition (IRIS 2015). Some have argued that if the “underlying structural drivers of fragmentation such as poverty and exclusionary politics are not addressed adequately at all levels of governance, devolution risks reproducing exclusionary cultures at the county level” (Rohwerder 2015; Sharamo 2014)

There are five main ethnic groups represented in Isiolo County: the majority Borana, the Somali, the Samburu, the Turkana, and the Meru. Menkhaus (2005) describes the communal clashes in Isiolo County (previously called Isiolo District) in the 1980s that rendered the county one of the most unstable areas of Northern Kenya, as a fault line area where several major ethnic groups share uneasy and shifting boundaries, where both urban space and rangeland is contested, and where competition over seats in parliament and locations is acute. Analysts differ over whether land disputes or political competition represent the most significant driver of conflict in Isiolo. Menkhaus asserts that because ethnic claims on land and ethnic control of political representation at the constituency and location

levels are so closely intertwined, the argument is somewhat artificial.

Cox (2015) describes the recent history of ethnic conflict in Isiolo from 1996 onward. There have been two major bouts of ethnopolitical conflict, the first from 1996 to 2002, and the second from 2009 to 2012. In 1996, the Borana raided the Degodia (Somali) in Eastern Isiolo; the ensuing interethnic group clashes led to 1,200 fatalities (CEWARN 2004, quoted in Cox 2015). Although it appeared to be a traditional interpastoral conflict characterized by raiding and resource-based conflict, this was said to “cloak” the reality of political competition, with weapons supplied to the Borana, who were allied to the ruling KANU party, by the political elite to be used against the Degodia, who supported the opposition. In 2009, following a near defeat in the elections, the Borana became fearful of losing their dominant position in the county. Uniting their clans and forming an alliance with the Somali, their former political enemies, they battled against a Samburu–Turkana alliance that sought to ethnically cleanse Isiolo North Constituency. Again, the conflict was characterized by typical interpastoral raids as well as attacks on settlements and enemy militias (Cox 2015).

Indigenous communities continue to fear that political seats, which were previously in their domain, may be taken over by Kenyans from other counties.<sup>25</sup> There is currently an interethnic and intercounty alliance against the Meru among the Borana, the Somali, the Turkana, and the Samburu.<sup>26</sup> However, some of the conflicts are intraethnic; during the Jubilee Party nominations for the 2017 election, the Borana

25. Interview with the chairman of Interfaith Organization, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

26. Interview with the chairman of Interfaith Organization, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

were divided into two camps.<sup>27</sup> The rift was heightened by the spreading of hate speech on social media, particularly WhatsApp, where each Borana clan had a separate group.<sup>28</sup> Land scarcity fuels pastoral and ethno-political conflicts in the area, and tensions are emerging in areas within the county that are earmarked for megaproject development, with a growing migration of elites, investors, and communities from both the pastoral and agricultural regions of Samburu, Baragoi, Marsabit, Meru, and other parts of Kenya (Sharamo 2014).

## Border Conflict

Boundary disputes have been a problem since the colonial era, when arbitrary boundary demarcations were made. The Isiolo–Meru boundary dispute, for example, originated from the ruling of the 1961 Royal Boundary Commission. Devolution has aggravated the situation, which has intensified the competition for resources and power.<sup>29</sup> Development projects have also exacerbated boundary disputes between Isiolo County and neighboring counties, especially Meru County.<sup>30</sup> Some of the projects that have been linked to boundary disputes, including the LAPSSET Corridor, the Isiolo International Airport, the oil refinery, and the resort city (Saferworld 2015). Ngige and Abdi (2015) comment that the pattern of attacks along the Isiolo–Meru border hints at a well-coordinated plan by powerful individuals to cause tension and displacement along the proposed LAPSSET corridor, and to benefit from the latter. Disputed areas include Gambella; parts of Ngare Mara, such as Attan, Kiwanja, Lewangila, and Chumvi Yare;

Ramadhan; Shaba Hills; Gotu; and Magado. On the Meru side, the conflict is largely in Ndumuru, Gachiuru, Leeta, Njarune, Bulu, and Kiutinne (Ngige and Abdi 2015). The airport is also the subject of a boundary dispute between Isiolo and Meru counties, as it is situated in both counties, prompting electoral and administrative disputes.<sup>31</sup>

The 2013 Nanyuki Accord, which was attended by elected leaders and community leaders of Isiolo and Meru counties, sought to calm tensions arising from the historical boundary demarcations. The accord emphasized the importance of interdependence and the need for communities in the two counties to peacefully and harmoniously coexist.<sup>32</sup> It was agreed that the dispute would be resolved through institutions whose mandate included boundary dispute identification and resolution; that activities taking place would be stopped until resolution had taken place; that the decisions of such institutions would be respected; and that there would be ongoing consultation between elders to promote peace and engage their respective administrators.<sup>33</sup> Conflict, however, persists.

## Education

Isiolo County's literacy rate is low, only 32 percent compared with the national average 66.4 percent;<sup>34</sup> and 51 percent of the population has not completed primary school (GOK 2014). The gender bias is strong: about half of the men are illiterate compared with two-thirds of women (UNDP/GOK 2009). Pastoralist livelihoods interfere with education,

27. Interview with the county commissioner, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

28. Interview with member of the media, May 11, 2017.

29. Interview with a former county commissioner, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

30. Interview with a former county commissioner, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

31. Interview with former County Commissioner, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

32. Interview with former County Commissioner, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

33. Resolutions of the Meru/Isiolo leaders meeting held at Sportsman Arms Hotel, Nanyuki, December 20, 2013.

34. Isiolo County Education Annual Status Report (2015), provided by county official.

which can be practically pursued only during the wet season, when families are relatively settled (Lekapana 2013; Nassef, Anderson, and Hesse 2009). During the county's dry season, conflicts among pastoral communities as well as farming communities tend to escalate, occasionally resulting in the closure of some schools.<sup>35</sup> Girls are especially affected during the dry season—they are withdrawn from school to support their mothers' search for food or to care for their siblings while their parents search for food; sometimes, a girl is married off at an early age to allow her family to recover livestock and gain access to food (Lekapana 2013). According to the Isiolo County Education Annual Status Report, factors impacting low retention and transition rates include repetition of classes—especially at the primary level, poverty, prolonged drought, tribal conflicts, and inconsistent feeding programs.<sup>36</sup> One disincentive is the lack of employment opportunities upon the completion of studies.<sup>37</sup> The elite do not send their children to the county schools, instead opting for other counties where education quality is considered better, while at the same time using children from poor families to herd their livestock.<sup>38</sup> One civil society respondent further noted that most political leaders are comfortable with the status quo and perceive educated people as a threat.<sup>39</sup>

Most communities in Isiolo County practice female genital mutilation (FGM) and early marriage of girls, which leads many to see no reason for further educating girls. The county director of education pointed out that at the beginning of primary school, male and female

enrollment rates are virtually the same, but as the cohort approaches ages 10–15, the number of enrolled girls declines, a situation compounded by early pregnancies resulting from marriage or sexual relations between students.<sup>40</sup> The Kenyan government has adopted several measures to improve the enrollment and retention rates of girls in schools, including: (1) criminalizing FGM and early marriage; (2) introducing free primary education; (3) assisting girls in returning to school after delivering a baby; and (4) conducting sensitization campaigns led by chiefs, aimed at increasing awareness around the importance of education. The county director claimed that these measures have been successful.

Even among boys in Isiolo County, few go beyond the primary school level. Suggested reasons include coming from a pastoralist family, as described; radicalization; and government policies that tend to focus more on girls (see tables 3.2 and 3.3).<sup>41</sup>

According to the county director for education, enrollment rates dropped drastically in schools where radicalization was alleged to have taken place or was taking place. Isiolo Boys and Girls High Schools, Garba Tulla High School, Bulawaso (a private high school), and Alfarawa Primary School were especially affected, with an estimated 30 boys being radicalized (DEIC 2015). Enrollment in Isiolo Boys High School declined by half.<sup>42</sup>

There is only one technical institute in Isiolo County, which is still under construction and has yet to admit its first class of students and one youth polytechnic school, which is fully

35. Interview with the county director for education, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

36. Isiolo County Education Annual Status Report (2015), provided by county official]

37. Interview with county director for education, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

38. Interview (name withheld), May 2017.

39. Interview (name withheld), May 2017.

40. Interview with the county director for education, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

41. Interview with the county director for education, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

42. Interview with the organizing secretary of Interfaith Organization, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

**Table 3.2. Enrollment by Gender in 2015**

	Early Childhood Development Education (pre-school)			Primary			Secondary		
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total
Public	6,115	6,020	12,135	14,277	13,908	28,185	2,293	1,370	3,663
Private	2,806	2,542	5,348	3,938	3,840	7,778	374	437	811

Source: DEIC 2015.

**Table 3.3. Transition and Completion Rates by Gender in 2015**

Transition Rates (percent)						Completion Rates (percent)								
Early Childhood Development Education to Primary			Primary to Secondary			Secondary to Higher			Primary			Secondary		
Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total
64.2	61.6	63.4	56.2	61.2	58.7	91.2	87.6	89.4	62.5	76.0	69.3	80.5	83.8	82.1

Source: DEIC 2015.

operational; a teacher training college has yet to be established (DEIC 2015). The county also has one secretarial college.<sup>43</sup>

Most youth in the county are unemployed.<sup>44</sup> The lack of employment among this population is linked to the lack of education (Kumssa and Kiriti-Ngángá 2016). While the megaprojects being developed in the county will likely to create numerous employment opportunities, the inhabitants of the county, especially the youth, are unlikely to benefit because they do not have the requisite skills. The low aspirations among the county's youth is noteworthy. During a focus group discussion in Kinna, many youths expressed excitement at the prospect of getting a job with a megaproject, but when asked about the type of job they wanted, they mentioned security guard, driver,

and janitor,<sup>45</sup> attributing their choices to their lack or low level of education. Most youths participating in the focus group discussion had a secondary level education. There are concerns that the county will have to import labor from outside, especially for the megaprojects, which could become a source of conflict, as is the case in Turkana County, as reflected in the SALW problem.<sup>46</sup>

Several factors have contributed to the region's educational marginalization. Ruto, Ongwenyi, and Mugo (2009) have identified some of them. First is sociocultural alienation of those receiving formal education when the society is predominantly Muslim and formal education is associated with Christianity. Second, as already noted, is the adherence to retrogressive cultural practices such as FGM and early marriage. Third is the issue

43. Interview with secretary of Interfaith Organization, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

44. Interview with secretary of Interfaith Organization, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

45. Focus group discussion with youth group, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

46. Interview with secretary of Interfaith Organization, May 8, 2017.

of socioeconomic returns, with high levels of unemployment casting doubt on the economic viability of education. Fourth is the language barrier, with the official languages of instruction in English and Kiswahili. Fifth is political isolation caused by neglect on the part of the national government, although attempts have been made to address the issue through the adoption of education policies and affirmative action in favor of the region, including the funding of low-cost boarding schools; a school-based food program; reserving places for children from the region in national secondary schools; and drafting a nomadic education policy, which seeks to adjust school systems to the realities of pastoral migration patterns (Ruto, Ongwenyi, and Mugo 2009).

