

NAROK COUNTY


CRIME AND VIOLENCE RAPID ASSESSMENT



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Cover photo: Maasai boma (homestead) in Loita area.
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Foreword

A rapid assessment was carried out in Narok County, Kenya in April 2019 under the Crime and Violence Prevention Training (CVPT) project of the Kenya Accountable Devolution Program (KADP). KADP is funded by the governments of Denmark, European Union, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The assessment explored the dynamics of crime and violence, risk and protective factors, and potential for their prevention. The research sought to inform the CVPT, a month-long course that has been held annually in Kenya since 2011 as a collaborative project between United States International

University-Africa and the Kenya School of Government, and recently joined by the National Crime Research Centre. During its first five years, the project was sponsored by Open Society Initiative East Africa as part of its Crime and Violence Prevention Initiative in the region, and it is now sponsored by the World Bank through KADP. Coffey International has also been a funding partner. The project has evolved over time to equip a wide range of relevant actors at the county level in response to Kenya's devolved government structure since 2013. County assessments now precede training courses to contextualize the training curriculum and provide common ground for discussion and learning.



Acknowledgements

This report was written by Kennedy Mkutu, Victoria Gioto, Munyae Mulinge, Carol Yogo, Gladys Soi, Mark Shiundu, and Elizabeth Atieno. We are grateful for the support for this project from the World Bank and to all informants from the various sectors of national and county government, security, civil society, businesses, and communities who assisted in providing the information in this document.

It is evident that many are committed to building their county for the future and creating a safer and healthier society for all Kenyans. Thank you to those who assisted the research in Narok, Julius Sayo and Amos Leuka.

The authors are grateful for the helpful comments of peer reviewers Raymond Kiiru, Dorothy Syallow, and Ben Okindo. Thanks to all, and thanks lastly to Tessa Mkutu for editing the work.



Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
FGC	female genital cutting
GBV	gender-based violence
km	kilometer
km ²	square kilometer
SACCO	savings and credit cooperative organizations
SAFE	Sponsored Arts for Education



A masai herder on mt. Suswa | World Bank

1. Introduction

Across the globe, high rates of crime and violence are undermining growth, threatening human welfare, and impeding social development, with the poor and vulnerable particularly affected. One in five people worldwide has been the victim of violence or crime (UN-Habitat 2013).

The term *crime* means different things to different people. As Haskell and Yablans (1983) point out, to members of the legal profession, a crime is an illegal act, but some social scientists equate the term with any behavior injurious to society (Haskell and Yablonsky 1983). Crime refers to behavior, either by act or omission, defined by statutory or common law, that is deserving of punishment.

The World Health Organization (WHO) (2014: 2) defines violence as:

“the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.”¹

There are various classifications of crime and violence. Crimes can be classified based on the potential penalty, such as felonies and misdemeanors, or based on subject matter, such as crimes against persons or property.

1. For more on definitions and typologies of violence, see www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/definition/en.

Violence can be classified based on its agents, such as gangs, youths, or collective groups; victims, such as women, children, or minority groups; the relationship between aggressor and victim, such as interpersonal or unrelated; perceived causality, such as psychopathological, situational, or learned; and type of harm, such as physical, psychological, or sexual.²

Root causes of crime and violence include rapid urbanization, persistent poverty and inequality, social exclusion, and post-conflict cultures. Urban residents, the poor, and those living in marginalized neighborhoods must cope with particularly high levels of crime and violence. Many African countries are growing increasingly concerned with soaring levels of crime and violence, which take a variety of forms, including youth violence; gender-based violence; and generally high rates of criminal victimization by robbery, assault, and theft (World Bank 2009).

The costs associated with crime and violence are significant. Direct costs can include the immediate destruction of public infrastructure as well as ongoing physical and mental health care. Indirect costs can include productivity losses, population displacement, and overall welfare (World Bank 2009). Social multiplier effects portend far-reaching ramifications for crime and violence, measuring the impact of an erosion of social assets, an intergenerational transfer of violence, a reduction in the quality of life, and a decrease in the public's confidence in the government and its institutions.

A preventive approach to crime and violence has been gaining increasing international recognition, as demonstrated in recent years

2. For more on definitions and typologies of violence, see www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/definition/en.

by its enactment in violence prevention laws and its promotion as part of an efficient and effective response to the ravages of crime and violence. As other practitioners assert:

“Crime prevention strategies not only prevent crime and victimization, but also promote community safety and contribute to sustainable development of countries. Effective, responsible crime prevention enhances the quality of life of all citizens. It has long-term benefits in terms of reducing the costs associated with the formal criminal justice system, as well as other social costs that result from crime.” (ECOSOC 2002:2)

Crime and violence prevention efforts involve taking a detailed look at both risk and protective factors. Based on a growing evidence base, the WHO and its partners have identified seven key strategies to help to prevent crime and violence:

1. Develop safe, stable, and nurturing relationships between children and their parents and/or caregivers;
2. Develop the life skills of children and adolescents;
3. Reduce the availability and harmful use of alcohol;
4. Reduce access to guns and knives;
5. Promote gender equality to prevent violence against women;
6. Change cultural and social norms that support violence; and
7. Promote victim identification, care, and support programs (WHO, UNODC, and UNDP 2014).

Holtmann (2011) describes this process as “building protective social layers,” which contributes to resilience against both victimization and offending behaviors. It is a multifaceted endeavor calling for extensive planning and strategizing. Successful prevention techniques target the underlying causes of violent behavior: spatial environments, family structures, and education. Referring to South Africa, Holtmann (2011) argues,

“We can only expect safety when we take collective responsibility for rebuilding our social system to mitigate the ravages of the social engineering of the past.”

Such an argument could apply to much of the African continent. The often-cited root causes of crime and violence include rapid urbanization, persistent poverty and inequality, political violence, post-conflict cultures, the more organized nature of crime, and the emergence of illegal drug use and drug trafficking—all of which may require national strategies to combat (World Bank 2003).

Multiple agencies must be involved in crime and violence prevention efforts, which if well-coordinated, could contribute a variety of perspectives, resources, and skills to utilize as efficiently, cost effectively, and sustainably as possible. Partners for such efforts can be from many different sectors. Efforts would involve national and local levels of government, which have different mandates and areas of expertise; as well as nonstate actors, particularly civil society groups and traditional authorities, to ensure local ownership at every stage—a key aspect of any successful approach. The media, with its powerful positive and negative potential to foster changes in attitudes and to disseminate information, plays an important role in a multiagency approach. Private sector

players have an interest in the issue and can participate in prevention efforts, such as with the growing use of public-private partnerships for the provision of services and by reducing opportunities for crime through situational crime prevention programs and environmental design. Lastly, academia and research institutions can direct and support crime prevention initiatives through valid research and publication of findings.

Crime and Violence Prevention in Kenya

The Kenyan government often adopts a traditional approach to law enforcement and criminal justice in addressing the country's crime and violence problem. Official and public discourse around crime and violence call for more aggressive policing and stiffer penalties against perpetrators (Reisman and Ruteere 2010). The government has responded to threats of crime and violence by establishing new police units and elite squads with more firepower, such as an antiterrorism police unit to address the terrorism issue, and by enacting laws to enhance the punishment of perpetrators of violent crime, such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012) and the Security Amendment Act (2014). Forceful disarmament operations have been carried out in cattle rustling areas but with little impact, except to harden resistance and strengthen the illegal supply chain of arms (Muhereza, Wairagu, and Kimani 2011). Such approaches fail to consider the underlying causes of crime and violence in society. They also fail to deal with hidden crime and violence, such as household violence—which leads to societal breakdown and hence to an increase in crime. The lack of available quantitative and qualitative data due to limited police capacity, security, and access (Hills 2009) presents a key challenge.

There has been little public debate or policy discourse about the prevention of crime and violence. Community policing has received some attention in Kenya over the past two decades, but benefits were never felt, partly due to a poor understanding of the concept, a lack of real partnership with communities, and a persistently repressive police culture (Ruteere and Pomerolle 2003). Legal, policy and institutional frameworks in Kenya for greater public accountability and participation were created in line with the 2010 constitution. However, these are yet to be fully exploited to strengthen police-community partnership and check on police brutality and excesses. These include the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA) (Fick 2018) and the Nyumba Kumi community-policing initiative. Therefore, Kenya urgently needs to develop alternative thinking and practices to replace repressive policing and must move its focus from securitization toward safety.

Crime and Violence Prevention Training

In 2011, through its Crime and Violence Prevention Initiative, and in collaboration with United States International University-Africa and Kenya School of Government, the Open Society Institute East Africa sponsored the Crime and Violence Prevention Training (CVPT), convening representatives from government, civil society, and academia to learn about crime prevention in Kenya. The training sought to:


- Promote policy and public discourse on crime and violence prevention and safety in Kenya;
- Explore strategies, tools, and methods of crime and violence prevention in Kenya;

- Facilitate the emergence of a multisector group of public, private, and civil society actors engaged in crime and violence prevention in Kenya; and
- Equip stakeholders of crime and violence prevention with adequate skills to conceptualize, design, implement, and monitor crime and violence prevention programs and interventions at the national and county level.

Subsequent trainings built on the aims and successes of the first, widening the audience and expanding the curriculum. In response to the devolution of many functions to county governments in 2013 (according to Kenya's 2010 constitution), CVPT has been brought to the county level, training county-level actors and entering into dialogue with participants about county-specific challenges. The ongoing training aims to continue the momentum in terms of building the capacity of people and promoting discourse around crime prevention and fostering an integrated approach to the issue.

The training has been a success in multiple ways. First, given the mounting evidence of the effectiveness of prevention strategies, an important next step would be to intensify and expand violence prevention awareness among decision makers (WHO 2010), which is exactly what CVPT does. Second, CVPT workshop sessions enhances the capacity of nonstate and state actors to design, implement, and manage effective sustainable crime and violence reduction programs. Third, while security management has traditionally remained a preserve of the state and its machineries, and a relationship of mistrust, fear, and suspicion has existed between members of civil society and Kenya's law enforcement agencies, CVPT

Figure 1.1. Kenya’s New System of Devolved Government



Green = new government organs; brown = existing government organs.

promotes understanding and partnerships between the actors.


County-Level Crime and Violence Prevention

Under the 2010 constitution’s new dispensation, Kenya now has 47 county governments, each with its respective county governor. (see figure 1.1). The 2010 constitution restructured existing security institutions, for example, the former Kenya Police Service became the National Police Service, and created new institutions, including the National Intelligence Service and the Kenya Defence Forces. The Provincial Administration, which comprised provincial commissioners and various administrative tiers down to chiefs at the ground level and which had previously coordinated

security at the local level was restructured and renamed the National Government Administration Office. County commissioner positions were created to oversee county-level coordination of security their role as chair of their respective county security committee (see figure 1.2).

In addition to the restructuring of security functions, devolution has the potential to influence security in other ways. Abdille and Abdi (2016) note that the devolution of funds for county development has frequently led to political and ethnic competition—and even conflict—at the county level as new majorities and minorities seek to control and benefit from the funding. At the same time, large-scale national and regional infrastructural development projects have raised the stakes

Figure 1.2. County-Level Security Actors



for political power and brought the well-recognized dynamics of land conflict and other adverse social and environmental impacts. Development and urbanization bring benefits as well as risks, including new forms of crime and violence.

County governors are responsible for controlling drugs and pornography, firefighting and disaster management, transport, control of public nuisances, trade development and regulation, early childhood education and health, and overall county planning and development. While conventional “security” provisions, such as police and intelligence, remain under the purview of the national government, overseen by county commissioners, the role of the county government is nonetheless vital to managing issues that have a bearing on security, including employment, development, and planning. Governors thus have the opportunity to improve their county’s security over the medium to long term, and possibly even over the short term. One area of potential conflict, however, is that the national police has to

enforce county laws (Burbidge 2017), which it may be unwilling to do if the county law is at odds with a national one.

Furthermore, echoing the constitutional requirement for increased participation by communities regarding decisions that affect them, the National Police Service Act of 2011, establishes a County Policing Authority (CPA) for each county, headed by the respective county governor and comprising 13 representatives of county-, national-, and local-, and community-level security interests, including 6 laypersons. CPAs are responsible for monitoring trends and patterns of crime; developing proposals on the priorities, objectives, and targets for police performance; monitoring progress and achievements; overseeing and promoting community policing initiatives; facilitating public participation; and providing financial oversight over the budget for policing. Regular briefings by the CPA are intended to inform the county security committee, which is responsible for day-to-day security management and police deployment.

However, guidelines to operationalize CPAs have not yet been created, which has slowed the implementation of this vital structure for crime and violence prevention.


Some governors have pushed to assume a greater role in policing, arguing that such responsibilities should be devolved. They cite the essential part they play in mitigating intra-ethnic, interethnic, and communal conflicts, as well as the need for security provision to better fit with local development plans. These governors also contend that, despite the hundreds of lives being lost, the national government has left them side-lined with regard to security issues (Mosuku 2015). Opposing views include concerns that localized control of security could allow governors to use security forces to manipulate political

events and interethnic tensions to their advantage.

Framework for Analysis

In analyzing the dynamics that drive crime and violence in Narok and that shape local prevention capacity, this work draws on the socioecological framework that has been widely used in crime and violence research and literature (Dahlberg and Krug 2002; Moon, Patton, and Rao 2010; Moore et al. 2014; Cramer and Kapusta 2017) (see figure 1.3). The framework helps to identify risk and protective factors whose complex interplay influences the likelihood of involvement in crime and violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2006). In so doing, it also suggests avenues for intervention.

Figure 1.3. The Socioecological Framework



Source: Adapted from Dahlberg and Krug 2002.

Figure 1.4. Community Crime Prevention Actions



Source: Berg and Carranza 2015.

Social cohesion, internal ties, and community identity are critical to crime prevention at the community level, and community organizations play a crucial role in promoting them (figure 1.4). This approach draws from social disorganization theory, which identifies particular characteristics of a community that shape opportunities for crime and for prevention (Bursik 1988; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). Dense internal ties, interpersonal trust, and shared expectations allow community members to trigger shared norms through social controls. Norris et al. (2008) notes that communities have used dense internal ties to prevent crime from taking root.

Communities can directly contribute to the prevention of crime and violence in multiple ways. Past assessments conducted in other countries demonstrate that it is common to find several community-based organizations working on different issues relevant to crime and violence prevention with no coordination of efforts and sometimes in competition with one another. While these organizations might be doing good work, they often lack the capacity and resources to sustain their efforts

or to expand into new areas. Strengthening and integrating community groups is therefore a crucial strategy.

Criminological research in North America and Europe shows that crime tends to be concentrated in geographic “hot spots” (Groff, Weisburd, and Yang 2010). The “routine theory” examines how patterns of individual behavior lead to the salience of hot spots where perpetrators cluster, such as malls, movie theaters, specific streets, and public spaces (Cohen and Felson 1979). Related to this is situational crime prevention literature, which focuses on the physical environment that affects the cost and benefit of perpetrating crime by facilitating surveillance or deterring criminal acts (Clarke 2008). This theory is currently being applied in Kenya. In Mombasa and Nairobi, the police are making use of closed-circuit television cameras to combat crime and violence and are implementing an integrated command control and communication system in urban areas. The use of surveillance through what is called Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

looks for changes in the physical environment that might reduce the opportunity for crime, such as street lighting (Cozens and Love 2017).

Lastly, the work considers violence in a broad sense, that is, not only manifest physical violence but also structural violence as identified by Galtung (1969), whose work extends violence to include psychological hurt and, in turn, alienation, repression, and deprivation (Galtung 1991). According to Rylko-Bauer and Farmer (2017), who define structural violence simply as “the violence of injustice and inequity” structures include pervasive

“cultural and political-economic structures such as caste, patriarchy, slavery, apartheid, colonialism, and neoliberalism, as well as poverty and discrimination by race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and migrant/refugee status.”

Structural violence not only leads to victimization but also perpetuates and reproduces violence through the marginalization of people and communities (Winter and Leighton 2001). Several studies have applied the concept of structural violence to explain the link between social problems, including crime and violence associated with poverty and social suffering (Dahlberg and Krug 2002; Mukherjee 2007; Peña 2011).

In urban contexts, deprivation as inequality is the most common form of structural violence, resulting in the reactionary violence that is prevalent in Kenya. Such deprivation includes income disparities and lack of access to basic social services; the absence of universal state security protection; the severe corruption, inefficiency, and brutality that generally hits the poor the hardest; and the lack of social cohesion. These living conditions heighten

the potential for the emergence of conflict, crime, and violence (Vanderschueren 1996). Rylko-Bauer and Farmer (2017) note that a structural violence framework provides a holistic approach to identifying the root causes of crime and violence by focusing on historical forces as well as social, economic, and political processes that shape risk and local reality, which is critical to developing effective approaches to counter crime and violence.

Goals of the Rapid Assessment

Since the training moved to the county level, crime and violence assessments have been carried out in preparation for the training. Such assessments assist in the tailoring of the curriculum to the specific challenges of the county, provide common ground for discussion among participants, and help identify participants from whom the training might be a useful investment. Drawing from the theory on crime and violence prevention, questions addressed by the assessment include:

- What are the main challenges in the county regarding crime and violence?
- What risk factors—drivers and enabling factors—as well as protective factors are visible?
- Who are the players in terms of managing crime and violence, and what are their capacities?
- What kinds of prevention activities and partnerships are already in place?

The assessments also provide participants with a useful reference to use in their work and as a starting point for further data collection, the importance of which has been noted. Narok

County is an important focus for training in crime and violence prevention due to its porous borders with Tanzania, its multiethnic population, the Mau Forest Complex, the predominance of a livestock economy, and the persistence in some areas of the moran culture, which trains male youth to be community warriors.

Methodology

The rapid assessment relies on desk-based research and five days of fieldwork by the team in each county. It is a rapid assessment consisting of quantitative and qualitative information as well as primary and secondary data, triangulated to enhance reliability. Primary data were collected using questionnaires, interviews, and focus group discussions, using purposive sampling, convenience sampling, and snowball sampling with all tiers of society, including key security actors, civil society workers, and local community members.

The assessment's general approach was to prearrange focus group discussions with chiefs and ward administrators, as well as interviews with key informants, to gain an overall view of the county and to explore specific issues in greater detail. Snowball sampling was then employed to follow important leads. Focus group discussions held with community members, including women and youth, ensures that local voices are heard.

Secondary data are sourced from civil society and donor reports, academic papers, official records, and reports by national and county governments, including the health and education departments (see list of references). The

assessment assumes that many incidences of crime and violence are never reported to the police due to low police presence; the existence of alternative justice mechanisms; stigma; and lack of access to and mistrust of the police and the judiciary due to past experiences of harassment, corruption, and long delays. Therefore, in addition to police data, other sources of information are needed to gain a fuller picture of crime and violence in the county. A victimization survey was not carried out in Narok County due to time constraints and out of a desire to capture less common but more serious forms of crime and violence, which are not usually captured using the method (Regoli et al. 2013).

Purposive sampling of informants took place during: (1) Nine scheduled focus group discussions with women, youths, elders, members of civil society, and administrators; and (2) 11 individual in-depth interviews with key informants from the administration, civil society, and the business sector. Four of Narok's six sub-counties were included in the visited areas (see table 1.1).

Limitations include budgetary constraints and insufficient time to visit every subcounty. The information gained in the given time was maximized by the use of key informant interviews and focus group discussions with respondents thought to have broad or specific understandings of the dynamics and impacts of crime and violence. The authors were able to gain access to security and administration personnel due to their government connections (KSG and National Crime Research Centre are governmental agencies).

Table 1.1. Overview of Fieldwork in Narok County

	Affiliation	Position Held	Number
Key informant interviews			
1.	National government	County commissioner	
2.	National government	Deputy county commissioner	
3.	National government	Conservator	
4.	National government	Prison officer	
5.	National government	Assistant county commissioner, Narok East subcounty	
6.	National government	Assistant county commissioner, Narok North subcounty	
7.	National government	Assistant county commissioner, Narok South subcounty	
8.	National government	Environment officer, National Environment Management Authority	
9.	County government	Medical superintendent, Narok Referral Hospital	
10.	Business sector	Chairman, Narok County Chamber of Commerce	
11.	Civil society sector	Sociologist	
Focus group discussions			
1.	National government	Narok County government officials	7
2.	Business sector	Regular members of Narok Chamber of Commerce	8
3.	Civil society organizations	Sponsored Arts for Education (SAFE)	6
4.	Civil society organizations	Ordinary members of varied civil society organizations	5
5.	Community	Maasai elders, Loita South subcounty	4
6.	Community	Maasai moran (warriors), Loita South subcounty	9
7.	Community	Married Maasai women, Loita South subcounty	16
8.	Mixed membership	Local administrator, Standard Gauge Railway liaison officer and Maasai elders, Suswa area of Narok East subcounty	8
9.	Mixed membership	Local administrator, Maasai village elders and community members, Suswa area of Narok East subcounty	10



2. Background: Crime and Violence Trends in Kenya

Kenya has experienced an increased incidence of crime and violence in the recent past, greatly affecting its growth and development. The nature and extent of the problem varies according to setting—urban or rural—and the prevailing conditions of a particular area. The Crime and Safety Report identifies road safety and crime as the greatest threats to security in Kenya (OSAC 2017). It further identifies carjacking, burglaries, and home invasions as the most serious crimes in Kenya. Police data for 2016 reveals that, by far, the highest number of reported crimes are in the assault category, followed by stealing, house break-ins and burglary, other offenses, and offenses against morality (mainly defilement).

The crime mapping survey conducted in 2016 by the National Crime Research Centre identifies the top 10 most commonly mentioned crimes: stealing, possession of illicit alcohol, assault, house break-ins and burglary, murder, rape, robbery, stock theft, defilement, and drunk and disorderly behavior (NCRC 2016). However, because it was not a victimization survey as such, certain crimes, such as gender-based violence and violence against children are probably underreported. Importantly, there is a great variation among counties in the incidence of crimes such as stock theft and associated violence, smuggling, and female genital mutilation (FGM).

High-profile and troubling incidences of crime and violence in Kenya include large-scale terrorist attacks as well as persistent smaller-scale attacks in the country's northern counties; gang killings and other gang crimes; political violence, such as the postelection violence of 2007–08; and police violence against citizens. On a day-to-day basis, however, serious incidents of crime and violence are normalized or repeatedly suffered because the victims are not in a position to report them. Incidents include corruption, gender-based violence, violence against children, and crimes or violence resulting from or flourishing due to a poor police presence and ineffective criminal justice mechanisms. This chapter provides useful contextual information on some of the issues raised by this rapid assessment, which are not limited to the participating subcounties.

Boda-Boda-Related Crime and Violence

There are an estimated 500,000 motorcycle taxis (*boda bodas*) on Kenyan roads (Omondi 2015). They play a major part in enhancing access to rural areas and unplanned urban settlements where road networks are poor. The boda boda subsector is a key contributor to business development and to the economy (Omondi 2015), and it is a crucial contributor to youth employment in Kenya. However, in addition to such benefits, boda bodas are renowned for their risks, particularly of road traffic accidents and severe injuries (NTSA 2014). Several factors may contribute to this problem, such as careless driving, poor training, lack of protective gear and reflectors; traffic congestion; poor urban and highway planning, including lack of pavements and lights; the use of alcohol; speeding to maximize customer base, and poor condition

of vehicles. In addition, the motorbikes (and parts) are not always genuine.³ While laws cover age (over 18) licensing, and protective gear (helmet and reflective clothing), enforcement is generally poor and bribery common. Importantly, scholars point out that Africa's road safety record is a function of larger structural inequalities and problems in transport planning and development that fail to protect the most vulnerable (Khayesi and Peden 2005; Lamont 2010). New mega projects in the country threaten to dispossess rural people from their land and increase the number of poor and underage youths attempting to make a living driving a boda boda (Mkutu and Mkutu 2019). The boda boda sector is also an important context for crime, with operators being both victims and perpetrators or accomplices. Operators are also frequently mobilized for political campaigns and can become actors in political violence.