### Cultural Practices

Harmful cultural practices tend to promote crime and violence. Some practices violate the human rights enshrined in international, regional, and local legal instruments, including the Kenyan constitution. Harmful practices such as early (child) or forced marriages, FGM, dowry-related crimes, taboos, and the preference for male children predominantly impact women and girls. Such practices are believed to ensure the political and economic subordination of women (Grabman and Eckman n.d.), although it should be noted that men and boys also experience specific disadvantages due to the cultural expectation that they assist with herding, which limits their access to education, and that they should engage in cattle rustling/raiding. According to Schilling, Opiyo, and Scheffran (2012), most of the people engaged in cattle raiding are males under the age of 30.

## Dynamics of Crime and Violence


The following section presents the available quantitative data, which provide an overview of crime and violence trends in Isiolo County. Detailed information is offered on some of the specific forms of crime and violence that assessment participants saw as important, their dynamics, and specific contributory factors as revealed by the qualitative component of the research and supplemented by secondary data.

### Overview of Crime and Violence

Figure 3.2 summarizes quantitative data on the perceived frequency of various types of crime and violence in Isiolo. Interestingly, a large number of respondents were of the opinion that most of the crimes they were asked about did not occur in Isiolo. For example, 43.9 percent believed that sexual violence never occurred, and 57 percent believed that neither smuggling nor poaching occurred, despite evidence to the contrary from other sources. In terms of sexual violence, the rate may reflect varying ideas of what constitutes violence; in terms of smuggling, it may reflect a lack of awareness. A majority of respondents identified petty theft, violent robbery, road traffic accidents, the use and sale of home brews, the use and sale of drugs, early marriage, FGM, and violent conflict—including over land disputes—as prevalent and frequent.

Participants identified violent hotspots in Isiolo County, including Bulla Pesa, Ngare Mara, Ngabela, Garba Banale, Kom, Garba Tulla, Kom, Kipsing, Mkogodo, and the county outskirts. Some hotspots, such as Kom, are convergence points for pastoralists during the dry season.

Figure 3.2. Perceptions about Frequency of Crime



Source: Isiolo County Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment.




Police data were available for 2014–16 (see table 3.4). Notably high incidence rates are recorded for defilement, stealing, and assault, with the most prevalent offenses being petty. Assaults are likely to include both gender-based violence and serious injuries sustained in cattle raids that required the involvement of the hospital. Police reports sometimes seem to indicate that certain crimes do not occur, such as prostitution, FGM, early marriage, kidnapping (disappearance), poaching, radicalization/violent extremism, and smuggling. Possible explanations for this anomaly include the fact that crimes can be classified differently than would be expected, or classified as other penal code offenses. In addition, most crimes are simply

not reported due to low police presence, fear or mistrust of the police, use of alternative mechanisms for justice, and societal normalization of some crimes and forms of violence. Finally, crimes such as violent extremism/radicalization are not included in the Kenyan penal code, but are instead governed by the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012 and the Security Amendment Laws of 2014, and data on these, held by the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, are difficult to access.

Police data on homicides may be incomplete. Participants in the rapid assessment stated that quite a number of people were killed during cattle raids, which may not be reported due to lack of police presence and

**Figure 3.3. Commonly Mentioned Crimes in Isiolo County, 2016**



Source: NCRC 2016.

unwillingness to report. A number of youths in Kinna claimed that some youths had committed suicide in the area.<sup>47</sup> The lack of reporting is likely associated with a desire to avoid police involvement when nothing can be done. Similarly, the official infanticide rate is zero, even though infanticide does occur on occasion. Most cattle rustling, a prevalent practice, is likely unreported, and incidents that are reported might be recorded under “stock theft” rather than a dedicated category.

A 2016 survey of about 100 people per county by the National Crime Research Centre includes a list of common crimes that participants claim occur in their respective localities. In Isiolo, the most commonly mentioned crime is stock theft, followed by stealing, possession of illegal brew, assault, and robbery with violence. Possession of weapons, prostitution, and FGM were also mentioned more than in many other counties (see figure 3.3).

47. Focus group discussion with youths, Kinna, May 9, 2017.

**Table 3.4. Crimes in Isiolo County 2015 and 2016 (Police Records)**

Offense	Category of Offense	2014	2015	2016
<b>Homicides</b>	Murder	8	8	5
	Manslaughter			
	Infanticide			
	Procuring abortion			
	Concealing birth			
	Suicide			
	Attempted suicide			
	Causing death by dangerous driving			
	Subtotal	8	8	5
<b>Offenses against morality</b>	Rape	5	2	4
	Defilement	45	18	30
	Incest	0	0	0
	Unnatural offenses (sodomy)	2	0	1
	Bestiality	0	0	0
	Indecent assault	5	1	1
	Sexual harassment			
	Abduction			
	Bigamy			
	Gang rape			
	Subtotal			
<b>Other offenses against persons</b>	Assault	85	61	93
	Creating disturbance	0	29	34
	Affray	0	0	1
	Grievous harm	0	1	2
	Subtotal	85	90	110

(continued)

Table 3.4. Continued

Offense	Category of Offense	2014	2015	2016
Robberies	Robbery	20	1	9
	Robbery with violence	0	12	18
	Carjacking	0	0	2
	Robbery from motor vehicle	0	0	0
	Cattle rustling	0	0	0
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>21</b>
Breakings	Housebreaking	0	26	13
	Burglary	41	11	21
	Other breaking	0	0	21
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>55</b>
Theft of stock	Theft of stock	40	20	4
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>4</b>
Stealing	Handling stolen property	5	2	0
	Stealing from person	0	0	2
	Stealing by tenant or lodger	0	0	0
	Stealing from a building	0	0	3
	General stealing	82	33	46
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>48</b>
Theft by servant	Stealing by directors	0	0	0
	Stealing by agents	0	5	2
	Stealing by employee or servant	6	5	10
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>
Vehicle and other theft	Theft of motor vehicle	1	0	0
	Theft from locked motor vehicle	3	0	3
	Theft of motor vehicle parts	2	0	0
	Theft of motorcycle	0	2	6
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>
Dangerous drugs	Possession	17	10	9
	Handling	0	0	0
	Trafficking	0	0	0
	Cultivating	0	0	0
	Usage	0	0	0
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>
Traffic offenses	Taking vehicle without lawful authority			
	Driving under influence of alcohol or drugs			
	<b>Subtotal</b>			

(continued)

Table 3.4. Continued

Offense	Category of Offense	2014	2015	2016
Criminal damage	Malicious damage	10	10	25
	Arson	15	10	2
	Negligent act	0	0	0
	Other criminal damage	0	0	0
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>27</b>
Economic crimes	Obtaining by false pretense	0	11	8
	Currency forgery	0	2	0
	False accounting	0	0	0
	Conspiracy to defraud			
	Issuing bad check			
	Other fraud or forgery offense	0	0	1
	<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>
Corruption	Soliciting for bribe		2	
	Accepting bribe		0	
	Accepting free gifts		0	
	Demanding by false pretense		0	
	Other corruption offense		2	
	<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>4</b>	
Offenses involving police officers	Soliciting bribe		2	6
	Accepting bribe		0	0
	Accepting free gifts		0	0
	Demanding by false pretense		0	0
	Other criminal offense		1	3
	<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>
Offenses involving tourists	Bag snatching			
	Other offense against tourist			
	Other offense			
	<b>Subtotal</b>			
Offenses against children	Child stealing			
	Child trafficking			
	Cruelty to child			
	Other offense against child			
	<b>Subtotal</b>			
Petty offenses	Liquor Licensing Act	14	43	1
	Traditional Liquor Act	0	0	0
	Chang'aa Prohibition Act	76	97	42
	Other acts	1,007	1,120	520
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1,097</b>	<b>1,260</b>	<b>563</b>
Other	Other penal code offenses	73	19	56
<b>Grand total</b>		<b>1,562</b>	<b>1,556</b>	<b>973</b>

Source: Isiolo County police records.

## Stealing

As could be expected, stealing is among the most common of crimes. Women in Ngare Mara gave an important perspective on this, explaining that while they knew that stealing was wrong and a crime (*akoko*), circumstances forced them to resort to stealing. Poverty and a lack of food made it necessary to steal to provide for their families. They insisted that their consciences bothered them whenever they had to steal something, and they asked God to forgive them.<sup>48</sup>

## Pastoral Conflicts

Traditionally, cattle rustling involved small-scale manageable violence and theft of the best livestock or replacement of animals lost during periods of drought or disease. The practice is prevalent among the county's pastoral communities and is normal practice in the rainy season.<sup>49</sup> In recent years, due to the proliferation of modern small arms, the commercialization of the activity, disputes over land tenure rights, banditry, predation, and the collusion of and financing by politicians, the cultural practice has become widespread, sophisticated, increasingly violent, which is destructive to the pastoral communities of northern Kenya (Schilling, Opiyo, and Scheffran 2012; Osamba 2000). The county commissioner noted that most communities are involved as both aggressors and victims, but that the Turkana and Samburu are particularly notorious: "the Samburu are the ATM and the Turkana are the PIN."

The Samburu cultural practice of a young man assuming the role of *moran* (warrior) is relevant. Following initiation rites, young men spend 10 years in the bush fending for

themselves before becoming junior elders. The Borana and Somali do not share this cultural practice or "military" organization and, therefore, during the ethnopolitical conflicts of 2009–12, they were vulnerable to Samburu attacks (CRECO 2012). In this sense, the Turkana do have a similar culture to the Samburu, with an age-set system playing a security role.<sup>50</sup>

There is also a long-running conflict between the Samburu and Turkana, mostly involving cattle raids/rustling; these became more severe in December 2016, with the most recent attack occurring in February of 2017.<sup>51</sup> The Turkana and Samburu do intermarry, but this does not foster cohesion between the communities as dowries paid in livestock by cultural demand are often reclaimed through cattle raids.<sup>52</sup> Women play a crucial role in encouraging raid violence. The return of young warriors from a raid with hundreds of cattle earns praise from young women and from elders, who see them as defending the community. Women have confirmed this finding, describing how the mother of a young man who stays at home rather than participating in a raid may complain that she does not have a son at all (Daballen 2014).