The government has encouraged boda boda operators to establish savings and credit cooperatives (popularly known as SACCOs) to assist with regulation and organization (Business Daily 2018). They already exist for the matatu industry, which runs its public transport vans along particular routes, however, unfortunately, they have already been absorbed by and have legitimized some criminal elements (VIUSasa News 2019).

Alcohol and Drug Abuse

Alcohol consumption has been identified as a public health concern in Kenya (Ndetei et al. 2016). According to a survey conducted by the National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse in 2012, alcohol

3. Focus group discussion with Maendeleo ya Wanawake, January 8, 2015.

is the most frequently abused substance in the country and poses the greatest harm to Kenyans (NACADA 2012).

The most common traditional alcoholic brews, such as the *chang'aa* spirit and the milder *busaa* beer, is widespread among poor families due to the easy availability of needed ingredients, including maize, sorghum, and sugar (NACADA 2012; Kinoti, Jason, and Harper 2011). Legal instruments include the Alcoholic Drinks Control Act 2010, which permits the production and consumption of *chang'aa* as long as certain rules are adhered to: that the drink is manufactured, packed, sold, and distributed in glass bottles of a capacity of not less than 250 milliliters and is not sold to anyone under the age 18 (Muturi 2014). However, the effectiveness of the law has been questioned (Opiyo and Omanga 2010). The restrictions imposed on the manufacture and consumption of traditional brews, such as *chang'aa*, may indirectly provide a ready market for second-generation alcohol: alcoholic drinks made by mixing neutral spirit—food grade ethanol, water and, flavoring (Otieno 2015). These drinks, which are simple to produce, inexpensive, and easy to access, are popular among many drinkers with low income levels. However, sometimes these spirits are adulterated with toxic substances, which has led to the deaths of hundreds of people and the permanent loss of vision among many survivors (Kihuria 2014).

Alcohol abuse is well recognized as a cause of crime and violence, including murder, rape, and domestic violence. Media reports have highlighted extreme incidents of women mutilating or even killing their alcohol-abusing husbands. Children are consuming alcohol and engaging in risky sexual behavior and impulsive crimes such as arson.

Closely connected to the problem of alcohol consumption is the issue of drug abuse. Commonly abused drugs in Kenya include tobacco (not illicit), *bhanga*, *miraa*, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine (“meth”), and MDMA (“ecstasy”) (Kahuthia-Gathu et al. 2013). *Bhanga* is the most easily available illicit drug in Kenya and its recreational use has about a 1.2 percent prevalence, while that of cocaine is 0.1 percent (NACADA 2012). *Bhanga* is sourced from the *Cannabis Sativa* plant and can either be smoked or consumed as a beverage. Rates of use are high among Kenyan urban youth, who usually smoke it, although new modes of consumption are emerging, including the lacing of confectioneries such as cakes, cookies, and sweets (NACADA 2015).

Miraa refers to the leaves and young shoots of the *Catha Edulis* flowering shrub, which is native to East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. It is a mild stimulant with a slight euphoric effect that has been widely used as a recreational drug by the indigenous people of East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Middle East since the 13th century (NDIC 2008). *Muguka* is a slightly stronger variety of the same drug. The Ministry of Health in Kenya recently classified *miraa* as being dangerous to human health, contradicting the move by the Kenyan government to petition the United Nations to remove it from the international list of psychoactive drugs, which would allow its export (Gathura 2017). Despite the health and socioeconomic impacts, production, sale, and consumption of these substances remain unregulated in Kenya (Michuki and Kivuva 2013; Carrier 2008). A study focusing on the five counties of Kwale, Isiolo, Marsabit, and Kitui found that current usage of *khat* is 54 percent. Apart from the health issues associated with its use, from a socioeconomic point of view, consumption of

khat results in idleness, irresponsibility, crime, wastage of household resources, and addiction (Michuki and Kivuva 2013).

Drugs can have severe community-level repercussions, particularly in low-income urban areas. They are integral to many forms of local-level violence, including gang warfare (controlling the drug market), robbery and assault (when money for drugs is scarce), the murder of drug addicts by social cleansing groups and constant (often violent) quarrels in the home. Winton (2004) notes,

“At their most extreme, drug groups can dominate the institutional structure of entire communities, with the drug trade creating a structure so embedded in some communities as to become normal ... In addition, the problem of drugs, if unchecked, results in imposing its own system of justice and social norms which are linked to the erosion of institutions and emergency of alternatives.”

Drug factions can become a recognized sociopolitical force at the local level (Dowdney 2003). However, this has less to do with the power of the drug factions and more to do with the absence of state-provided services, providing an opportunity to drug groups to fill the gap (Leeds 1996). Therefore, simply strengthening state institutions may weaken the power of the illicit groups that are fueling the drug problem.

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Gender-based violence, mostly against women, is common in Kenya, but it is under-reported and normalized. Importantly, some cultural traditions in Kenya legitimize physical and sexual violence within marriage, although this is becoming less prevalent due with

increased education and economic status (KNBS 2014a). The 2014 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KNBS 2014a) finds that almost half of women and men (45 and 44 percent, respectively) aged 15 to 49 have experienced some form of physical violence since age 15. Interestingly, while the main perpetrators against women are husbands; men are more likely to suffer at the hands of their parents, teachers, or others. Sexual violence has affected a smaller number of people overall, but women are more vulnerable than men (14.1 versus 5.9 percent). The most likely perpetrator for either men or women is their current or former spouse. Women are more often affected by physical or sexual spousal violence than men (39 percent versus 9 percent respectively, of those currently or previously married).

Violence against Children

In terms of violence against children, a survey commissioned by the World Health Organization finds that around 31 percent of girls and 18 percent of boys in Kenya have been victims of sexual violence (including unwanted sexual touching, forced sex, and attempted forced sex or sex under pressure). With regard to forced sex, this was claimed by 7.1 percent of girls and 1.4 percent of boys. In most cases, the perpetrator was a boyfriend or girlfriend, sometimes a neighbor, and less often a family member; in one third of cases, the perpetrator was at least 10 years older than the victim (UNICEF and GOK 2012). Although the 2006 Sexual Offences Act created tighter laws against defilement⁴ and sexual assault, implementation remains weak.

4. *Defilement* is the legal term for sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 18, subject to punishment of life imprisonment if the child is 11 years old or younger.

There are physical, psychological, and social implications for victims of sexual violence, including potential unintended pregnancies, pregnancy complications, unsafe abortions, gynecological disorders, complex pain syndromes, chronic pelvic pain, HIV, and other infections, (WHO, UNODC, and UNDP 2014: 14–16) anxiety, depression, stigma, and poor performance at school. Importantly, economic, educational, and social barriers impede most women from accessing timely help after experiencing sexual violence. And because it is usually not feasible to collect forensic evidence within 24 hours after an incident, as required, most cases never reach the formal justice system, instead being handled out of court by traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, if at all (FIDA Kenya 2013).

Radicalization and Recruitment into Violent Extremism

Kenya has experienced horrifying and high-profile terrorist attacks on the public in recent years, and it continues to suffer ongoing incidents against police posts and the public near its border with Somalia. Al-Shabaab has taken responsibility for most such attacks (Nzes 2014). Especially since losing territory in Somalia after the offensive by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012, efforts to recruit and build local support within Kenya through its affiliate Al-Hijra, have been persistent and successful (Anderson and McKnight 2014; Nzes 2014). A 2011 United Nations report roughly estimates that there are 200 to 500 Kenyan fighters, mostly Muslim youth who have joined Al-Shabaab's campaign against AMISOM forces in Somalia or who have taken part in terrorist attacks within Kenya (UN Security Council 2011: 140–44). A later estimate put the figure at around 2,000 Kenyan fighters—roughly one quarter of Al-Shabaab's

7,000–9,000 forces (Burrige 2014). In 2014, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims estimated that around 700 “returnees” (mostly between the ages of 18 and 45) were living in Kenya, having returned from Somalia where they had trained and fought with Al-Shabaab (SUPKEM, IOM, and GOK 2015).

Radicalization can be understood as the propensity to carry out acts of violence in the name of a political cause; *recruitment* can be usefully considered in terms of “enlistment,” whether voluntary or forced to some extent; importantly, one can occur without the other (Borum 2011). Push and pull factors are often used to conceptualize radicalization or recruitment (Hassan 2012). *Push factors* are negative aspects of social surroundings that are likely to propel a vulnerable individual on a path to recruitment and radicalization. *Pull factors* relate to perceived benefits of joining an extremist organization. The United States Agency for International Development also usefully refers to *enabling factors*—contextual elements that allow such activities to take place (USAID 2009).

Mlula, Ruskiewicz, and Shirley (2015) list commonly identified factors related to a rise in violent extremism in Kenya, including: the spillover of Salafi ideology, fighters, and resources from Al-Shabaab's occupation of Somalia; external actors who have exploited this instability; a burgeoning Muslim youth population; socioeconomic disparities; and lack of political representation.

Western governments often speak of the importance of combatting poverty to undermine radicalization, but this view is controversial; literature from many countries does not appear to support such an approach (Kessels and Nemr 2016; Piazza 2011), although Kfir (2008) notes that East Africa has

not been examined sufficiently. In a study by Botha and Abdile (2014), 27 percent of 88 former Al-Shabaab combatants in Somalia identify “economic reasons” as the primary push factor for their recruitment; 39 percent cite economic reasons as the “catalyst” to their joining. Several other scholars echo the observation that people join because they are offered money or a salary (Amble and Hitchens 2014; Bradbury and Kleinman 2010). Organizations that support terrorism may also provide essential services and assistance (von Hippel 2004; Kfir 2008). Further, inequality—rather than poverty per se—may lead to alienation and frustration, which recruiters can then exploit (Piazza 2011). A large study carried out in Kenya by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2017) finds that economic factors represent a source of frustration for youths, making them vulnerable to narratives that inviting them to channel their grievances into acts of violent extremism.

The influence of low educational levels on recruitment and radicalization is also a controversial topic, partly because some terrorist organizations deliberately favor the educated as prospective recruits (Bueno de Mesquite 2005), although this does not appear to be the case with Al-Shabaab, which represents the majority of Kenyan recruits (SUPKEM, IOM, and GOK 2015).

In addition, the UNDP study identifies a lack of parenting and an unhappy childhood as common threads in the stories of youths who had been radicalized (UNDP 2017). It further examines the role that religion plays, determining that, for the most part, it is used by recruiters to frame other grievances. Recruits, it found, generally have low levels of understanding of

religious texts but still feel that their religion is “under threat.” Mlula, Ruszkiewicz, and Shirley (2015) point to the growing influence of extremist forms of Islam in the country funded through external sources, however non-Muslims are also being recruited (Mkutu, Marani, and Ruteere 2014).

Importantly, 71 percent of respondents in the UNDP study say that government actions “tipped” them into recruitment. Botha (2014) and Van Metre (2016) among others, argue that stigmatization, harassment, and marginalization by the Kenyan state and security forces contribute to recruitment efforts. As a result, efforts to combat terrorism often have the opposite of the intended effect.

Returnees are youths who have returned back to Kenya after training or fighting with Al-Shabaab in Somalia; many live in Kenya’s coastal area. Some are disillusioned by promised pay that never materialized;⁵ some returned out of fear or because of the weakness of or conflict within Al-Shabaab;⁶ and some returned intending to carry out violent extremist activities in Kenya. The phenomenon of foreign fighters returning home from Syria and other parts of the world has become a major issue (Barrett 2016; De Bie, de Poot, and van der Leun 2015). These returnees, having witnessed extreme violence, have become hardened and have acquired skills in the use of weapons and explosives as well as networks with jihadists (Byman 2015). In addition, the policies of home and host states are crucial to the reintegration of foreign fighters (Malet 2015).