### Kom (Chari Ward, Merti Subcounty)

Kom is traditionally used by Borana, Samburu, Rendile, and Somali pastoralists as a dry season reserve grazing area.<sup>53</sup> During severe droughts, the area also hosts the Turkana from Isiolo and Somali (Degodia and Aajuran) pastoralists from Garissa and Wajir counties. Intense resource competition leads to conflict. The area can become a "no go zone,"

48. Focus group discussion with women, Ngare Mara, May 10, 2017.

49. Interview with assistant chief, Duse, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

50. Interview with secretary to the chief, Ngare Mara, May 10, 2017.

51. Focus group discussion with women, Ngare Mara, May 10, 2017.

52. Focus group discussion with women, Ngare Mara, May 10, 2017.

53. Focus group discussion with ward administrators, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.



with conflict sometimes evolving to include cattle rustling and revenge attacks.<sup>54</sup> The sophisticated weaponry used by some of the combatants during conflicts raises concerns that some might be national police reservist or government soldiers. It was also alleged that senior civil servants and government officers were involved because they owned some of the livestock brought to Kom.<sup>55</sup> Similarly, some felt that the conflict in Kom was weighted in favor of the Samburu, who were supported by politicians and conservancies and whose weapons are more sophisticated.<sup>56</sup> Several heads of cattle have died because pastoralists are afraid to venture into Kom during the dry season.<sup>57</sup>

#### **Kinna Ward, Garbatulla Subcounty**

There are several conflicts in Garbatulla between the Somali and the Borana.<sup>58</sup> Kinna Ward, which is predominantly inhabited by the Borana, borders Meru County, Garissa County, and the Meru National Park. The main livelihood of the area's inhabitants is pastoralism, though some irrigation farming and subsistence farming also take place. Conflicts occur between the Borana and the Somali from Garissa County and between the Borana and the Meru from Meru County after rains.<sup>59</sup> Kinna operates the Gada governance system of rangeland management, but non-Borana groups do not always respected it.<sup>60</sup>

Kula Mawe location has been greatly affected by militia attacks, cattle raids, and arms trafficking; there are Borana and Somalia militias

said to be funded by the Isiolo leaders, and cattle can "disappear into thin air."<sup>61</sup> It is suspected that stolen livestock is transported in trucks out of the area to other towns, including Nairobi. There are also persistent grazing conflicts in Duse, a water catchment area used during the dry season. The major conflict is with the Aulihan herders from Garissa County, who are accused of allowing camels to enter the reservoir and ignoring the agreements of the Modogashe Declaration.<sup>62</sup> In some instances, elders from the Aulihan clan come and negotiate with the Borana elders and pay a fee to access the pasture, but armed youths may abuse the system and also demand money from the Aulihan,<sup>63</sup> a problem that stems from intergenerational conflict over the sharing of money.<sup>64</sup> The population of Duse, which is approximately 3,000, fled to Kinna following a recent attack by the Somali. Only 2,000 had returned to Duse at the time of research.<sup>65</sup> The chiefs try to settle disputes between the two communities, sometimes involving security agencies to forcibly remove the Aulihan.<sup>66</sup> However, some believe that the Aulihan have the support of politicians.<sup>67</sup> As noted earlier, a similar allegation was made against the Samburu in Kom.

#### **Small Arms**

Cattle rustling and intercommunal conflicts are exacerbated by the ready availability and widespread use of small arms in the region (Saferworld 2015; Wepundi et al. 2012). One chief claimed: "It's easier to buy a gun in Isiolo than bhang [marijuana]."<sup>68</sup> Another administrator asserted: "You call a peace meeting,

54. Focus group discussion with ward administrators, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

55. Focus group discussion with ward administrators, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

56. Interview with county official (name withheld), Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

57. Focus group discussion with ward administrators, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

58. Interview with UN Peace Worker, Isiolo, May 7, 2017.

59. Interview with ward administrator, May 9, 2017.

60. Focus group discussion with Peace Group, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

61. Interview with UN Peace Worker, Isiolo Town, May 7, 2017.

62. Interview with administrator (name withheld), May 10, 2017.

63. Interview with Administration Police officer, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

64. Focus group discussion with youths, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

65. Interview with administrator (name withheld), May 10, 2017.

66. Focus group discussion with youths, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

67. Focus group discussion with youths, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

68. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

and you see guns, they are used as sticks to fight.”<sup>69</sup> However, there is widespread feeling that arms are absolutely essential for pastoralists to protect their cattle wealth, like armed guards at an ATM machine. The tension in the area is aptly captured by the assistant chief of Duse, who remarked: “Our cows eat with guns.” This situation is caused by a low police presence and poor capacity in these rural areas. Security agencies struggle to pursue and apprehend cattle rustlers; the latter is believed to be more powerful than the former.<sup>70</sup>

According to a ward administrator, in the early 1990s, Kinna experienced banditry by ethnic Somali pastoralists. The bandits conducted repeated attacks until 1996, when the locals decided to arm themselves. The arms were referred to as “friendly forces” or “walking sticks.” The administrator claimed that this brought peace due to what he referred to as “the balance of terror,” until March 2017, when Somali pastoralists attacked again. One chief expressed the view that guns are not used freely or carelessly for fear they be taken away, and that a majority of the pastoralists are ex-soldiers with strict instructions on how to use the arms.<sup>71</sup> However, such limits are clearly not always adhered to.

Pastoral communities believe that owning firearms is prestigious.<sup>72</sup> Youth in Kinna reiterated this sentiment, most claiming that that they thought it was “cool” to handle firearms and that they aspired to be soldiers.<sup>73</sup> Arms acquisition increased during the preelection

period of 2017,<sup>74</sup> with politicians suspected of using Community Development Fund money to buy arms and ammunition.<sup>75</sup>

As previously noted, small arms dramatically increase the danger and scale of cattle raiding. Around 1,000 injuries recorded by hospitals in 2016 were classified as violence a new category since 2016. The county health department clarified that this category refers to gunshot injuries, likely sustained in one of the frequent cattle raids occurring in the region. Such injuries can be fatal or may result in significant disability, which is especially difficult for pastoralists, who have a mobile and physically demanding lifestyle.

The county, with its geographically central yet remote location, has been a hub for the small arms trade for the last 50 years (Mkutu 2008). One peace worker described how arms are illegally sourced across the porous borders of Somalia and Ethiopia, and by the Kenyan government through the arming of paramilitary forces, a decision influenced by politicians.<sup>76</sup> Kula Mawe is among the illegal arms trafficking sites.<sup>77</sup> Various sources described the types and cost of guns: national police reservists are given Gewehr 3 battle rifles (G3s) by the government; arms coming across the border with neighboring countries are usually the Avtomat Kalashnikova assault rifles (AK-47s). It is not known how M16 rifles are reaching community members because the weapon is usually used by the United Kingdom or the United States. One G3 rifle costs about Kshs 150,000; an AK-47 is an estimated Kshs 80,000; and a carbine is about Kshs 60,000.<sup>78</sup> Cheaper

69. Interview with administrator (name withheld), Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

70. Focus group discussion with chiefs, May 9, 2017.

71. Focus group discussion with chiefs, May 9, 2017.

72. Interview with the county director for education, Isiolo, May 9, 2017.

73. Focus group discussion with youth group, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

74. Interviews, various, including boda boda operators. May 8–14, 2017.

75. Interview with senior administrator (name withheld), May 9, 2017.

76. Interview with United Nations Peace Worker (name withheld), May 7, 2017.

77. Interview with United Nations Peace Worker (name withheld), May 7, 2017.

78. Interview with *mzee wa kijiji* (village elder), Kinna, May 9, 2017.

AK-47s seem to be available for as low as Kshs 14,000.<sup>79</sup> Some people are able to obtain M16 guns and ammunition, which are used by the British Army in the area, through means yet to be confirmed.<sup>80</sup> Ammunition is acquired from sources that include the National Police Service, army, prisons, and the Kenya Wildlife Service.<sup>81</sup> Bullets for the G3 cost Kshs 200 (approximately US\$2) each while those for the AK-47 are priced at about Kshs 150–170 (approximately US\$1.50–1.70), according to multiple sources. Some politicians were said to assist locals in buying bullets.<sup>82</sup> Arms traders come from northeastern parts of Kenya, including El Wak.<sup>83</sup> Arms are sometimes smuggled along with animals and other commodities, including miraa.<sup>84</sup>

In his analysis of the ethno-political conflicts in Isiolo from 2009 to 2012, Cox (2015) describes how the state responded in a variety of ways, deploying specialist policing units (Anti-Stock Theft and Rapid Deployment Units), the military (Kenya Defence Forces), and armed communities by creating National Police Reservists (local armed volunteers). One plan to arm the Borana to balance power and hence mitigate conflict had the unintended effect of increasing the armaments among the Samburu, who then engaged in offensive attacks to undermine the capacity of their enemies (Saferworld 2009 and UNDP 2010, quoted in Cox 2015). Ultimately, as the 2013 election loomed, both armament and disarmament became strongly politicized.

There have been several attempts at disarmament over the years in Isiolo County. The

security agencies in the region, led by the county commissioner, mounted a major disarmament exercise in 2015 to mop up illegal firearms (Jebet 2015b), which may have led to a short-term reduction in stock theft, as reflected in police statistics. The most recent exercise in 2016 called on communities to register their illegal weapons to be considered for positions with the National Police Reserve. Around 40 arms were yielded after several months. However, a local administrator complained that “the government is disarming people [in Isiolo], but our neighbors are not disarmed so we are at a loss.”<sup>85</sup> Residents of Ngare Mara, which neighbors Samburu County, note that that they need guns to survive.<sup>86</sup> Disarmament, when it takes place in Kenya, is often heavy handed, failing to acknowledge the root causes of the demand for arms. Such efforts are often poorly coordinated across local and international borders and unmatched by an adequate security presence to protect communities. Sometimes, the government or elites are actively arming other communities to protect themselves. Thus, communities often submit old or defunct arms or government-issued weapons, while keeping other illicit weapons (Mkutu 2008).

### Radicalization and Recruitment into Violent Extremism

Although Isiolo County has not experienced any terrorist attacks, the radicalization and recruitment of youths into violent extremist groups is a serious problem. The Isiolo County Action Plan for Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism notes that while Isiolo has not been hit by terrorist attacks it has been an important recruiting ground for Al Shabaab and ISIS and a transit point for those travelling

79. Interview with an administrator (name withheld), Burat, May 9, 2017.

80. Interview with senior administrator, May 9 2017.

81. Interview with *mzee wa kijiji* (village elder), Kinna, May 9, 2017.

82. Interview with ward administrator (name withheld), May 9, 2017.

83. Interview with Administration Police officer, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

84. Various interviews, May 2017.

85. Interview with secretary to the chief, Ngare Mara, May 10, 2017.

86. Interview with secretary to the chief, Ngare Mara, May 10, 2017.

to Libya and Somalia. According to the plan, up to 200 young people have been recruited from Isiolo county to join terror organizations. The plan, which was based on a research study, identifies certain factors such as proximity and road links to Somalia, the presence of recruiters, social exclusion, unjust treatment by police, tensions between youth and elders. Unemployment and substance abuse are also mentioned. (Isiolo County 2018).

The deputy governor explained that two years ago, media reports indicated that 22 boys from Isiolo Boys High School, (Merti subcounty) had been radicalized and had left for Somalia, with a few joining ISIS. According to the community-based organization Sensitization of Communities on Radicalization and Empowerment Solutions (SCORES), approximately 40 youths have been recruited into Al-Shabaab, including the 22 previously mentioned plus others from St. Paul's and Barracks schools.<sup>87</sup> Others have estimated the number to be higher. Two girls have also reportedly joined ISIS.<sup>88</sup> Most of the youths who left were form-four leavers. As a result of the incident, enrollment Isiolo Boys High School dropped significantly, from about 500 students to about 200 students due to parents' fears of their sons being radicalized. Respondents were able to report recruitment of about 26 youths in various villages.<sup>89</sup>

Bulla Pesa seems to be a significant hotspot for radicalization and recruitment.<sup>90</sup> Factors that render Isiolo County vulnerable to radicalization include its geographically central position and yet relatively close proximity to the Somalia border; its cosmopolitan nature and

diverse religious beliefs, which can play into recruitment narratives; and the use of social media and mobile money transfer systems.<sup>91</sup> The deputy governor, however, argued that Isiolo County was not exceptional in this way, as Rift Valley and Western Kenya have also experienced recruitment drives.