5. Interview with SCORES personnel, Isiolo, May 12, 2017.

6. Interview with county commissioner, Isiolo, May 9, 2017.



A focus group discussion with Morans in Entasekera, Loita | World Bank

3. Rapid Assessment of Narok County

Overview of Narok County

Narok County, named after Enkare Narok, the river that flows through Narok Town, is one of the 47 counties that was created under the 2010 Kenyan constitution. Occupying an area of 17,921 square kilometers (km²), Narok is located in the southern part of Kenya along the Great Rift Valley; it borders Tanzania to the south, Bomet and Nakuru counties to the north, Migori and Kuria counties to the west, and Kajiado County to the east (NCG 2018).

In 2019, the population of Narok was 1,157,973, (579,042 males and 578,805 females); and the population density was low at about 65 people per km² (KNBS 2019). The county is characterized by high fertility rates

among women, evidenced by the fact that in 2013, 43 percent of all households had an average of four to six members each, (KNBS/SID 2013). Fifty-one percent of the total population are children 14 years old or younger.

A notable sociodemographic feature of the Narok County population is the low levels of educational attainment, which is a recipe for poverty and unemployment. As of 2013, 51 percent of county residents had completed a primary education; 38 percent had not completed any level of formal education; and only 11 percent had at least a secondary-level education (KNBS/SID 2013). Factors that significantly impact educational attainment are remoteness and lack of infrastructure at home and at existing schools (NCG 2018).


There are six subcounties in Narok County: Transmara East, Transmara West, Narok North, Narok South, Narok East, and Narok West. Narok Town is located in Narok North subcounty, is the county headquarters and its major commercial center. The county's primary ethnic groups are the Maasai and the Kalenjin (Kipsigis subgroup); other groups include the Kikuyu, the Abagusii (Kisii), and the Luo; and minority communities include the Ogiek and the Oromo (NCG 2018).

Most land in Narok County has historically been trust land (held in trust for indigenous communities by local authorities, now known as community land), collectively owned and used by communities with no individual title deeds. In the late 1960s, group ranches (in which a group of community members held a group title deed) were introduced in an attempt to protect pastoralist land, commercialize production, enhance environmental management, and improve the well-being of pastoralists (GOK 1968). However, with increasing adjudication, group ranches are now being subdivided, giving way to individual holdings (NCG 2018). There are three main livelihoods among the county's population: pastoralism (34 percent), mixed farming (39 percent), and agropastoral activities (17 percent) (see map 3.1 and figure 3.1).

The Maasai Mara National Reserve, a notable tourist destination that is home to the famous wildebeest migration is located in Narok County (NCG 2018). The county hosts luxurious hotels, lodges, clubs, and campsites; and tourists can enjoy activities such as game drives, bird watching, sightseeing, and balloon rides.

Agriculture is the second largest contributor to the county's economy. The main activities

Figure 3.1.
Livelihoods in Narok County
(percent of population)



Source: KFSSG 2010.

of the sector are livestock farming, which represents an estimated 10 percent of the country's gross domestic product, and crop farming. The main crops grown are maize, wheat, barley, beans, white potatoes, and horticultural crops. Maize and wheat are the highest income-earning cash crops in the county. Mining, including gold mining in Lolgorian and Kilimapesa, as well as quarry and sand harvesting, represents another important economic activity in Narok (NCG 2018).

Cross-cutting Drivers of Crime and Violence

Key informants and focus group discussants both identified a wide variety of factors they believed were responsible for the crime and violence in Narok County. Presented below is a detailed exposition of these issues. Drivers that are very specific to a particular form of crime or violence are discussed in the later chapter on the dynamics of crime and violence.




Standard Gauge Railway passing through Kedong Valley, viewed from Mount Suswa | World Bank


Unemployment

Narok County is characterized by a high rate of unemployment, with youths being most affected (NCG 2018). Youth unemployment represents a serious threat to the county's economy. A survey conducted by the National Council for Population and Development establishes that the primary available employment and income opportunities in the county are agriculture or farming, trade, industry, and tourism (NCPD 2017). Crop farming, mainly of wheat, potatoes, and maize, as well as animal

husbandry, are occurring on a large scale. (NCPD 2017). Specific economic activities include crop farming, livestock rearing, trade/business, boda boda driving, and mining. Older people dominate the crop and livestock farming sector, while the boda boda and mining sectors are dominated by the youth (NCPD 2017). There are about 4,000 youths engaged as boda boda operators in Narok Town alone. A low literacy rate among the population is a major contributor to the county's high rate of unemployment that characterizes the majority of the Maasai community.

Map 3.1. Narok County Showing Conflict Hotspots





Source: Field Data, 2019.

Marginalization

Narok County is among the 14 counties that are considered marginalized under the 2010 constitution; internal marginalization based on clan affiliation is similar to that of other northern counties. Residents of the Loita area near the Tanzanian border complain that their area has been marginalized by the county government despite the increase in local spending since devolution.

“We are a small clan and we are marginalized. Since devolution, there are no roads and no electricity in Loita. Basic infrastructure, road/health we are lacking. We have a helicopter governor who does not know the issues of the road. We have not felt the fruits of devolution. The national government arrangement was better; Kibaki’s books and teachers reached us and we felt the education.”⁷

During a focus group discussion, residents of Olmesutye, which is located 8 km from the Tanzanian border, reported that since independence, Loita, which has a population of 10,000, has never had a member of its community serve in a government position or in the parliament, whether through election or nomination. The only meaningful position one of them had ever held was as the chair of county council.

Immigration

The availability of land for purchase has resulted in an influx of non-Maasai who are agro-pastoralists and agriculturalists into Narok County. Olpusimoru is now largely inhabited by the Kipsigis, who bought land from the Maasai and arrived in large numbers.

7. Comment made in a focus group discussion with elders, Ensakara, April, 2019.

Other groups who have moved in include the Kisii, the Kikuyu, the Luo, and Somalis, occasioning further land fragmentation and fencing and thereby threatening the mobile livelihoods of pastoralists. The Maasai feel under pressure in terms of their livelihoods and their voter strength, which has resulted in ethnopolitical tensions with the potential of erupting into violent conflict.

Land-Based Conflicts

Land-based conflicts and boundary disputes are becoming a common feature of Narok County (see map 3.1), which is characterized by a mixture of land tenure systems, including public, private/freehold, and community land. A particular challenge is the demarcation of group ranches into individual freehold titles, which is an invitation for fraud, corruption, and land-based conflict. Land demarcation committee members have allegedly taken advantage of illiterate community members by allocating land to nonmembers, including themselves and other officials, and by giving priority to those with money for bribes. Some committee members have been accused of allocating plots of land to multiple parties or of shifting the boundaries of plots. Further, group ranch members sometimes sell their allocated land to outsiders, depriving their own families of this important resource. It is notable that the land demarcation committees do not include as members the area chiefs—the ideal custodians of community interests.

The changing land tenure system is a recipe for economic deprivation among members of the Maasai community. The shift from group ranches to privately owned, small holder, and freehold land is incompatible with the pastoral lifestyle that was until recently the mainstay of Maasai livelihoods and culture. Moving to alternative livelihoods may not be an easy process,

and an increase in criminal or illicit economic activities and conflict with non-Maasai communities seems likely. To illustrate, the Maasai sold land in Olpusimoru to Kipsigis members, and now all of the area's political leaders are from that community. It was noted that the Maasai realize that they have lost control over the entire area, and some are attempting to limit further sales by members of their communities, or to buy it back. A senior administrator captured the situation this way:

"Most of the Maasai land is already sold, and their cattle do not have enough land for grazing. This will soon make Moran (male youths) to fight people living in their land irrespective of the fact that they legally sold the land. This has created problems between Maasai and other communities in the Mau Forest as the Maasai are looking for grazing fields while others in the forest want to cultivate the land."

Another key informant echoed these sentiments:

"The traditional system is breaking down. We are moving from a communal system to the 'I,' selfish, self-centered, 'I have a right to sell' system. The Kikuyu have assimilated us (Purko) and Narok has become cosmopolitan. We follow the culture of town. The future of pastoralism is bleak as the maize-growers fence. The system of transhumance is going because of no free grazing land to go to. The elders warn that 'we are losing' because pastoralism with cattle is no longer sustainable."

In Suswa, where the subdivision of group ranches is common, an administrator reported that land-based conflicts are active 90 percent of the time, fostering hatred and contestation among the Maasai and non-Maasai.

Particularly critical is the emerging trend of elites buying land for speculation. Members of the parliament and governors are said to be buying land at cheap prices along the Standard Gauge Railway in anticipation of receiving hefty compensation from the railway's construction contractors. Political dynamics also spur land conflicts because the Maasai feel entitled to all of the area's political positions while migrants are banding together and voting for members of their own community.

Conservation Areas

There are 15 conservancies in Narok County under the Maasai Mara Wildlife Conservation Association, mostly clustered on the north side of the Mara Reserve (KWCA 2016). Almost all of these conservancies are group-owned, and many were once group ranches, although they may be owned by the government, by the private sector, or jointly by the community, depending on the tenure of the land. Some owners of subdivided group ranches have subsequently merged to form a conservancy, which they then leased to investors; in some instances, individuals have done the same.

The distribution of revenue generated from conservancies is a cause of conflict. According to some reports, community members who lease out land receive up to 20 percent of its revenue (Mpungu 2019), but in 2019 the allocation of revenues led to serious disagreements in the conservancies of Mara North and Naboisho between the Maasai Mara Wildlife Conservation Association, which had recently contracted with a new management company, and community members who had signed lease agreements. Most reports suggest that rents are around KShs 22,000 (US\$220) for 150 acres (that is about KShs 150 per acre per month) (Kiplagat 2019, Sayagie 2019a).

A county administrator, after speaking to a beneficiary, stated that revenues are between higher at between 275 and 700 KShs per acre per month. The case is in court at the time of writing.

Community members believe their profits would be higher from crop farming or ranching on the same land; and they complain that most of the people employed at the conservancy are from communities outside the area (Mpungu 2019). Disputes have given rise to protests by a group of 400 community members as well as the forced invasion of leased conservancy lands with large livestock herds, sometime involving physical fighting between community members and conservancy rangers (Kiplagat 2019). Elite business and political interests have also been blamed for starting the conflict (Sayagie 2019b). Further, respondents noted, investors are often foreigners who may live abroad and hire others to manage their ranches, which provides an opportunity for misappropriation or mismanagement and thereby conflict.

Land and Resource Conflict in the Mau Forest Complex

The Mau Forest Complex is a 400,000 acre area of forest spread across several counties. It is a major water tower for Kenya, an important indigenous forest ecosystem,⁸ and a lifeline for the Maasai community and their herds. Twenty-two of the 23 Mau forests have been gazetted and are protected by the government. Parts of Maasai Mau—the only nongazetted forest—have been allocated by the government for the settlement of Kalenjin communities without the consent of the Masaai, which has led to intercommunal


8. See <https://na.unep.net/atlas/webatlas.php?id=393> for an overview and satellite pictures showing the deforestation that has been occurring over the past four decades.

and ethnopolitical contestation and conflict. Human encroachment is also evident beyond the Mau Forest cutline at Enosupookia area in Narok South; and even some Maasai elders have been involved in selling off thousands of acres of land to non-Maasai communities. Human encroachment into the Mau Forest Complex is associated with deforestation due to the incoming agriculturalists who clear the forest to use as farmland and the well-connected elites looking for timber to sell. The Maasai want to use the land for grazing and, as a result, their cattle feed on planted crops.

According to the United Nations Environment Programme, since the 1970s, the Mau Forest Complex has lost over 8,214 ha of forest within its official boundaries and another 32,000 ha outside its protected area. In 2009, deforestation and the threat to key industries, livelihoods, and lives led Kenya to create a task force and to partner with international donors to develop a strategy for preserving the forest complex (GOK 2009). The 2009 report states that 180,000 ha (25 percent) had already been lost to settlements and cultivation during the past 15 years. Among its wide-ranging recommendations was the eviction of illegal settlers.

The effect on the ecosystem of deforestation and stream diversion has been declared an emergency. The depletion of major rivers, such as the Mara and the Ewaso Nyiro, has led to a severe water shortage in areas such as Narok South subcounty and has occasioned conflict over water resources. The water scarcity has resulted in pastoralists migrating to the upper side of Narok during times of drought in search of green pastures and water for their livestock, which has triggered conflicts among communities. The drying of the Mara River has depleted wildlife and has apparently already affected the wildebeest migration, with a detrimental effect on tourism.

Map 3.2. Mau Forest Complex (showing cutline in red)



Source: Survey of Kenya/Kenya Forest Service.

Large-Scale Development Projects

Large-scale farming projects, especially the growing of wheat, as well as the Standard Gauge Railway are Narok County's main megaprojects. They have sparked community conflict due to displacement, socioeconomic impacts, and exclusion from the ensuing benefits. Large-scale wheat farming, for example, results in encroachment into pasturelands, and the significant payments made to wheat farmers, often in cash, has been associated with increased prostitution.

The final terminus of the railway where all the cargo will be cleared will be a dry port in Mahi Mahiu near Naivasha Town rather than Mombasa. About 40 kilometers (km) away from the Suswa in Narok County, 405 ha of land is being set aside for an industrial park, and the small town is expected to become a city over time (The Star 2019). The project is expected to displace about 10,000 families, and one Maasai community has taken the matter to court (Murage and Mwita 2019; Gitonga 2019). Interestingly, land for dry ports has been gifted by the government of Kenya to South Sudan and Uganda, who will fund and operate them, but Kenya may not experience as much benefit as expected from the arrangement (Omondi 2019). A county official noted that the port is expected to employ 21,000 people, but this will likely include many immigrants from other counties whose need for accommodations for themselves and their families will put more pressure on pastoral land.

The railway project has also affected pastoral migration by damaging the ecosystem; including the blocking of water facilities, deforestation, pollution of water sources, dust pollution, and land vibration. Furthermore, the project has been associated with fraudulent land dealings that have resulted in the

exploitation of the many by the few. Influential people, including members of the parliament, have bought land from locals at low prices and sold it at exorbitant prices to the Chinese company constructing the Standard Gauge Railway. In Duka Moja, Suswa, one man's farm was bought for KShs 40,000 and then resold for millions of dollars.

No clear policy exists for compensating people displaced by the railway project. The 2016 Community Land Act and the 2012 Land Act provide for the compensation of landholders, even those who collectively own land. If land is not registered to a specific community, the county government holds it in trust and should keep the money for compensation in a bank account until the community registers their land. However, there is a dearth of awareness about the policy, so that scant land has been registered. Further, the enactment of the Land Value Index Act of 2018 has seemingly introduced a new hurdle into the compensation process. The act is aimed at countering the efforts of speculators fighting to achieve maximum profits by allowing the government to proceed with the project rather than being tied up in court cases over compensation, however, some are concerned that such an approach could more easily override community rights. In the case of the Standard Gauge Railway, the government has allowed the Chinese contractor to compensate landowners directly, creating disorder and avoidable disputes. In some cases, individuals compensated by the contractor still expect to be compensated by the government through the Land Commission. According to key informants from Suswa, sometimes individuals are compensated for collectively owned land, undoubtedly causing conflicts.

Interethnic and Interclan Conflict

As previously alluded to, frequent interethnic and interclan conflicts characterize Narok County. This is mainly due to competition for resource and for leadership positions. In particular, there has been interethnic conflict between Maasai pastoralists and Kipsigis (Kalenjin) farmers over land in Mau and Transmara. The latter displace the former, and both steal cattle from each other. A Catholic Justice and Peace Commission Report summarized the situation this way:

“The high intensity of the violent conflicts experienced in the Mau and Transmara regions are more associated with ethnic and clan-based competition over power to control and access natural resources, mostly land and pasture. These types of conflicts are largely followed or preceded by the electoral cycles and have been previously witnessed in 1991/92, 1997/1998, 2007/2008, 2015/2016 and 2018. In some instances, these conflicts have also tended to be exacerbated by additional factors, such as: political incitement further leading to ethnic and sometime clan polarization; a culture of impunity, bad governance and paying lip service to the rule of law; lack of public trust in judicial and land commission and registry, police service; the erosion of existing traditional mechanisms for local conflict management and dispute resolution; incomplete transitional issues, identity crisis rocked by ethnic or clan dynamics; and the lack of mechanisms for political and social dialogue among various interest groups and communities, to address perceptions and realities of exclusion/marginalization. This scenario is compounded by an increase in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.” (Kadenyo 2018: 4)

Olpusimoru has been at the center of Maasai-Kalenjin conflict, which was particularly severe in 2015 and 2018, characterized by violence and the burning of houses resulting in the instatement of a dusk-to-dawn curfew.

Interethnic conflict has also occurred between the Maasai and the Kuria. The Kuria claim rights over part of the Transmara area of Narok County, which is occupied by the Tende (Kuria) clan and which has been adjudicated and officially allocated to them as freehold private titles. Interethnic contestations have also pitted the Maasai against the Kisii, whose population outnumbers that of the Maasai in some areas. Similarly, in the Kikonyoki area of Narok East subcounty, interethnic conflict has pitted the Maasai against the Kikuyu. Although the two ethnic groups have intermarried extensively—30 percent of the population is blended—the conflict is particularly active during election season. The Maasai feel that all political leadership positions should be held by them but the Kikuyu have allegedly flocked into the area to influence election outcomes, resulting in violence during every election period. This is what led the late Ole Ntimama to evoke a one-time directive at foreigners to “lie low like an envelope.” Many vacate the area just before voting begins or cast their votes and then depart.

Interclan conflicts have occurred among various Maasai clans, mainly over boundary disputes, competition for the control of grazing lands, and competition for political dominance, with majority groups fighting to avoid being dominated by minority clans. To illustrate, the Purko and the Uasin Gishu are two of the most dominant Maasai clans, but the county governor originates from the Siria, a minority group. He formed an alliance with the Kikuyu, the Luhya, the Kisii, and the Kalenjin

in order to win. Such scenarios create tension and sometimes spark conflict, which can lead to crimes such as assault or murder.

One key informant in Narok East subcounty suggested that interethnic and interclan conflicts could potentially escalate in Narok County:

For the Maasai community, the last frontier is being pushed very hard and the future looks gloomy. Historically, they have been pushed from every side and soon they might not have a territory to call home. This could produce war. The outsiders who have invaded the county are not only taking Maasai land but are also destroying our environment, e.g., the Kalenjin are crossing over to Narok to burn charcoal. But slowly the Maasai are waking up and beginning to fight back.

County Politics

As noted, interethnic resource conflict is a highly politicized phenomenon. Politicians capitalizing on negative feelings can incite conflicts (Kadenyo 2018). According to a senior national government administrator interviewed in Narok East subcounty, social media, especially the local language radio station, is being used to fuel disunity and incitement against outsiders (e.g., the Kikuyu and Kalenjin) in Narok County. Local politicians are the main perpetrators of such incitement using the media. The Maasai are said to be nervous about the growing power of the Kalenjin, who already have one constituency—Trans-Mara East—and control five county assembly seats in the North, South, and West. The situation is further aggravated by the rapid growth of the Kalenjin population relative to that of the Maasai.

Political rivalries in urban centers have aggravated conflicts over economic space, especially town markets. To illustrate, in February 2018, the county government tore down the Uhuru market, one of Narok's main markets, which the previous Narok County Council had given to the Maasai community, claiming that it needed to reallocate plots. Angry Maasai youths retaliated by setting the mainly Kikuyu Muthurwa market on fire, killing two people in the process.

Another possible driver of crime mentioned in Narok County is the misuse of youths by politicians for their political ends. Politicians pay youths during the electioneering period to perpetuate election-related crimes, including starting riots, destroying property, and otherwise disrupting the opposition to create voting blocks. However, when the election is over, the politicians abandon the youths, leaving them with no alternative livelihood source and thereby predisposing them to committing crime to economically sustain themselves.

Business Competition

Rivalry among different business groups is rampant in Narok County. This is particularly rampant in the transport sector, where the major sources of conflict are stage control and competition for passengers. The situation is compounded by the existence of cartels who reign supreme over the sector, controlling, managing, and monopolizing stages. They have been responsible for the harassment of matatu (public transport van) operators as they assert their authority in controlling territorial routes.

Marketplaces are also characterized by competition that spurs conflict. As pointed out earlier, Narok Town initially used to have three

major markets; Muthurwa, ODM (derived from the opposition party name, the Orange Democratic Movement), and Uhuru. However, the destruction of ODM market by the government to create parking space for public service vehicles and the attempts to merge Muthurwa and Uhuru markets by flattening the latter has created a basis for contestation and conflict among different ethnic groups. For example, with the destruction of ODM market, the Maasai, who are supporters of the party from which it's name is derived, retaliated by burning the Kikuyu dominated Muthurwa market. The destruction of Uhuru market in August 2018 by the county government evoked a similar reaction; the Maasai community responded by setting Muthurwa market on fire. A catalyst in the competition for market stalls has been the perceived unfairness in the allocation of stalls.

Misappropriation of County Resources

Narok County is rich with resources that generates substantial revenues, but most of the local population live in poverty. As one senior government administrator who served as a key informant expressed, "There is a lot of money, but very empty people." This, it was claimed, is because the local leadership lacks integrity and accountability, leading to the misappropriation and unequal distribution of resources. One clan elder in Suswa said:

"If you are given a job, your responsibility is to eat. Eating is a chain; I am going to eat, then employ my people to eat too."

Participants emphasized that minority clans control the county's resources. For example, the governor, the senator, the speaker of the county assembly, and the county executive for finance are members of the Siria, a minority

Maasai clan. The Siria reportedly tend to favor their own members, ensuring that they are hired for important positions. As a consequence, members of majority clans have been excluded, rendering it increasingly difficult for them to substantially benefit from county resources. They have demonstrated in protest of the discriminatory practices but to no avail. A key informant captures the situation this way:


"There is power in money. Money can buy anything. You make noise, they make you eat, and you keep silent. The result is that the majority suffer."

Some complained that the development of water resources, including boreholes, dams, and piped water, has been done in a discriminatory way. For example, members of the parliament sometimes decree that community water projects in Suswa skip certain areas where the population did not vote for them, which can easily provoke unnecessary competition characterized by vandalism and conflict between communities.

Dynamics of Crime and Violence

Consistent with trends observed in Mombasa, Isiolo, and Kisumu counties, the rapid assessment conducted in Narok reveals a county facing a wide variety of forms of crime and violence, including gender-based violence (GBV), stock theft, motorcycle theft, illegal possession of firearms, house/shop breakings, illicit brews, assault, arson, rape, and defilement, unlicensed mining, and prostitution. Assault, general stealing, stock theft, and rape are the most common crimes reported to the police (figure 3.2). A more detailed profile of each follows.

Figure 3.2. Crime Trends in Narok County, 2016–18



Source: Narok Police data.

Gender-based Violence and Violence Against Children

GBV comes in various forms, including psychological, sexual, physical, verbal, and even economic abuse. Much has been written on the patriarchal nature of Maasai culture, and indeed other patriarchal societies in Kenya, under which women have few rights to property or self-determination, limited access


to state education, high fertility rates, and low rates of contraceptive use. Women at Entasekera location in Loita Hills claim to have been denied their right to an education, which they believe could empower them to engage in economic and social activities apart from homemaking. They voiced their admiration for educated women who they see as independent, and conversant on multiple national-level issues.

Patriarchal societies are characterized by polygamy, early marriage of girls to older men, a general approval for the physical discipline of women, the normalization of many forms of domestic violence, and a lack of condemnation of marital rape. Multiple forms of GBV, including sexual violence, are rampant in the county but often normalized, underreported, and concealed. As one female key informant explained: “If you are beaten, it’s discipline. If you are not beaten, you ask why.” Men can also be the victims of GBV, but they rarely report because they fear being ridiculed. One key informant described it this way: “If a man is beaten by wife, no one will speak. You cannot go to the chief or the elders to report.” Alcoholism also significantly contributes to incidents of GBV.