Contrary to the common assumption that those recruited into terrorist organizations come from poor backgrounds with little to no education, this assessment found the reverse to be true, with most recruits being form-four leavers. Of the three youths recruited into ISIS, two were students at Moi University, including one who had been in the engineering department and who reportedly died in a U.S. missile attack.<sup>92</sup> Most notable, however, is the incident involving the son of the county assembly speaker, who was arrested at the Kenya–Somalia border while trying to cross over into Somalia. He had called his parents to say “Do not worry about me, I am with God.”<sup>93</sup> There may be a link between recruitment into radicalization and leaving form four. One chief explained: “Most youths have no employment. After school they return home and chew miraa. Many who have finished form four are recruited, and those that are in school just disappear.”<sup>94</sup>

A religious leader suggested that financial incentives offered by recruiters, poor relationships with parents, or a lack of parenting are relevant factors in recruitment;<sup>95</sup> recruiters also target new converts to Islam.<sup>96</sup> Social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are being used to radicalize and recruit; and

87. It should be noted that though the youths were recruited from schools within Isiolo County, not all of them were from the county.

88. Interview with SCORES personnel, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

89. Interview with ward administrator, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

90. Interview with ward administrator, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

91. Interview with SCORES personnel, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

92. Interview with SCORES personnel, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

93. Focus group discussion with ward administrators, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

94. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

95. Interview with religious leader, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

96. Interview with SCORES personnel, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

some assessment participants said there is a connection to drug use. A religious leader mentioned that sending children to boarding school might indicate a poor relationship between the children and their parents, which could make them more vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment efforts. A Muslim peace worker agreed that parents—particularly wealthy ones—often do not know what is happening to their children.<sup>97</sup>

In 2009, the national government recruited thousands of predominantly Somali youths from Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, and Isiolo counties, and offered them military training to fight Al Shabaab. They received training at a military base at Archer's Post in Samburu County and at the Kenya Wildlife Service training facility at Manyani in Taita-Taveta County. They were promised lucrative terms to fight alongside former Somalia Transitional Federal Government troops as part of the deal to fight rising threats from the Islamic Courts Union and its allies led by Al Shabaab—i.e., a salary of Kshs 255,000 per month (approximately US\$2,550), insurance for themselves and their families, prime plots of land in Ras Kamboni and Kismayu, and permanent resettlement (Abdi 2015). Other youths were trained in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. However, the government failed to fulfil its promises, which led some of these trained youths to join Al Shabaab instead, either in Somalia or as “sleepers cells” in Kenya (Abdi 2015).

Recruiters are apparently known to both the locals and the police. Youths are normally recruited by a person known to them, even a relative or close friend, with whom there is a relationship of trust.<sup>98</sup> A Muslim peace worker expressed his concerns about radicalization

happening in their midst, and noted that the radicalizing preachers were known to the security and government but were protected through corrupt means and intimidation. Recruiters are not exclusively male: there is one well-known female recruiter who has been in and out of police custody.<sup>99</sup>

Some recruiters involved in the radicalization of youths in Isiolo County are believed to come from Bulla Pesa.<sup>100</sup> Some respondents suggested that there was a link between the radicalization and chang'aa brewing because the narrative used by recruiters played on the religious diversity in the county and the production, sale, and consumption of alcohol, which is contrary to tenets of Islam.<sup>101</sup> Chiefs also noted that there was an association between radicalization and miraa (a plant that is chewed to produce a mildly stimulating effect). Recruiters have exploited the fact that many youths have little else to do but gather together and chew the drug; they use this time to target and indoctrinate youths.<sup>102</sup> One respondent said: “A father who was a doctor bought a motorbike for his son at Kshs 120,000 (approximately US\$1,200). After a week the son bought petrol and got on the motorbike with two of his friends. They were later found on the Kenya–Somalia border, while on drugs. All the boys that are disappearing are bhang smokers.”<sup>103</sup>

Estimates of the number of returnees to Isiolo County range from 4 to 11. These returnees are in hiding because they fear for their lives and of being stigmatized; they feel at odds with their community and with the authorities

97. Interview with religious leader, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

98. Interview with SCORES personnel, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

99. Interview with ward administrator, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

100. Interview with peace worker, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

101. Interview with SCORES personnel, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

102. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

103. Interview with chair of boda boda association, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

who perceive them to be criminals. They also face a threat from Al Shabaab (Mkutu 2008).<sup>104</sup>

## Boda Boda Crime and Accidents

*Boda bodas* (motorcycle taxis) are a popular mode of transport in the county, with numbers rising from 100 in 2013 to an estimated 20,000 in 2017.<sup>105</sup> There is a change from traditional to modern livelihoods with parents, particularly among the Turkana and the Borana, who take out loans to buy motorbikes for their children;<sup>106</sup> and many youths aspire to own motorcycles and work in this industry.<sup>107</sup> According to one boda boda operator in the town of Isiolo, the average daily income on a good day is Kshs 1,200 (approximately US\$12) and Kshs 500 (approximately US\$5) on a bad day. This seemingly easy source of money has led to increased school dropout rates among boys in the county, which may explain why enrollment rates are higher for girls. The sector lacks organization, probably due to rapid growth; and the county government has not yet designated pick up and drop off zones (stages).<sup>108</sup> There is a boda boda association in the county, but there is not a savings and credit cooperative society, which public service vehicles should be a member of, by law.

Boda bodas have been linked to multiple crimes. They are used in stock theft<sup>109</sup> as well as trade in arms near the Ameret, Isiolo, and Ngare Mara forests to transport guns. On average, the youths are paid between Kshs 5,000 and Kshs 10,000 (approximately US\$50–100) to transport a single gun. These are transported *inter alia* to Meru County,

where they exacerbate cattle rustling by the Meru against the Turkana. People in this business are vulnerable to attack, theft of motorbikes, and murder, but at the same time, the small arms trade earns them money to buy the motorbikes.<sup>110</sup>

Boda bodas are a major source of road traffic accidents in the county.<sup>111</sup> Many drivers are underage, between the ages of 14 and 17, and they are not properly trained. The sector is not well regulated. While there are traffic laws governing all forms of motorized transport, most boda boda drivers are unaware of or flout them. Some drive under the influence of drugs or alcohol.<sup>112</sup> As the chair of boda boda association in Isiolo county explained:

“Boda boda riders are mostly underage and they are not trained. A majority are aged between 14 and 17 years. They are brothers and relatives. When they reach 17, they start chewing miraa, and drugs available from pharmacists. So the boys don’t listen to their parents and elders. Two days ago, three boys who were riding on one boda boda were run over by an army truck. The bike was speeding and could not brake, and they all died.”<sup>113</sup>

Figure 3.4 depicts road traffic accidents for all road users, recorded by the police from 2014 to 2016. There appears to have been a dramatic increase over the time period, although this may be reflective of improved detection. Hospital data confirms that few cases actually reach the police (see figure 3.5).

104. Interview with senior administrator, May 9, 2018.

105. Interview with the chair of a boda boda association, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

106. Interview with an Administration Police officer, May 9, 2017.

107. Interview with an Administration Police officer, May 9, 2017.

108. Interview with the county secretary, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

109. Interview with ward administrator, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

110. Interview with boda boda operator, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.


111. Interview with county secretary, May 8, 2017; interview with county health department personnel, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

112. Interview with boda boda operator, Isiolo Town May 12, 2017; interview with county health department personnel, May 9, 2017.

113. Interview with chair of aboda boda association Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.




**Figure 3.4. Outcomes of Road Traffic Accidents in Isiolo 2014–16**



Source: Isiolo County police records.

**Figure 3.5. Injuries Due to Road Traffic Accidents and Other Causes in Isiolo**



Source: Isiolo County hospital records.

Boda boda operators have also been accused of having sexual relations with underage girls whom they drive to school. This has led to teenage pregnancies and may be spreading HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases in the area.<sup>114</sup> Boda bodas are considered a status symbol and an easy source of

money, which attracts girls; some operators play loud music and offer free rides to girls.

Boda boda operators are not only perpetrators of crime and violence; they are also victims of kidnappings and murders. Multiple women participating in a focus group discussion said that four or five boda boda operators are kidnapped every month in Ngare Mara,

<sup>114</sup> Focus group discussion with women, May 10, 2017.

**Table 3.5. Rates of Physical and Sexual Violence by Partner or Spouse in Isiolo County**

	Physical Violence		Sexual Violence	
	Ever Experienced (%)	Last 12 Months (%)	Ever Experienced (%)	Last 12 Months (%)
<b>Kenya</b>				
Women	44.8	20.3	14.1	7.8
Men	44.0	11.1	5.9	2.3
<b>Eastern</b>				
Women	48.8	20.8	12.2	6.7
Men	41.6	8.4	4.9	1.7

Source: Isiolo County Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment.

and their motorcycles stolen.<sup>115</sup> A ward administrator explained how in Burat, Bula Pesa Ward, dwindling cattle numbers, stock theft is being replaced by other crimes including motorcycle theft.<sup>116</sup> Boda bodas have also been linked to political violence in the county. Drivers are regularly hired by politicians to engage in acts of hooliganism and property destruction.<sup>117</sup> In some instances, they are part of the politician's campaign entourage.

### Sexual and Gender-Based Violence and Crime

Table 3.5 presents rates of sexual and gender-based violence in Kenya's former Eastern province from the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KNBS 2014). Unfortunately, county-specific data are not available. Rates of physical violence against women appear to be slightly higher than the national average, but sexual violence is slightly lower.

Gender-based physical violence is normalized in Isiolo County, as it is in many patriarchal

societies throughout Kenya. As one chief said, "When a man beats his wife, its discipline. They fight and finish in the house ... You have a stick for cows, women, and children!"<sup>118</sup> An assistant chief concurred, "GBV is not reported. Domestic violence is normal. Some we sort out, others we take to the children's office. FGM is not an issue that can be sorted easily. It's being done, but it's gone down."<sup>119</sup>

### Prostitution

Prostitution is classified as an offense against morality (public morals) under chapter 15 of the Kenyan Penal Code. An officer manning the gender desk at the police station asserted that there were no reported cases of prostitution in the county.<sup>120</sup> Although police data confirm this, prostitution is said to be prevalent in the busy cosmopolitan Bulla Pesa area of Isiolo Town.<sup>121</sup>

### Female Genital Mutilation

The World Health Organization defines FGM as comprising "all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female

115. Focus group discussion with women, May 10, 2017.

116. Interview with ward administrator, May 9, 2017.

117. Interview with boda boda operator, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

118. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

119. Interview with assistant chief, Duse, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

120. Interview with gender desk officer, Isiolo Town, May 11, 2017.

121. Interview with peace worker, May 12, 2017.

genitalia or other injury to female genital organs for non-medical reasons.” The practice is common among several ethnic groups in Kenya, particularly among the Borana, the Rendille, the Samburu, and the Somali in Isiolo (Njue and Askew 2004). The practice has also spread to include some in the Turkana community.<sup>122</sup> FGM remains an entrenched cultural practice despite the passage of the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 2011, and its prohibition has led many to avoid speaking openly on the subject. About 65 percent of Isiolo girls aged 15–19 report having been circumcised compared with 12 percent nationally (Ministry of Health n.d.). The practice often occurs collectively during school holidays, often preceding early marriage. A refuge exists in the county for girls to escape FGM, but chiefs noted that the issue is usually ignored by officials.<sup>123</sup> As some literature details, female circumcision may result in immediate complications such as psychological trauma, bleeding, serious infection, and even death, in addition to future gynecological and obstetric complications (UNFPA 2017). Less directly, the practice is also linked to female subjugation, early marriage, exposure to infection through marriage to older men, teenage pregnancy, and interference with schooling.