Respondents claimed that incidents of rape were rare, but on the rise in Narok County. Statistics on the crime likely suffer from significant underreporting. One key informant in the Suswa area related a case of a single

young man who raped about 20 women over a short period of time. Data obtained from Narok Hospital reveal that there was a sharp fivefold rise in cases between 2016 and 2018 (see figure 3.3), but this is probably due to changes in the services provided or record keeping rather than the reflection of an actual increase. And, as previous studies indicate, many survivors of sexual and gender-based violence who live in isolated areas never present themselves to health care providers or to police. However, interestingly, police records for the same 2016–18 period also capture a significant increase in rape and attempted rape cases in 2018; the reasons for this remain unclear. Narok Hospital data also reveal that girls between the ages of 10 and 17 are more affected than older women, possibly because sexual and gender-based violence, which usually occurs in a marital context, is normalized and less likely to be reported than other crimes. The number of young children represented is less but is very disturbing.

Figure 3.3. Rape Cases Presented to Narok Hospital, 2016–18



Source: Narok Hospital records.

The most prevalent form of GBV, primarily meted out to young girls, is female genital cutting (FGC), followed by early marriage. FGC is outlawed throughout Kenya, and the government, religious organizations, and nongovernmental organizations are publicly opposed to the practice, but many locals think it is an important part of their culture and continue the practice in secret. The prevalence of FGC in Narok is estimated at 78 percent (KNBS 2014a). FGC is sometimes performed on young girls without their consent while they are giving birth by traditional birth attendants. One senior government administrator explained:

“FGC is still embraced in the Maasai community and nowadays it is done secretly, especially when a lady is giving birth at home. This is important because marriage is never considered serious without FGC.”

Some cases of FGC are reported at school, but most are unreported even though teachers are aware that it is happening. In the Loita area on the border of Kenya and Tanzania, for example, interviewees reported that FGC is occurring in villages at Christmastime, with some girls crossing the border into Tanzania to avoid arrest for undergoing the procedures. Chiefs, elders, Nyumba Kumi (community policing) groups, and pastors are aware of what is going on but do not report it. On the other hand, the county commissioner of Narok as well as some civil society organizations have campaigned against the practice. The commissioner is emphatic about the fact that FGC is against the law, and that anyone caught performing the practice would be dealt with in accordance with the law.

Girls who undergo FGC at an early age are at greater risk of early marriage and early pregnancy. Many believe that circumcision ushers


a girl into adulthood and readies her for marriage. According to one key informant—a government official interviewed in the Suswa area, bride price payments perpetuate early marriage by making the practice advantageous to the bride’s parents. The official pointed out that there are cases of girls being married off as young as seven years old for this reason; and in some cases, the bride price payments begin at the time of the girl child’s birth. It is often older men paying the dowries; neither the girl nor her mother is party to the negotiations.

In some cases, initiation into adulthood through circumcision of both young men and women paves the way for a period of freedom and sexual experimentation before marriage. This is institutionalized in the cultural practice of “beading,” when moran (young male warriors) are allowed to have sex with girls, to whom they then give beads. And the church is said to be playing a role in fostering sexual experimentation among youths by sponsoring youth camps and “kesha” (all night prayer meetings). Because freedom of worship is enshrined in the constitution, it is difficult to restrict such gatherings.

Economic violence is another form of GBV. In Narok County, land is predominantly owned by men; widows are often excluded from their right to inherit land, contrary to current inheritance law under which men and women receive equal treatment. Some women claim they are being discriminated against, especially as they are solely responsible for the care and sustenance of their children. Orphans are also at risk of economic violence because they lack the voice of a father to advocate for them.

Violence against children is closely related to GBV in multiple ways. Secondary data for child-related crimes for 2018/19 (provided by

Figure 3.4. Frequency of Select Gender-based Violent Offenses Meted on Children, 2018/19



Source: County Government of Narok Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development 2018.


the County Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development) reveals a high prevalence of several forms of violence and sex offenses against children, especially and overwhelmingly neglect, but also early pregnancy; early marriage; physical abuse; emotional abuse; and sex-related offenses such as defilement, incest, FGC, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation (see figure 3.4). According to the County Gender Technical Working Group, child/adolescent pregnancies comprise an estimated 41 percent of all pregnancies in Narok County. The perpetrators include husbands of adolescent girls, principals of schools, teachers, and village elders.

Data mined from Narok Hospital records on antenatal mothers in 2018 reveal that pregnancy under the age of 18 is prevalent in all of Narok’s subcounties (see figure 3.5). Narok South and Transmara West subcounties have the highest rates, possibly because the populations residing there is isolated and

traditional. Cases of pregnancy under the age of 15 represent a relatively small proportion of hospital antenatal clinic attendants, however, there are likely to be a number of hidden cases with births taking place outside a hospital settled, handled by traditional birth attendants.

Respondents pointed out that cases of defilement often occur in the context of blended families, although the crime is rarely reported. One senior national government administrator in Narok East subcounty revealed that defilement was rampant, even affecting children as young as 6 years old, but community members avoid accessing the state legal system over incidents, instead opting for informal alternative dispute resolution systems. In addition, a senior prison officer revealed that there are some offenders serving time for defilement who claim that they were framed by their wives who wanted to inherit their land.

Figure 3.5. New Antenatal Mothers in 2018, by Age and Subcounty



Source: Narok Hospital records.

Early marriage is associated with FGC, rampant early pregnancy, and low rates of school attendance among girls. Girls who become pregnant are allowed to return to school, but most get married instead. As one key informant put it, “If you get pregnant, you go to your husband; if not, you are given a spare husband.” A girl who drops out of school after being impregnated by a fellow schoolmate tends to marry an uneducated man (some moran are more educated than others). Because they lack the maturity to fully embrace the responsibilities associated with being a homemaker, young girls forced into early marriages are vulnerable to suffering assault perpetrated by their husbands.

Another form of violence against children evident in Narok County is child labor. Young boys who do not want to attend school reportedly work at sand mines, and as they find they can earn modest incomes in this way,

they are often tempted to drop out of school completely.

Sexual Networking and Prostitution

Narok County is rich with agricultural resources, and during wheat harvesting season in the month of March, there is an influx of women from other towns who solicit money through prostitution at the many entertainment venues. Some sex workers reportedly spike the drinks of their clients with sedative drugs and then steal client’s personal belongings.

As previously noted, the construction of the Standard Gauge Railway is associated with prostitution resulting from the influx of construction workers and boost to the local economy. Cases of HIV/AIDS have risen as a result: at the Duka Moja HIV testing center in the Suswa area, 11 of 214 people tested positive for the virus in a single day. One 19-year-old

woman who was working as a barmaid and who tested positive asserted:

“I have to leave this town because I have had an affair with the area chief, who has three wives, and with other prominent people.”

Early pregnancy is on the rise: for example, 19 girls from Suswa Girls’ Secondary school became pregnant over the course of a single term. Those responsible for impregnating girls include prominent citizens, railway supervisors and workers, boys who harvest sand for the railway project, and boda boda operators. According to one focus group discussant in the Suswa area, “Those who do not have money are told to turn to ‘between the legs.’” In many cases, girls are lured into illicit sexual encounters with Mpesa (mobile money). This county official explained that several girls have become single mothers after engaging in casual relationships with Chinese supervisors of the Standard Gauge Railway.

Stealing, Stock Theft, and Robbery

Police data and probation records show that rates of stealing, stock theft, and robbery⁹ remained fairly constant between 2016 and 2018; and that robberies occur less frequently than other types of theft. A senior prison officer of Narok Prison indicated that this type of crime was mainly committed by non-Maasai and urban Maasai in Narok Township, Suswa, Nairegi Enkare, and Mulot.

Although police records of motor vehicle thefts are scant, respondents claim that the crime is rampant, especially in Narok Town.

9. Robbery refers to stealing with the threat of force or when force is used; victims are more likely report robbery than other types of theft, allowing for a more accurate reflection of its prevalence (see <https://www.britannica.com/topic/theft>).

Syndicates originating from as far away as Nairobi City are reportedly involved in such crimes; and thefts of motorcycles, especially boda-boda, are on the rise. Armed criminals are said to be posing as potential passengers who flag down and attack operators or ambush them while they are en route to steal their motorcycles.

Cattle thefts or raids (the latter term implies theft on a larger scale) are a concern in Narok County, especially in Transmara, the Kisii and Migori borders, and the Mau area—where the Maasai experience cattle theft by the Kipsigis. The dependence of the Maasai pastoralists on a cattle-based economy, with few other alternatives, is an important factor in cattle theft. According to a government officer in the Suswa area, the crime is mainly committed by youths and there is often elaborate planning and networking, sale on black markets and transport out of the vicinity to avoid detection.

Cattle theft in Narok County has a cultural precedent for pastoralists in terms of survival, restocking, revenge, masculinity, and payment of bride price, among other practices. The thefts are especially rampant in areas where traditional culture is robust and where there are numerous moran (Maasai youths in the warrior stage of their lives), such as Transmara East and West and Narok South.¹⁰ In addition, some moran are acting outside of traditional restraints. As one senior administrator put it, “Maasai moran are no longer peacemakers but terrorists.” They have strayed from their traditional security roles and have begun to

10. Maasai men traditionally pass through an age-set system, which includes a period of time spent as a moran—a warrior for the security of the community before becoming an elder. The practice is in decline in many areas due to the influences of Christianity and modernization, as well as to law enforcement efforts, which limit cattle raiding, but moran culture remains strong in the semiarid area of Mosiro.


terrorize nonlocals and occasionally even locals by stealing their cattle, sheep, and goats, which they may then sell at market for cash.

Moran culture is also being misused in Narok Country by politicians, who hire the young men to beat up and steal from non-Maasai communities at the markets. An informant reported that the late Ole Ntimama used to do this around elections in order to chase out the non-Maasai, and this tactic has since been adopted by others.

Burglary

Respondents reported that the burglary of houses and shops was common (see figure 3.6).¹¹ These offenses occur most often in urban areas, especially during election season, when youths take advantage of political rivalries to participate in looting. Outside the context of politics, youths are often engaged in shop break-ins. In some areas,

Figure 3.6. Recorded Breakings, 2016–18



Source: Narok Police data.

such as Suswa, sand harvesting groups are also engaged as private security work guards

by the community, with the understanding that they notify police or local administrators if they observe suspicious behavior. Police records from 2016 to 2018 show an increase in the number of break-ins (also referred to as breakings in police data) in 2017, which might be related to the election periods of August and October 2017.

Fraud and Corruption

Fraud in Narok County is mainly associated with land dealings, particularly the adjudication and sale of community land and group ranches. Although land has been subdivided and allocation letters issued, there are land ownership disputes in the outskirts of Narok Town due to duplicate allocations. Fraudulent land allocation has also occurred in the Mau Forest area, where some individuals have illegally sold community-owned forest land. The county is also experiencing cybercrime fraud via mobile phones, mainly due to low levels of education among users. The crime is prevalent in prisons and is emerging as a major security concern.

Corruption is rampant in Narok County, as elsewhere in Kenya, but crime statistics do not reflect this reality. As already noted, corruption is often manifest in land fraud, particularly among land demarcation committees and in government lands' offices and lawyers' offices. This resulted in bribery, the sale of land, or a part of a piece of land without the knowledge of the owner and duplicate allocations of a single plot of land. Respondents emphatically asserted that bribery is common in land adjudication. The subdivision of Suswa, Kitete, Mosoro, and Oliopito group ranches were cited as a significant example. The land demarcation committee members reportedly allocate land to nonresidents, and locals who fail to give bribes will surely lose their land. In



A homestead showing the foundations of the previous house burned during the 2018 Olpusimoru conflict | World Bank

addition, a few educated and clever Maasai exploit the ignorance of many of their people to allocate themselves more land and to sell to outsiders. Consequently, the land subdivision exercise was said to have become “a curse,” setting the stage for future land-related conflicts in the affected areas.

Corruption is also said to be rampant among police, who take bribes to suppress reported cases or ignore the commission of a crime. The Maasai do not complain of corruption at the community level; they do not view the gifting of government officers as being corrupt. They are aware that there is corruption among politicians and government officials, but they feel powerless to act in response. One business person reported that “the police always ask for their share from the businessmen in the markets.”