Oloo, Wanjiru, and Newell-Jones (2011) list the various “functions” of FGM: it is a rite of passage from girlhood to womanhood, after which one is considered mature, obedient, and aware of a woman’s role in the family and society; it is also a means of reducing the sexual desire of girls and women to keep them from straying. Hamilton (2017) explains the thinking among many that the practice “purifies” the girl’s “bad” blood that it is beneficial

in terms of hygiene. According to a police officer manning the gender desk, a girl or woman who has not undergone circumcision is not considered marriageable. *Chebeni*—children born outside marriage—are frequently killed.<sup>124</sup> A female participant at a sensitization forum held in Loruko about FGM explained:

“Uncircumcised Samburu women cannot be married by a Samburu ... even after she gives birth, her kids will never be married by a Samburu ... she and her offspring will be outcasts, cursed ... Moreover, girls who are not circumcised are not respected by their peers and the community members at large ... any girl who goes against it loses her identity and belongingness as a Samburu woman ....” (IRCK 2017)

Over time, education has lessened the grip of FGM, with some young men even refusing to marry circumcised girls.<sup>125</sup> There are several advocates against the practice, including the Anti-Female Genital Mutilation Board, which embarked on a sensitization campaign in 2016 that targeted police, chiefs, religious leaders, and community-based organizations in various parts of the country, including Isiolo County (KNA 2016).

### Incest

Although police reports do not reflect any cases of incest, an officer manning the Gender Desk at the Isiolo County Police Headquarters indicated that cases are often unreported.<sup>126</sup> Incest can occur in the context of divorce, when children are left in the custody of their father or another male relative.<sup>127</sup>

122. Interview with secretary to the chief, Ngare Mara, May 10, 2017.  
123. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

124. Interview with Administration Police officer, May 10, 2017.  
125. Interview with chairman of minorities of Interfaith Organization, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.  
126. Interview with officer manning gender desk, May 11, 2017.  
127. Interview with officer manning gender desk, May 11, 2017.

### Early Marriage and Beading

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) defines *early marriage*, also referred to as child marriage, as a formal or informal union before the age of 18 (UNICEF 2013). Section 2 of Kenya's 2001 Children's Act defines *early marriage* as "marriage or cohabitation with a child or any arrangement made for such marriage or cohabitation." Though such arrangements can involve boys, it is girls who are most affected. Child marriage is prevalent in Isiolo County, but it is rarely reported.<sup>128</sup> It is particularly prevalent in Ngare Mara—an area that is predominantly inhabited by the Turkana—where "from around age 15, a girl is regarded as a woman and is married off, even to an old man. [Brideprice] takes the form of cattle ... not be less than 10."<sup>129</sup> Brideprice may serve as an incentive to families to marry off their daughters early.

Early marriages have resulted in early pregnancies and the spread of HIV/AIDS. According to the county commissioner, eight girls in Elmet Primary School in Ngare Mara dropped out of school in one month due to pregnancies.<sup>130</sup> The commissioner noted that some girls who had been given bursaries for secondary school still dropped out of school because they were pregnant. However, efforts to help a girl resume her studies after she delivers are increasing.<sup>131</sup> Early pregnancies resulting from consensual relationships between unmarried young people are also prevalent. One woman explained, "When a girl gets to class six, she believes she has matured. By the time she gets to class seven, it is hard to control her. She either becomes pregnant or contracts [sexually transmitted diseases]." These cases

often go unreported, but if the boy's parents do not compensate the girl's parents, the matter might be reported to the police.<sup>132</sup> The boy is then charged with statutory rape or defilement in accordance with the Sexual Offences Act.<sup>133</sup>

HIV/AIDS is a major issue in Merti subcounty and also in Ngare Mara, where people reportedly avoid testing or keep their status hidden; women fearing violence from their spouses take their antiretroviral drugs in secret.<sup>134</sup> Furthermore, one respondent noted that women cannot afford condoms so use plastic bags instead.<sup>135</sup> Section 24 of the HIV and AIDS Prevention and Control Act criminalizes the intentional or reckless transmission of the HIV virus by a person who is aware that he or she is infected. A person found guilty of committing such an act is liable to a fine of up to Kshs 500,000 (approximately US\$5,000), a prison term of up to seven years, or both. Most participants of this assessment were not aware of this law.

Beading is a secretive and little-known cultural practice closely intertwined with FGM and early marriage. It is practiced solely by the Samburu community. Ahlstedt (2017) describes the practice:

"Morans are allowed to have a temporary marital relationship with a very young girl from the same clan ... The moran buys red beads for the girl after getting the mandate from the family of the girl. The main objective of the beading is to prepare the young girl for marriage in the future. Since the

128. Interview with county commissioner, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

129. Interview with secretary to the chief, Ngare Mara, May 10, 2017.

130. Interview with secretary of Interfaith Organization, May 8, 2017.

131. Focus group discussion with women, Ngare Mara, May 10, 2017.


132. Interview with gender desk officer, May 11, 2017.

133. Interview with gender desk officer, May 11, 2017.

134. Focus group discussion with women, Kinna, May 9, 2017.


135. Interview with organizing secretary of Interfaith Organization, May 8, 2017.

Figure 3.6. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence by Age in Isiolo County



Source: Isiolo County Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment.

Figure 3.7. Teenage Pregnancies in Isiolo County by Age, 2016



Source: Isiolo County Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment.

moran and his beaded girl are relatives, and the girl is uncircumcised, both marriage and pregnancy are forbidden. In case of a pregnancy, the pregnancy has to be terminated through cruel abortion by elderly women. If the beaded girl gives birth, the child has to be killed through herbs poisoning, since the child is perceived to be an outcast. The lucky babies who survive are given out to other

communities like the Turkana tribe. In addition to life threatening early pregnancies and abortions, the practice of beading exposes young girls to physical, mental, and sexual violence. Most often the opinion of the girl does not matter, when the beading relationship is negotiated.”

It was extremely challenging to get participants of this assessment to open up about FGM and early marriages, let alone the beading practice and its link with infanticide. The issue demands further research. Hospital statistics might better reflect sexual violence than police statistics. As figure 3.6 illustrates, about 300 cases of sexual violence were recorded between 2014–16.

Data on teenage pregnancies were only available for the year 2016 (see figure 3.7), but the rates are concerning, with 43 cases of girls aged 10–14 and 1,414 cases of girls aged 15–19. The considerably lower number of pregnancies among the 10-to-14-year-old cohort can be attributed to government policies, such as the banning of FGM with the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act and the outlawing of early marriage with the Children’s Act. However, Kenyan law does permit the marriage of girls aged 16 or 17 with parental consent.

### Drugs and Alcohol

A major issue in Isiolo County is the consumption of illicit brews, most commonly chang’aa and similar substances sold in sachets and small bottles.<sup>136</sup> Police statistics reflect illicit brewing as a petty offense, with very high levels. The problem became so acute that Samburu elders cursed chang’aa brewers and consumers to discourage its production, sale, and consumption; 12,000 liters of illicit brew was impounded during a morning raid in Isiolo market almost one year later. The brews reportedly come from Shambani and Bulla Pesa in the town of Isiolo, as well as from Meru County (Jebet 2015a). One county administrator asserted that Bulla Pesa was a hotspot for brewing of both chang’aa and

another local brew, maisha bora (“better life”), and that this may be contributing to a rise of crime in the area, including prostitution, theft, and murder.<sup>137</sup> Bulla Pesa is a highly populated cosmopolitan area inhabited by the Meru, the Turkana, the Luo, and the Kikuyu, among other groups, and the population continues to grow at a rapid pace.<sup>138</sup> Ironically, many consumers of the illegal brews are Muslim.<sup>139</sup> Similarly, in the Garbatulla subcounty of Kinna, chang’aa is said to be prevalent and greatly affect productivity among the youth. Some youths attending a focus group discussion were visibly drunk and smelled of alcohol, a very concerning observation as it was mid-morning, a time when they should have been engaged in meaningful work in either the formal or informal sector, and yet they were not in state for working. The youths asked for money, which they probably intended to use to purchase more alcohol.

Several verses of the Qur’an categorically prohibit the consumption of alcohol (Khan 2016), and most counties that are predominantly Muslim, including Garissa County, prohibit its sale. However, the cosmopolitan nature of Isiolo County makes such a prohibition challenging. Ideally, the county government should be issuing liquor licenses, but the county assembly has not yet passed a bill that would facilitate such a process, partly due to insufficient capacity for drafting bills and partly because such a measure would upset Muslim residents, whose religious tenets do not permit them to drink.<sup>140</sup> Corruption and ill-equipped enforcement have also negatively affected the implementation of relevant laws and policies (Lutta 2016). Multiple respondents

136. Interview with assistant chief, Duse, May 10, 2017.

137. Interview with County Administrator, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017; interview, Peace Worker, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

138. Interview with ward administrator, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

139. Interview with peace worker, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

140. Interview with deputy governor, May 8, 2017.



concurred that officials are not keen on addressing the alcohol and drug problem in the county.

Other substances in common use throughout the county include miraa, also known as khat, and bhang (marijuana), which are both grown locally in the Mount Kenya area (Kinoti, Jason, and Harper 2011). One respondent noted that the chewing of miraa is almost universal in Isiolo: "Miraa is very common, it's like tea. Even women chew miraa."<sup>141</sup> A peace worker expressed it this way: "Drugs are a major problem, but you cannot see it. At 2:00 pm you cannot take a boda boda, as most of the youths are on drugs."<sup>142</sup> Participants asserted that the county administrators were doing little to stop their use.<sup>143</sup> The impacts of drug use in the county include idleness, irresponsibility, wastage of household resources, addiction, and crime (Michuki and Kivuva 2013). A boda boda operator from the town of Isiolo illustrated this point by explaining that while the county had great potential, many offices close at 2:00 pm so that people can go and chew miraa until late in the evening.<sup>144</sup> Youths claimed that some of their colleagues engaged in malicious damage of property and arson when under the influence of drugs.<sup>145</sup>

The use of bhang is common in the county. It is primarily locally sourced, although a reportedly superior variety is coming in from Ethiopia.<sup>146</sup> The consumption of bhang among youths has resulted in some serious consequences. For example, in June 2016, school property of unknown value was destroyed after students from St. Paul's Kiwanjani Mixed

Secondary School became violent after smoking bhang (Nzioki 2017). The use of cocaine is less prevalent.<sup>147</sup>

Drug trafficking is common in Isiolo County, due to trading links Somalia (Kumssa and Kiriti-Ngángá 2016). Transporters of miraa have also been the victims of bandit attacks on their way from Meru County to Moyale in Marsabit County and to Mandera County.<sup>148</sup> There are no police reports of drug trafficking; respondents claimed that the county government also ignores the problem.<sup>149</sup>

Studies show that several risk factors account for drugs and alcohol use in Kenya (e.g., Kinoti, Jason, and Harper 2011). Culture, unemployment, peer pressure, work related stress, marital problems, poverty, and media influences are among the risk factors associated with alcohol use (NACADA 2012). Respondents of this assessment confirmed these factors as relevant.<sup>150</sup> Kinoti, Jason, and Harper (2011) suggest that the cultural, political, economic, social, and religious transitions in Kenya, as it moves from a traditional system to a modern one, may be contributing to lower levels of self-esteem and increased vulnerability to drug and alcohol use. This theory may be applicable to Isiolo County as well, which may be regarded as county in transition. As the planned developments begin to materialize, the county will likely grow increasingly cosmopolitan and experience additional changes and stressors, which could exacerbate the drug and alcohol consumption problem.

141. Interview with assistant chief, Duse, May 10, 2017.

142. Interview with peace worker, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

143. Focus group discussion with peace group, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

144. Interview with chair of boda boda association, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

145. Focus group discussion with youths, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

146. Focus group discussion with peace group, Kinna, May 10, 2017; interview with assistant chief, Duse, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

147. Focus group discussion with peace group, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

148. Interview with Administration Police officer, May 10, 2017.

149. Focus group discussion with peace group, Kinna, 10 May 2017.

150. Focus group discussion with youths, Kinna, May 10, 2017; interview with peace worker, May 12, 2017.

## Security Interventions

Isiolo suffers from a weak state apparatus, including the police and the judiciary, which because there is no deterrent effect, response, or pacification, enables the endemic conflicts (Chopra 2008). The police response to cattle rustling, including tracking and recovery of stolen cattle, is poor and delayed.<sup>151</sup> This is partly because the police do not work at night, and raiders know this. Law enforcement agencies struggle to physically operate in the vast and harsh terrain of the arid lands, and they receive little support from local communities. County ward administrators corroborated this assertion, explaining that there is a reluctance on the part of the police to work on the “front line,” a role that is instead largely fulfilled by the National Police Reserve.<sup>152</sup> One chief observed:

“We went to fight and we were 10, and the enemy bandits were three, the police could not manage to defeat the three. In another instance, we had 180 police who went to sort a raiding problem against 30 bandits, the 30 defeated us. The protectors of citizens are ineffective.”<sup>153</sup>

Respondents in Kinna noted that there is no functional police station; buildings are complete, but officers have yet to be deployed.<sup>154</sup> Residents have been asking the government to deploy police officers in their area for the last 10 years because the ward, which is located 50 miles from Garbatulla and has a population of 30,000 people, only has an Administration Police camp with poor quality facilities, staffed with five officers and three national police reservists.

151. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

152. Focus group discussion with ward administrators, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

153. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

154. Focus group discussion with peace group, Kinna, May 9, 2017.

Changes in the structure of the police force since devolution have introduced security challenges. Administration Police officers and national police reservists had previously been mobilized by the provincial administration, namely the chiefs,<sup>155</sup> but under the new dispensation, they are merged with the regular police (Kenya Police) in the National Police Service. This means that chiefs no longer have a security mandate, which severely hampers the security response in remote areas.<sup>156</sup> Chiefs claimed that when they could deploy people with arms and work together with reservists, they were successful in repelling raiders. A county government official lamented the lack of collaboration between county and national governments on security issues, feeling that the former has a role to play but has been “locked out.” He noted that the county government sometimes fuels the vehicles in cases of security-related emergencies, and that whenever the police harass the residents, the residents turn to the county government.<sup>157</sup>

## National Police Reserve

The National Police Reserve is an armed auxiliary volunteer force, whose role is to work under the National Police Service to protect their own communities (National Police Service Act 2011, Section 110). They often guard their own pastoralist cattle kraals (enclosures) and move with cattle caravans to protect them against raids by other pastoral groups. They are used by the national government to boost police services in remote areas and are often the main security force at national borders. In 2016, Isiolo’s county commissioner announced that the national government would recruit 500 national police

155. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

156. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

157. Interview with county government official (name withheld), Isiolo Town, May 2017.

reservists, prioritizing those who had registered their illegal arms (Daily Nation 2012).

There are mixed feelings about the national police reservists. They are generally appreciated by communities as the first and best responders who are familiar with the geography and conditions in the areas they serve. One chief explained:

“The guns that protect citizens are the illegal guns. The police employed do not want to die. It’s only the [traditional] security who are ready to die for cows.”<sup>158</sup>

However, the National Police Reserve is often accused of unprofessional behavior, owing to deficiencies in training, and livelihood needs which result in raiding and banditry with the use of government arms. At times, the reserve has been controlled by politicians and private entities, and reservists have been diverted into involvement in ethnicized conflict. The creation of the National Police Reserve in Isiolo is said to have entrenched ethnic rivalries and created a kind of legal arms race between communities; Isiolo County residents feel that Samburu County has given more legal arms to reservists, which they use for aggressive acts against them.<sup>159</sup>

### Conservancy and Wildlife Security

Many national police reservists now work within conservancies and receive a salary from the conservancy management, such as Isiolo with the Northern Rangelands Trust. Conservancies in Isiolo are also currently waiting for the use of drones to be regularized.<sup>160</sup> The association of conservancies with security has resulted in other communities clamoring

for conservancies to be set up in their areas. The people of Meru County are demanding conservancies because Isiolo County have them. Some of the assessment participants even suggested that every community should have a conservancy. They are therefore being increasingly seen as a security solution for the area, one that raises questions about the potential for ethnicization and security governance as the state is in essence ceding its authority to nonstate entities.

A major conflict in Kom (Chari Ward, Merti subcounty) was linked to the presence of a conservancy.<sup>161</sup> Kom is divided into three zones: the Biliqo-Bulesa conservancy where the elephants breed, the grazing zone, and the buffer zone, which is controlled by elders. The conservancy, which has received three-year funding from the United States Agency for International Development, has employed 20 armed scouts (national police reservists) and a manager. As local residents, the reservists have their own ethnic loyalties, and on one occasion, the conflict became ethnicized, with the Borana and the Samburu reservists fighting each another.<sup>162</sup> In this way, donor funding can inadvertently be channeled into intercommunal conflict. Data sourced from various interviews indicate that local communities believe there is a very strong tribal nature to the conservancies. Ward administrators opined that the major problem besieging the conservancies is personal/vested interests. They faulted the management structure of the conservancies, saying that the 15-member board had inadequate influence over decisions. Decisions were more likely to be made by the manager of the conservancy, who is a member of the Samburu group, employed by the Northern Rangelands Trust, resulting

158. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

159. Interview with administrator (name withheld), May 7, 2017.

160. Interview with county commissioner, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

161. Interview with ward administrator for Chari, May 9, 2017; interview, conservancy staff member, May 10, 2017.

162. Interview with conservancy staff member, May 10, 2017.

in decisions that favor the Samburu over the Borana. The Samburu took advantage of the situation, using the conservancy as a grazing area.<sup>163</sup> During the Kom conflict, it was alleged that planes from Lewa Wildlife Conservancy came to assist the Samburu. This situation is partly the result of the longer history of conservancies in Samburu County, such that many of the Samburu are in management positions, and the security teams are well established and well trained; however, it is clearly a potentially dangerous imbalance.

Ward administrators described how the relationship deteriorated between the Kenya Wildlife Service and its rangers with community members in Kinna living adjacent to Meru National Park. There have been incidences of poaching by community members, and rangers have been accused of extrajudicial killings of community members. Eleven people are said to have “disappeared” in this way. In one incident, three people were accosted and killed by rangers as they traveled to the Duse market. These killings resulted in a community demonstration, leading to further violence by the rangers, who killed another person and injured 14. Kenya Wildlife Service compensated victims following peace-building efforts by the national government, politicians, and the Kenya Human Rights Commission.<sup>164</sup> However, tension still simmers between the two groups, as evidenced by the Kenya Wildlife Service’s refusal to respond to new conflicts between humans and wildlife, as elephants have invaded homesteads, injuring people, and destroying property.<sup>165</sup>

163. Focus group discussion with ward administrators, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

164. Interview with ward administrator, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

165. Interview with county secretary for tourism, Isiolo Town, May 10, 2017.

## Community Policing

The National Police Reserve serves a type of community policing for rural areas. Nyumba Kumi, the recently launched 10-house model for community policing has so far achieved limited progress on the ground. Some places have created the structures and have selected local chairpersons, but little else is happening.

## Countering Violent Extremism


The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit was established to deal with terrorism and other related offenses; it opened a branch in the town of Isiolo in July 2016. Although the unit has made progress in addressing radicalization and recruitment, it has faced criticism for arbitrary arrests of youths and for allegedly demanding sums of Kshs 200,000–300,000 (approximately US\$2,000–3,000 for their release. Furthermore, parents of youths who have traveled to Somalia have also been detained and treated inhumanely.<sup>166</sup> These allegations are corroborated in a separate study (Isiolo County 2018) as noted by a youth, “The issue of violent extremism has become an enterprise. Young people are arrested and the ATPU officers ask for a lot of money.” Many people expressed that they would rather not report suspected terrorists or recruiters to the police because of the manner in which such cases are handled. Sometimes, the person reporting an incident is treated as a suspect and is arrested. This sometimes includes already devastated parents who report the disappearance of their child.<sup>167</sup> In other instances, security agencies have been guilty of ethnic and religious profiling, targeting Muslims and those who were perceived to be of Somali origin.<sup>168</sup> As

166. Interview with county administrator, Isiolo Town, May 7, 2017.

167. Interview with subcounty administrator, Isiolo Town, May 7, 2017.

168. Interview with SCORES personnel, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

**Figure 3.8. Importance of Various Institutions in Addressing Crime and Violence**



Source: Isiolo County Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment.

previously described, the breakdown in trust severely hampers intelligence gathering.

One informant suggested that recruiters are known to some security personnel. He asserted, “The security agencies knew the people radicalizing and taking the children to Somalia; the employees of government are aware of what is happening, since they are given a lot of money.” He went on to describe how there were sympathizers within the security apparatus who intimidate those who report activities of violent extremists.<sup>169</sup>

Counterterrorism efforts are further hampered by a lack of willingness on the part of the

national government to coordinate with the county government.<sup>170</sup>

Some have resorted to falsely accusing others of terrorism to settle personal scores, giving false reports to the police.<sup>171</sup> As an example, one woman falsely reported to the police that her husband was a member of Al Shabaab, following a domestic argument. Similarly, a taxi driver who had been denied access to a hospital hired two boys to assist him in gaining entry. The matter was reported to the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, which tried to arrest the two boys, who were regarded as suspected terrorists.

169. Interview with a Muslim respondent (name withheld), May 2017.

170. Interview with senior county administrator (name withheld), May 2017.

171. Interview with a Muslim respondent (name withheld), May 2017.

**Table 3.6. Economic Activities Among Youth and Related Challenges**

Economic Activities	Challenges	How to Address Challenges
Business	Lack of capital	Provide loans
Boda boda	Poor road infrastructure	Provide irrigation water
Buying and selling of livestock	Motorcycle accidents	Improve security
Casual laborer	Poor pay and exploitation	
	Insecurity	

Source: NCPD 2017.