Assault

Police data suggest that there is a high prevalence of assault causing bodily harm in Narok County; there were about 300–350 reported cases per year. In 2018, 33 people were serving probation for this crime. Many believe the problem is related to high rates of youth unemployment; and in urban centers, assaults often occur when drunk youths begin fighting over a woman. Some sand harvesters commit assault as they compete for the resource.

Use and Abuse of Alcohol and Drugs

There are no meaningful statistics available on drug and alcohol abuse, but respondents asserted that the county has a real problem with widespread use. The smoking of bhang is prevalent, and the habit of chewing the mildly stimulant leaves *miraa* and *moguka* is present in the county, despite being generally

Table 3.1. Number of Accidents Involving Boda Bodas and Types of Injuries, 2016–18

Year	Total	Fractures	Referrals	Deaths	Male	Female	Children Ages <10	Children/ Youths Ages 10–17
2016	52	19	1	0	37	15	2	7
2017	30	6	1	0	24	6	1	4
2018	72	35	2	1	56	16	7	4
Total	154	60	4	1	117	37	10	15

Source: Narok Police data .

associated with the northeast and coastal areas. Police records from 2016 to 2018 (average of 45 cases per year) and probation records from 2018 (14 cases) support the assertion that there is a problem, even though the number of prosecuted cases probably substantially underrepresents actual use.

The brewing of illicit alcohol is mostly confined to slums, such as Majengo and Bobongi in Narok Town, where home brews, commonly referred by locals as “miti dawa” and “kabute” are easily available and cheap. The height of illicit brewing is the month of December during the Christmastime festivities. Many youths are said to drink alcohol to excess most of the time. Alcohol abuse is a common factor in domestic violence and child neglect. In Narok East subcounty an informant described how women’s workload has increased due to alcoholic husbands; even when pregnant some are compelled to fetch firewood to sell in the market so they can money to support their families.

Boda-Boda Accidents, Crime, and Violence

There are approximately 5,000 boda boda operators in Narok Township, according to the Narok branch of the Kenya National Chamber

of Commerce. These drivers provide a useful and affordable service to many people, and they are able to access unmade roads. The sector is an important source of tax revenue for the county and a major contributor to economic growth. However, boda bodas are also the cause of many accidents and may be commissioned to commit crimes.

Most boda boda operators are youths, many of whom lack basic training, insurance, and safety gear; some drive in a dangerous manner or under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Accident, injury, and fatality rates are high. Sometimes, when an incident occurs involving a boda boda and a motorist, the former calls for the assistance of other operators to carry out mob justice against the latter, including manhandling, demanding compensation, and even setting the motorist’s vehicle on fire. Table 3.1 presents the characteristics of accidents involving boda bodas from 2016 and 2018. A total of 52 accidents were documented in 2016, declining to 30 in 2017, only to rise again to 72 in 2018. The table shows how accidents disproportionately affect men and youths between the ages of 18 and 35: 60 percent of those affected were from this age cohort. Most victims suffered potentially disabling fractures and these include some children.

Boda bodas are often used, either wittingly or unwittingly, to commit crimes. Riders are often paid off by criminals to aid them in committing crimes. Sometimes, criminals posing as operators hijack their passengers and rob them of their belongings; while conversely sometimes criminals pose as passengers and attack operators, stealing their motorcycles. Unfortunately, the township lacks officially allocated parking spaces for the boda bodas, which has sparked conflict between groups of riders competing for parking spaces.

Possession of Illegal Firearms

In Transmara West, which borders the Kilgoris subcounty and Migori County, the Kuria people possess firearms coming from Tanzania, which they use against the Maasai during cattle rustling attacks. The two groups are in perpetual conflict over historical claims to Narok by the Kuria.

Unlicensed Mining of Natural Resources

The Loita Hills in the southern part of the county are rich with mineral resources. In the Orote area of Loita, community land was taken by private individuals along with a Chinese investor who together formed Loita Color Stone Ltd. to mine quartz and tanzanite,¹² obtaining licenses after the onset of mining in an irregular manner without community participation. This was possible, it seems, because one of company directors was a local politician who signed off on the deal on behalf of the community. The license confers to the company the power to demarcate the land and to explore and extract minerals from it in an area

12. Gold is also being mined in Logorian area, where miners ear about KShs 500 million per year, while local communities fail to receive any significant benefits.

of about 300 km² (approximately 1,500 cadastral blocks).

The mining has caused tensions and sparked confrontations over compensation issues between the company and the community. On May 15, 2019, the community filed an objection with the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining, citing their lack of participation and expressing concern that they had not been informed as to how the mining and extraction of minerals would benefit them. In some instances, community members have been bribed to remain silent.

At the same time, the mining activities have provided some individuals with the opportunity to become involved in mineral smuggling across the border into Tanzania. The Loita Hills also produce rare valuable and medicinal plants, including the aromatic sandalwood tree, which are being destroyed by the excavation. In addition, rivalries among mining investors have also made it necessary for the national administration to intervene and contain the situation.

The Kilimapesa gold mine (see map 3.1) in Lolgorian area, Transmara West subcounty, is run by the UK-based investor Goldplat PLC. The company's Kenyan operations have been experiencing losses in recent years, and the county government complains about the lack of revenue. Health and safety concerns surround the mine's operations. In 2018, a farmer in Lolgorian lost cattle worth Ksh1.5 million after his 18 cows allegedly drank poisonous effluent from the gold processing factory and died. His cattle were allegedly grazing nearby, consuming dirty water in a trench trickling from the leach tanks (Sayagie 2018). In addition, artisanal miners in Lolgorian use mercury to extract gold—a major public health concern—and without the use of safety gear.

Forced Evictions

Settlers from the Mau Forest Complex have experienced evictions in 2005 and most recently in 2018–19 at the time of writing. Human Rights Watch asserts that these evictions were unlawful and inhumane and that the government did not follow its own eviction procedures (HRW 2019). To provide a sense of the scale of the evictions, in August 2019, the government announced plans to evict 60,000 people. During a previous wave of evictions in 2018, allegations were made of beatings, burning of homes, destruction of crops, rapes, and nine deaths. Many title deeds were canceled on the grounds that they had been illegally issued in the first place; and the government rejected the idea of resettlement or compensation for the same reason (HRW 2019). A respondent complained that ordinary people were being punished for the sins of the political leaders.

Other Crimes

Other crimes affecting Narok County include suicide, obstructing traffic, poaching, child labor, and denial of education rights to females. Suicide, interview participants indicated, was a particular problem for youths dumped by politicians after elections season, as previously described. Obstruction of traffic is another crime associated with electioneering. As a result, youths barricade the road at the Narok Town bridge along Ewaso Ng'iro River, causing transportation problems that cause businesses to sustain losses.

In terms of poaching, Kenya Wildlife officials suggested that while cases had been present in Narok County in the past, the problem has been controlled through a collaboration of multiple security agencies comprised of game rangers, scouts, and Kenya police reservists.

Security Interventions

Policing

There are 718 Administration Police Service officers based in 89 stations in Narok County and 378 regular Kenya Police Service officers based in 11 stations (table 3.2 shows their distribution).¹³ There is a 1 to 1032 ratio of police officers to civilians in the county compared with the national average of 1 to 500 (NCG 2018).

Police officers in Narok face many challenges. One recent study by Lagat (2018) identifies issues such as inadequate housing and accommodations, procedural problems with remuneration, and low operational capacity in some areas due to inadequate patrol vehicles, a lack of protective clothing, and the absence of

Table 3.2. Number of Police Officers in the Subcounties of Narok

Subcounty	Administration Police	Kenya Police
Transmara East	0	95
Transmara West	71	31
Narok North	161	160
Narok East	58	0
Narok South	121	82
Narok West	87	0

Source: County Government of Narok 2018.

communication devices. Guidelines are inadequate in several areas, including recruitment and employment, supervision and control, training, medical coverage, and compensation for injuries or loss of life. There is poor police coverage in some parts of the county, especially the vast Loita area in Narok South, where a police post may be as far away as 50 km, which makes it impossible to report crimes or

violence. Furthermore, there is no immigration office at the Kenya–Tanzania border at Loita to control the entry of illegal immigrants and contraband.

Respondents noted that in some cases the fight against crime and violence is hampered by mistrust among law enforcement agencies as well as between the police and the community—findings echoed in previous rapid assessments conducted in other areas of Kenya. There are occasional allegations made against Narok police regarding their involvement in criminal activities, including extortion, the protection of illegal loggers in Mau Forest, and the protection of drug dealers and home brewers for the purpose of extracting payoffs from them (Modern Kenyan Corps 2018).

Managing Conflicts Over Resources and Firearms

In the Olpusimoru area of Transmara, there is heavy policing by General Service Unit and Rapid Deployment Unit personnel, deployed to deter cattle rustling and resource-related conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Maasai. The national administration authority has previously been compelled to impose a curfew to regulate movement and curb the insecurity between the two warring communities.

Disarmament is among the strategies employed by the Office of the County Commissioner to contain the problem of cattle theft and other firearm-aided crimes and violence in the county. In 2018, for example, a disarmament exercise was conducted by which amnesty given by the County Commissioner to individuals turning in illegal firearms. Close to 100 firearms were surrendered, and the effort was credited for a reduction in cattle rustling incidents. However, one respondent for this assessment explained that for a long

time, the officer who was responsible for the county's gun control efforts had become corrupted by his links to local people and assisted illegal gun-holders to keep them rather than charging them with illegal possession.

Nyumba Kumi Community Policing Initiative

The *Nyumba Kumi* (“ten households”) neighborhood watch concept is being applied in a few areas in Narok County, including Suswa, to detect and deter crime at the smallest community unit. Under the Nyumba Kumi model, groups of ten households each are managed by one leader—a chair who is supported by a secretary and who reports to the assistant chief. The approach is said to be effective, but challenges include secretiveness among some members, a fear of victimization for divulging information, and a lack of a formal office or supplies (the initiative is operated out of member homes).

Crime and Violence Prevention Activities

Prevention activities include state and non-state interventions that seek to tackle the root causes of and risk factors for crime and violence and/or bolster protective factors. Such activities are often characterized by partnerships among multiple sectors, a reflection of the complex systems that drive and sustain crime and violence. An overview of crime and violence prevention activities follows based on interviews and focus group discussions, and supplemented by secondary sources. It is not, however, a comprehensive list of all relevant activities occurring in Narok County.



Advocacy and Awareness on Gender Issues

Multiple actors, including national and county government actors, religious organizations, and civil society organizations are involved in advocacy and awareness raising around gender violence. The Office of the County Commissioner, for example, is engaged in campaigns regarding the illegality of FGC and alternative rites of passage for women. Chief's *barazas* (public meetings) educate communities on the negative consequences of early pregnancy and early marriage, and discourages participating in all-night religious functions (*keshas*) and all-night dances for Maasai youth (*esoto*).

Nongovernmental organizations such as Sponsored Arts for Education (SAFE) and Gender Justice have been similarly conducting advocacy campaigns for alternative rites of passage, utilizing avenues such drama,

workshop trainings, health clubs, youth forums, house-to-house discussions, and outreach programs to Maasai elders. The SAFE team, which comprises only Maasai members, have faced challenges including resistance from elders and in remote areas, such as Loita, even attacks. However, the team has managed to reach over 30,000 people and has trained half of all the traditional birth attendants in the region (the same women who perform FGC) in the alternative rite. In February 2019, SAFE convened 3,000 people in Loita Hills, including 42 cultural leaders, in support of a declaration to abandon the practice of FGC. In addition, Compassion International is supporting children and families; and Asante Africa is providing empowerment and health education to girls at its headquarters in Narok. Religious organizations like Catholic Relief Services are also involved in advocacy work for the protection of young girls.

Rescue Centers and Children's Homes

Several civil society organizations have established rescue centers for young girls to escape FGC and early marriage as well as for other children in need. Some centers also pay school fees. The Narok County Integrated Development Plan lists 8 children's homes and rescue centers, which are home to 238 children (103 boys and 135 girls) (County Government of Narok 2018).