## Crime and Violence Prevention Activities

The actors, institutions, and organizations that are relevant to crime and violence prevention, peace, and cohesion in Isiolo are described below, as well as specific issues related to crime and violence for which there are multiple interventions by various actors. In the questionnaire, people were asked about a wide range of institutions responsible for addressing crime and violence both reactively and preventatively (see figure 3.8). Most people recognized the importance of formal and informal institutions, with elders, mosques, and family scoring the highest.

About half of the respondents felt that there was no coordination between local, county, and national agencies to address crime and violence in Isiolo County; only 16 percent felt that there was some coordination. Responses with regards to coordination of peace-building initiatives were similar.

## Addressing Marginalization, Development, and Employment

Isiolo county was one of 14 beneficiaries of the Equalization Fund for 2018–19 [Article 204 (1) of the 2010 Kenyan constitution] to be used by the national government

“to provide basic services including water, roads, health facilities and electricity to marginalized areas to the extent necessary to bring the quality of those services in those areas to the level generally enjoyed by the rest of the nation, so far as possible.” (Kiplagat 2017)

Criteria used to identify deserving counties included historical marginalization and lack of access to basic amenities. In addition to the equalization fund, the government established the Isiolo County Climate Change Fund in 2013, which seeks to build climate resilience among vulnerable communities at the ecosystem level; it is managed by committees operating at the county and ward levels (Nyangena, Stott, and Wario 2017).

Several strategies have been suggested to address the risk factors associated with crime and violence in the county and to build resilience among residents (Kumssa and Kiriti-Ngángá 2016). These strategies include improving infrastructure, especially roads and communications; creating markets for agricultural products, especially livestock products; improving access to schools and hospitals; tackling the issue of corruption; and improving the management of the Uwezo Fund, the Women Enterprise Fund, and Youth Development Fund.



**Table 3.7. Interventions and Programs Addressing Youth Unemployment**

Interventions	Challenges	How to Address Challenges
Uwezo Fund Youth Economic Development Fund National Youth Service Women's Economic Fund	Lack of awareness of program Program requirements Loan repayment Corruption	Sensitize on the interventions Ease access to funds

Source: NCPD 2017.

The county government recognizes that youths need employment and skills, and that this may prevent them from being pulled into terrorism and other crimes. As Isiolo County develops, youths also need assistance with skills development and literacy so they will not experience further displacement and disenfranchisement. A 2015 survey conducted by the National Council for Population and Development identified some of the economic activities among youth (see table 3.6) (NCPD 2017); and some of the proposed interventions have been adopted by the national and county governments (see table 3.7).

### Alternative Dispute Resolutions

It is often very difficult for rural-dwelling or poor people to access and engage with modern justice mechanisms due to technicalities, complex procedures, high costs, and delays (Muigua and Kariuki n.d.). Many rely instead on local or indigenous mechanisms to resolve conflicts and seek justice. The constitution has provisions for such mechanisms, provided that they “do not contravene the bill of rights, they are not repugnant to justice and morality and are not inconsistent with the constitution and other written law.”

There is a single magistrate’s court in the town of Isiolo<sup>172</sup> and high court stations in Meru and

Nyeri counties, although the high court is also under construction in the county (Ndungú and Wepundi 2012). Hence, communities in Northern Kenya, including Isiolo County, have for a long time and with varying success used alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms to deal with conflict, crime, and violence in the region (CRECO 2012). An ADR pilot project was launched in Isiolo County in 2013 to formalize and support this. It was envisaged that this would reduce the backlog in the courts and make justice more accessible to rural areas (Mamo and Nduro 2013). The Councils of Elders in Isiolo County has been restructured; elders have been trained on mediation and dispute resolution, and the project seems to have been effective.<sup>173</sup>

Locals often have a negative attitude toward the formal justice system; they perceive the officers posted to the region as “either incompetent or indolent (having been transferred to these areas on disciplinary grounds)” (CRECO 2012). The failure of the formal justice system to prosecute those responsible for intercommunal violence has further eroded the local population’s confidence (CRECO 2012). ADR has the benefit of being flexible and timely, and often has increased legitimacy in the eyes of local people. The mechanisms are conciliatory and account for the needs of the entire community or communities involved; they

172. See judiciary.go.ke.

173. Interview with secretary to the chief, Ngare Mara, May 10, 2017.

often focus on reconciliation because anyone found guilty almost always continues to reside in the community (Kariuki n.d.). Punishments include fines and other reparative mechanisms rather than retributive violence or exclusion from the community. The adjudicators of cases share similar values, religion, and beliefs as the parties before them, and base their decisions in ways that make sense to all concerned (Forber 2009). Elders commonly approach the court to request that a case be withdrawn, arguing that solving the particular case is their responsibility and believing that their own solutions are likely to be more acceptable to the community (Chopra 2008).

However, ADR has its shortcomings. It is based on customary law, usually in patriarchal societies that discriminate against women and youth (Jütting and Morrison 2005; Chiongson et al. 2011). The county commissioner noted that defilement and rape were among the prevalent serious offenses; such cases are managed quietly by elders through ADR.<sup>174</sup> The human rights of the victim or the offender can be violated in this process, including forced marriage in cases of rape (Forber 2009). Women are often aggrieved by the decisions of the elders but do not feel that they have any choice but to accept them.<sup>175</sup> There is usually no right of appeal of the elders' decisions, or the appeals process is not widely understood. Further, an appeal of an elder's decision can jeopardize the interests of whoever appeals as well as of their families, who may be penalized for undermining the authority of an elder (Forber 2009). ADR is not always suitable for more serious criminal cases, although some rely on it regardless. The process can also be challenged by the differing norms of the vari-

ous communities in Isiolo County. Local actors and NGOs have attempted to bridge this gap by developing "peace committees" that meet across county and ethnic boundaries to negotiate solutions to conflicts (Chopra 2008). Also operating are Khadis' courts; which resolve questions regarding Islamic law/Sharia.<sup>176</sup>

## Peace Initiatives

District peace committees still exist in Kenya but since losing direct funding from the national government under the new dispensation have been in state of limbo. The county government reportedly refused to fund the committees, arguing that this was the responsibility of the national government.<sup>177</sup> The committees, which were created by the national government, overseen by the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management, used to play an important role, as Cox (2015) describes. They were instrumental in monitoring conflict and provided an early-warning mechanism for the Borana–Somali conflict of 1996–2002. However, in the subsequent conflict between the Borana–Somali alliance and the Samburu–Turkana alliance, the peace committee itself allegedly became politicized (Cox 2015). Other actors included the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, the National Drought Management Authority, and civil society actors.

The Modogashe Declaration of April 2001 was the result of an organized meeting that included peace committees, district security committees, and other formal and informal

174. Interview with county commissioner, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

175. Focus group discussion with women, Kinna, May 10, 2017.

176. Constitution of Kenya, chapter 10, part 3, section 170 on Kadhi's courts. See <http://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/136-chapter-ten-judiciary/part-3-subordinate-courts/339-170-kadhis-courts>.

177. Interview with United Nations Peace Worker, Isiolo Town, May 7, 2017.

stakeholders of the Isiolo, Marsabit, Wajir, and Garissa counties, following an intense period of conflict (Chopra 2009). The declaration outlines the general challenges faced by communities in the area, such as cattle rustling, disputed use of pasture and water sources, and the trafficking of illegal firearms; it spelled out ground rules aimed at tackling these challenges. It determined that all unauthorized grazers had to seek prior consent from elders and chiefs if they wished to migrate to another area, that such grazers were not allowed to enter strange grazing areas with their firearms, and that they had to return to their home county at the end of a drought (Chopra 2009). Cox (2015) also describes how elders and other community members, drawn from all major communities, mitigated the political drivers of the conflict through a process of “negotiated democracy,” in which political candidates were chosen and anointed by elders. This proved effective in bringing an end to the clashes.

However, although the Modogashe Declaration was supposed to apply to all pastoralists, its enforcement was problematic.<sup>178</sup> In May 2005, it was reviewed, and a revised declaration—officially known as the Garissa Declaration—was drafted. The new declaration, which was signed by the counties of Isiolo, Garissa, Marsabit, Samburu, Meru, Tana River, Mandera, and Wajir, gave more explicit guidance on the payment mechanism for the use of land normally claimed by another group (Chopra 2009).

178. Interview with ward administrator for Kinna, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

## Rangeland Management

The Borana have a very prominent traditional system of governance: the Gada system of power succession assumes responsibility for military, economic, political, and ritual concerns (Legesse 1973); it also serves as a mechanism for enforcing moral conduct, building social cohesion, and expressing forms of community culture (UNESCO 2016). The Gada system is a viable sociopolitical system of government in which leaders are elected to positions of authority through the will and active participation of the people they represent (UNESCO n.d.). Kom is managed by the Borana through the Gada system, and herders must seek permission from it before they can graze in the area.<sup>179</sup> The terms by which herders are allowed to graze are often negotiated and agreed on by both parties, but some herders—especially non-Borana—do not abide by the terms of the agreement, for example, by exceeding the agreed number of livestock or staying longer than the agreed time.<sup>180</sup>

Local communities need better representation in conservancy management and information-sharing efforts need to be improved to prevent community members from suspecting that conservation is a smokescreen for land grabbing. Existing community expertise in rangeland management must be harnessed, and communities must be supported by counties. This is particularly important to the Borana due to the effective Gada system. It would be prudent to strengthen and support their system rather than introduce a new rangeland management system that is opposed by the local community.

179. Focus group discussion with ward administrators, May 9, 2017.

180. Focus group discussion with ward administrators, May 9, 2017.

## Measures to Address Radicalization

According to Finn et al. (2016),

“power and grassroots community initiatives, especially those that involve Muslim women and mothers, have the greatest potential to produce tangible results for the reduction of radicalization to violent extremism in Kenya.”

Soft-power approaches can counter the narratives of extremist groups and mitigate push and pull factors (structural, individual, incentive-based, and enabling) that render disenfranchised youth vulnerable to violent extremism and radicalization.

The deputy governor underscored the need to adopt a community-based approach to countering radicalization in the region.<sup>181</sup> He noted that religious leaders and parent-teacher associations were speaking to both male and female students in county schools in collaboration with the Office of the President. However, the deputy governor was concerned that there was no coherent policy in the county to address radicalization. The Isiolo county commissioner acknowledged that religious leaders had been cooperating with the police and his office, which has led to the reduction in centers of radicalization.<sup>182</sup>

Community-based organizations, such as SCORES and Interfaith Organization, play a vital role in countering violent extremism. SCORES has launched a school program to ensure that only vetted sheikhs preach to the students; provide a forum for the youth to talk about radicalization; and build cohesion among the various faiths.<sup>183</sup> The Interfaith

Network is a civil society organization that is actively involved in countering violent extremism; elders from different communities and faiths provide a counternarrative to minimize the effects of radicalization and to help with deradicalization efforts. Members of the organization meet with university students to discuss violent extremism and how to counter it.<sup>184</sup> SCORES has reached out to street children who it determined had been targeted for radicalization, while at the same time recognizing that the children can be conduits of valuable information on radicalization in the county.<sup>185</sup> Religious organizations such as churches and mosques have set up systems to bring people together as well, including well-established groups such as Youths for Faith and Women for Faith, with a specific focus of catering to their spiritual needs.<sup>186</sup>

Finally, the county has created an action plan for preventing and countering violent extremism and a forum for coordinating CVE activities of various sectors which the plan identified as being poorly coordinated up to this point. The plan identifies 12 pillars of the plan, the most important being education; access to justice including addressing marginalization; faith and ideology (that is, providing counter-narratives), women’s roles in preventing violent extremism, and reintegration of former violent extremists. The plan notes that “The role of the state, particularly the national and county government in providing and anchoring the framework for engagement between the state and non-state actors is very key to the success of [the plan].”

181. Interview with deputy governor, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

182. Interview with county commissioner, Isiolo Town, May 9, 2017.

183. Interview with SCORES personnel, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

184. Interview with chair of Interfaith Organization, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

185. Interview with SCORES personnel, Isiolo Town, May 12, 2017.

186. Interview with chair of Interfaith Organization, Isiolo Town, May 8, 2017.

## Other Activities

Several community-based organizations, including Interfaith Organization, work closely with the county commissioner, elders, religious groups, business people, women's groups, and youths. Multiple local and international NGOs are distributed throughout the county; they are involved in activities related to education, health, HIV/AIDS, children's rights, and livestock-keeping, as examples. The main NGOs include Action Aid, Mid-P, Action Against Hunger, Kenya Red Cross, African Muslim Agency, Alfalah, Catholic Development Office, UNICEF, World Vision, Food for the Hungry, and Council of Churches of Kenya. There are 28 cooperative societies in the county, 60 active women self-help groups, 345 community-based organizations, and 280 registered and operating youth groups (Isiolo County 2013). Grants sources include governmental revolving loan fund schemes, such as the Women Enterprise Fund, the Youth Enterprise Development Fund, and the Poverty Eradication Commission Revolving Loan Fund, among others. Most groups engage in multisectoral activities that include HIV/AIDS-related activities, health, education, and savings mobilization, among others.

There is in-fighting among some civil society organizations, such as Peace Link and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission.<sup>187</sup>

The National Cohesion and Integration Commission and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) formed the Isiolo Triangle Community Peace and Dialogue Forum, which includes Isiolo, Marsabit, Garissa, Samburu, and Laikipia. Based in Nairobi, the forum focuses on preventing and mitigating intercommunal violence, particularly electoral violence among ethnic groups (UNDP 2017).

The Frontier Counties Development Council, a company limited by guarantee established in 2016 to accelerate the socioeconomic development of the member counties, increasing its trade, tourism, and investments, encouraging private enterprise, and advancing efforts toward peace and development. Member counties are Garissa, Isiolo, Lamu, Mandera, Marsabit, Tana River, and Wajir.<sup>188</sup> Most of the assessment participants did not seem aware of that the Frontier Counties Development Council existed. A recent study found it to be lacking in capacity and effectiveness at present (Mkutu and Boru 2019).

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187. Interview with peace worker, May 8, 2017.

188. See [fcdc.or.ke](http://fcdc.or.ke).





## Conclusion

Isiolo, a strategically located county in the center of Kenya, is in transition, shedding its marginalized past and embracing a future that puts it at the epicenter of development. This transition has greatly influenced the county's politics, economy, and demographics, and has already placed enormous stress on local conflict management mechanisms in northern Kenya's most cosmopolitan county, earning it a reputation as "Kenya's boomtown powder keg" (Menkhaus 2015). Sources of conflict include communal claims on natural resources; control of county revenues, jobs, and contracts; urban land disputes; rural land grabbing; contested county borders; impacts of development projects on local livelihoods; highly uneven distribution of benefits from new development; business rivalries; the influx of migrants from other regions; and the potential for sectarian violence and violent extremism (Menkhaus 2015). These new sources

of conflict frequently manifest as traditional cattle rustling and intercommunal violence, which if not adequately addressed may prove to be the bane of the county. Only time will tell if such pessimism is justified. Other forms of crime and violence in the county include radicalization, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), gender-based violence, female genital mutilation, early marriage, and petty crime.

Risk factors, or drivers of crime and violence, are myriad and important to identify to help create prevention strategies, some of which are considered below. Some risk factors are cross-cutting, possibly driving some crimes and forms of violence; while others are more specific. Moreover, while some risk factors are longstanding and challenging to address (and a comprehensive discussion on how to address development challenges is impossible



here), it may be possible to identify potential areas for intervention that are within reach and that might offer tangible benefits over the short to medium term. Cross-cutting drivers include resource-based conflicts and ethnopolitical rivalries. Competition over land and low levels of education may also lead to the exclusion of locals from any benefits resulting from new development, and this is likely to drive crime and violence in the future. Cultural factors were identified as important drivers of violent raiding and female genital mutilation, although such cultural practices can rub both ways. Isiolo County has the potential to avoid some of the problems associated with the deprivation of land rights among indigenous communities before development comes to it. Even in the absence of land registration under the Community Land Act, there are laws and frameworks for the protection of community land under the trusteeship of the county government that could be utilized.


The national government has tried to improve school attendance in Isiolo County with numerous initiatives. Devolution now offers the chance to give youth a reason to stay in school through the building of additional educational institutions that can provide them with future options; such plans are outlined in the county's integrated development plan.<sup>189</sup> Drug and alcohol use also remain risk factors for youths to become involved with crime and violence.

This assessment revealed a number of enabling and facilitating factors of crime and violence. Although a full review of formal security interventions was beyond the scope of this report, it is evident that the county

lacks an effective police response. Police are underresourced and unable to reach remote areas to ensure the return of raided cattle, which has led to community members acquiring arms from both licit and illicit sources. Many have witnessed heavy-handed behavior by the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in tackling violent extremism. The resulting breakdown in the relationship between the police and the community is self-reinforcing, hampering intelligence gathering efforts and fostering radicalization. The National Police Reserve fills the policing gap in Isiolo County, but it has challenges of its own, not the least of which is that many reservists are now based in community conservancies, trained, resourced, and deployed under the leadership of a nongovernmental conservation organization. This may increase the potential for ethnopolitical conflict in a county already at high risk of conflict. Conflict prevention efforts specifically related to the national police reservists would involve strengthening the oversight of the National Police Service, supervising existing reservists, and questioning the policy of using reservists with minimal training and professionalism to police remote areas.

Community policing is often seen as an important arm of crime and violence prevention, but it has not taken off at all in Isiolo County. Interestingly, while community policing is overseen by the county government, it also serves as an important interface between the community and the national police and, as noted, much is wanting in the relationship between the two, which acts as an enabling factor for crime and violence. Therefore, strengthening existing structures would greatly contribute to improving reporting by community members and community policing groups. Security and peace actors operating in counties must explore ways of bridging the

189. This CIDP 2018–23 is upcoming, and some of the authors have been involved in developing it.



community-police gap, assisting collaboration, and protecting those who are leading the way in such endeavors.

Protective factors were also evident in the county, including community and peace groups; religious and interfaith organizations; and traditional institutions, which the assessment revealed as engaged in valuable work as trusted among the local population. Elders score highest in terms of community perceptions of institutions addressing crime and violence, and alternative dispute resolution seem to be an effective tool for dealing with crime and violence and preventing repercussions, although it has drawbacks. There is a history of important peace agreements, which need to be maintained through constant dialogue among trusted representatives from the various ethnic groups. There are also some valuable ongoing activities to counter the radicalization of children and youth, which need additional support from the county and protection by the police. When examining crime and violence related to boda bodas, the industry associations seem to serve as a protective factor and provide a way to partner with other actors, such as the police and civil society. Several nongovernmental organizations and charities are active in the county, and there is potential for mapping and greater coordination of these actors by the county government. More support could also be given to religious and community organizations, which support the well-being of families and mitigate violence in the home.

The adoption of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals has been a watershed moment for the global community, especially

because they recognize that achieving social and economic progress for humanity requires varied multisectoral approaches, and that security and justice are central aspects of social development. Progress in these areas will be essential to achieving the goals. Evidence suggests that strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to breaking cycles of violence (World Bank 2011). However, prevention requires incentives and coalitions of many actors to be an effective development tool (World Bank 2017).

Crime and violence prevention efforts also require leadership to foster a culture of prevention and hence the attention on county governments. Leadership in the 21st century should embed the characteristics of good governance, equity, and inclusion to truly embrace development for the people. County governments in Kenya now have an important role to play in fostering a collaborative framework that allows for the participation of all levels of government in the management of county-level peace and security; provides a forum for dialogue between various levels of government and with civil society; and strengthens and operationalizes key institutions and structures. The County Policing Authority, county security committees, and peace committees can serve as vehicles for prevention; the former is in the hands of the county government and can provide direction to the latter. Moving forward, the Crime and Violence Prevention Training collaboration therefore aims to continue providing technical advice and training to build capacity for multi-sectoral actors at the county level with a view to meeting these needs.

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## Appendixes

## Appendix A. Crime and Violence Baseline Rapid Assessment Methodology

Police	National Government Administrator	County Government	Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations	Community	Other (e.g., Business, Hospital, or School)
<b>Crime, violence, and their drivers in the studied county</b>					
Annual Crime Report statistics Types of crime and violence Hidden crime and violence? Hot spots? Gangs? Resource and land conflict? Ethnic/religious conflict? Boda bodas	Types of crime and violence Drivers of crime and violence	Types of crime and violence Drivers of crime and violence (e.g., youth unemployment, inequality, borders, resources, and under-development)	Specific crime and violence seen Drivers of crime and violence observed (e.g., conflict and youth employment) Community safety Protective and risk factors	Types of crime and violence (violence against women and children, petty crime, conflicts, boda boda) Community safety Protective and risk factors	Violence against women and children (gender-based violence statistics if available from hospitals)
<b>Responses to crime and violence</b>					
Current police strategies, effective? Not effective? Police-community relations	Current government strategies, effective? Not effective?	Current government strategies, effective? Not effective?	Experience of current strategies being used in county, effective? Not effective? Police-community relations	Experience of current strategies being used in county, effective? Not effective? Police-community relations	Experience of current strategies being used in county, effective? Not effective? Police-community relations
<b>Crime prevention activities and partnerships</b>					
Partnerships with other organizations? Thoughts about the CPA Thoughts about community policing/nyumba kumi Vigilante bill?	Addressing development and drivers of crime and violence Partnerships? Thoughts about the CPA Thoughts about community policing/nyumba kumi	Addressing development and drivers of crime and violence Partnerships? Thoughts about the CPA Thoughts about community policing/nyumba kumi	Specific activities (e.g., peacebuilding, advocacy, support, and practical help) Partnering with police and government? Effectiveness of partnerships? Duplication?	Specific activities? Partnering, with police and government?	Specific activities? Partnering with other organizations, police, and government?

CPA = County Policing Authority; NGO = nongovernmental organization.



## Appendix B. General Framework for In-Depth Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

### Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment

#### Interview/meeting report

Date:

Reporter:

Other Participant(s):

Meeting with:

Name:

Organization:

Contact Information:

- (1) What are the main activities of this organization related to crime and violence?
- (2) What are the main challenges related to crime and violence in this locality?
- (3) What are the drivers of these challenges?
- (4) What is being done or could be done to help reduce crime and violence?





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