However, the sector is purportedly troubled with criminal elements who use the charitable status to make money for themselves rather than for the benefit of the children. Some have been accused of allowing child sex abuse. The county government has attempted to prevent such incidents by vetting and regularly inspecting children's homes, but some respondents stressed the need for background checks for the management and staff.

Intercommunal Peacebuilding

Some members of the national government administration, including assistant county commissioners, have been involved in peacebuilding, including the important work of outreach to youths who may have been enticed to bring about a division in the county during election season. The interdenominational Narok Peace Association holds weekly prayer meetings and conducts music outreach events for youths. And in April 2019, The Interfaith Council, which consists of representatives from the Council of Elders, persons with disability, minority Ogiek, the transport sector, Maendeleo wa Wanawake, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, National Council of Churches, and the Kenya Dialogue on Peace, Land and Devolution, held a conference attended by 120 delegates who had an opportunity to express their views on matters

related to ethnic and class differences, political interferences, clan differences, and land. In addition, the government has used public barazas (meetings) to address both interethnic and interclan conflict among groups.

A Community-Led Preventative Approach to Illegal Mining

At the time of this assessment, civil society leaders, together with members of the affected communities, had reportedly taken a decisive nonviolent approach to the problem of illegal mining in Loita by raising awareness and presenting the problem to the national government. The mining was successfully halted, partly due to increased awareness and the capacity building of civil society through the CVPT program.

Activities by Informal Governance Structures and Local Administration

Village elders play an important role in crime and violence prevention. They are knowledgeable about all members of their communities, and they can receive and disseminate information. Elders serve as points of contact for administrators, well profiled and easily reached. They are supposed to meet regularly and then pass on the minutes to their assistant chief. Some respondents noted that the official administration does not sufficiently recognize the role of the elders who do not receive any payments as tokens of appreciation for the time and money they spend talking on the telephone, which forces them to tap other sources, including members.

Where on-the-ground state structures are thin or lack capacity, communities often find alternative dispute resolution more relevant, trustworthy, timely, and convenient. In Narok, alternative dispute resolution is often used to

address land and resource-based conflicts. Village elders are involved in the arbitration of cases, particularly at the family level, and may pass difficult matters on to chiefs or assistant chiefs, who then may pass on serious cases to the police. Assistant chiefs and chiefs are also major players in crime and violence prevention, chairing security committees at sublocation and location levels, respectively. They are particularly effective at mobilization efforts. Unfortunately, many lack offices that allow them to operate in private.

Rehabilitation of Offenders

Prisons are involved in the fight against crime and violence in their deterrent function as well as by operating rehabilitation programs with the aim of reducing the risk of repeat offending. Services include counselling conducted by social welfare officers; the provision of formal education to inmates; and skills training in carpentry, welding, and masonry.

Suggested Interventions

Other useful suggestions for the prevention and management of crime and violence in Narok county offered by respondents include:

Regulate the transport sector. There is a need for covered parking areas. Operators should form cooperatives that are allocated to specific stages. The county government should establish an agency to oversee and regulate the matatu (public transport van) industry and their stages to address the competition for parking spaces and passengers and to reduce the interference of cartels.

Construct offices for chiefs. In areas where chiefs lack permanent official addresses, making it more difficult for community members to access them, the national government should

impress on members of the parliament to allocate constituency development funds for the construction of offices for all chiefs in their respective constituencies.

Regulate businesses and investments.

Collaboration between the county government and the Narok Chapter of the Chamber of Commerce could significantly reduce intergroup competition and conflict. The Chamber of Commerce is involved in improving relations among businesses, developing good business practices, lobbying for fair rates by a licensing authority, and exploring opportunities for a single business permit.

Improve accessibility of police for community members.

Most police stations have a female officer on staff to handle GBV-related matters. However, Narok County lacks a child protection unit at police stations or safe houses where children in conflict with the law or who require welfare support can be kept. This exposes the children to the dangers associated with mixing adults in such settings.

Some of the respondents suggested that community members need to be more included during dialogues on policing priorities. This is the purpose of structures such as county policing authorities and Nyumba Kumi (community policing), but an improvement in basic ground-level interactions, such as the way police deal with community members is also crucial.



4. Conclusion

The potential for economic development in Narok County is great. However, the results of this rapid assessment suggest that crime and violence threaten the county's peace, security, and stability, and pose major challenges to sustainable development.

Risk Factors

Identifying the many drivers of and risk factors for crime and violence victimization and perpetration is crucial when developing prevention strategies (see table 4.1). Some risk and enabling factors are cross-cutting—they can lead to multiple types of crime and violence; others are specific to certain categories or settings.

Various forms of crime and violence stem from the risk factors enumerated in table 4.1. In particular, the county suffers from gender-based violence; violence against children; various forms of stealing, including stock theft with the use of firearms in the Transmara area; fraud and corruption; violent politicized land conflicts between pastoralist and immigrant communities and illegal dispossession of pastoralist land by agriculture, conservation, mining, and mega-projects, together with an increase in other social ills resulting from rapid development. Narok is the picture of vulnerable communities living on land that is easily grabbed despite constitutional and legal provisions to prevent it because of loopholes in the law and a lack of knowledge around their rights and their capacity to exercise them.

Protective Factors

It is clear, however, that pastoralists are becoming increasingly aware of their rights and are attempting to exercise them, evident in disputes over conservation areas and illegal mining. The Mau issue has been a matter of national-level concern; some land has been reclaimed and people evicted, although this raises new concerns about new forms of dispossession of innocent people who were encouraged to settle on the land by their elected officials. Existing intercommunal peace-building initiatives may have limited success while ethnopolitics enabled by corruption is so embedded in systems. The sharing of political power has been championed in some counties with strong affiliations to clans/tribal identity, including Nakuru. There is evidence to suggest that this has effectively reduced hostilities (Elfverson and Sjögren 2020). Such an approach is worth considering for Narok. In addition, there are valuable interventions to mitigate GBV led by locals that have had a measure of success.

Suggested interventions for prevention of crime and violence by community stakeholders include better regulation of the transport sector and other strategies for making state services, such as police and chiefs, more accessible to the community. It is not surprising that these should be among the priorities of the residents of a county with many very remote areas where some groups are not experiencing the benefits of the modern state.

Table 4.1. Identified Risk Factors of Crime and Violence in Narok County

Level	Risk Factor
Individual	Alcohol abuse and bhang use
	Being a boda boda operator/passenger
Family	Patriarchy and norms of violence against women/girls in certain areas (specific risk factor for GBV)
	Economic marginalization of certain areas
	Elders selling communally-owned land
	Access to guns
	Local alcohol brewing
	Competition for business opportunities
	Competition for business opportunities
Community	Patriarchy and norms of violence against women/girls in certain areas (specific risk factor for GBV)
	Economic marginalization of certain areas
	Elders selling communally-owned land
	Access to guns
	Local alcohol brewing
	Competition for business opportunities
Society	Low level of state penetration
	Ethnopolitics
	Changes in land tenure
	Corruption
	High rates of immigration
	Proximity to Tanzanian border
	Large-scale infrastructure projects
	Degradation of the Mau Forest Complex
	Conflict over county-level resource allocation

Final Remarks

Crime and violence prevention efforts require leaders to foster a culture of prevention and therefore the attention of county governments. To truly embrace development for their citizens, 21st century leaders should have the characteristics of good governance, equity, and inclusion. County governments in Kenya now have an important role to play in fostering a collaborative framework that allows for the participation of both levels of government in the management of peace and security in Kenya, provides a forum for dialogue between

levels of government and with civil society, and strengthens and operationalizes key institutions and structures. The county policing authority, county security committees, and peace committees can potentially serve as vehicles for prevention; the policy authority, under the supervision of the county government, can provide direction. The Crime and Violence Prevention Training collaboration therefore aims to continue providing technical advice and training to build the capacity of multisectoral actors at the county level with a view toward meeting the needs outlined in this assessment.



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Appendixes

Appendix A. Child-Related Crimes, 2018/19

Case Category	Age (years)										Total (male)	Total (female)	Total (overall)
	0-4		5-9		10-14		15-18		18+				
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F			
Abandoned	11	12	4	3	1	1					16	16	32
Abducted	1	4	1								2	4	6
Child delinquency			1	1	7	6		4			8	11	19
Child labor			2								2		2
Child marriage		1		1	1	8	2	17		2	3	29	32
Child of imprisoned parent(s)	3					2		1			3	3	6
Child offender	1	1			3		4		2		10	1	11
Child pregnancy		1		1		25		48		4	1	79	80
Child radicalization													
Child truancy			2	1	16	13	13	20		1	31	35	66
Children on the streets	1	1	2		2	1					5	2	7
Custody	123	124	99	79	44	34	21	16	12	14	299	267	566
Defilement		4		9		15	3	22	1	4	4	54	58
Disputed paternity	1		1	3	1		3				6	3	9
Emotional abuse	2	1		2	2	1	1				5	4	9
Female genital cutting				3		4		2				9	9
Harmful cultural practices				1								1	1
Incest		1										1	1
Inheritance	1				1		1				3		3
Lost and found children	2	3	3		10	2		3		1	15	9	24
Neglect	185	181	130	105	71	79	54	49	56	61	496	475	971
Orphaned children		1	8	3	6	4	3	7	5	4	22	19	41
Parental child abduction		2	1								1	2	3
Physical abuse/violence	11	9	6	13	3	7	2	3			22	32	54
Sexual assault		1		1			1				1	2	3
Sexual exploitation and abuse			2			3		1			2	4	6
Trafficked child								2				2	2
Total	342	347	262	226	168	205	109	195	76	91	957	1,064	2,021

F = female; M = male;

Appendix B. Crime Trends: Police Records, 2016–18

Category of Offense	2016	2017	2018	Trend
Murder	49	40	42	2
Manslaughter	1	-		Static
Rape and attempted rape	81	33	145	112
Assault	348	314	323	9
Other offenses against persons	157	390	164	-226
Robberies	34	49	40	-9
Breakings	55	99	53	-46
Stock theft	90	108	100	-8
General stealing	145	153	126	-27
Theft of motor vehicles	13	22	9	-13
Theft of motor vehicle parts	-	-	2	2
Theft from motor vehicles	-	1	5	4
Theft of bicycles	8	-	2	2
Stealing by servants	28	35	22	-11
Dangerous drugs	42	51	39	-12
Handling stolen goods	1	3	4	1
Corruption	-	3		Static
Causing death by dangerous driving	-	5	3	-2
Other offenses against property	64	41	38	-3
All other penal code offenses	547	127	126	-1
Total	1,663	1,401	1,243	-158

Appendix C. Female Inmates in Narok Prison by Areas of Crime Commission, January–April, 2019

S/No.	Offense Committed and Section of the Law	Location	Total Number
1	Murder C/Section 203 as read with 204 of PC	Sogoo	1
2	Robbery with violence C/Section 296(2) of PC	Obwari	2
		Narengare	
3	Stock theft C/Section 278 Of PC	Oleshapai	4
		Ololunga	
		Oleshepani	
		Milelo	
4	Creating disturbance C/Section 95(1) (B) of PC	Oleshabani	5
		Tenduet	
		Kurto	
		Topoti	
		Lower Melili	
5	Stealing C/Section 268 as read with Section 275 of PC	Enabelbel	7
		Nyakach Kasai	
		Ololunga	
		Bahati	
		Ildamat	
		Ilmotiok	
		Olojoro	
6	Defilement C/Section 8 (1) (2) Of Sexual Offences Act	Sajera	5
		Ntulele	
		Kirieni	
		Olokurto	
		Kapsabet	
7	Assault C/Section 251 of P.C	Ololunga	1
8	Possession of alcoholic drinks C/Section 27(1) (B)	Bosumoru	13
		Ololunga	
		Mulot	
		Mulot	
		Mulot	
		Melelo	
		Mulot	
		Sogam	
		Melelo	
		Ololunga	
		Mulot	
		Kamandura	
		Ololunga	

S/No.	Offense Committed and Section of the Law	Location	Total Number
9	Causing death by dangerous driving C/Section 46 Traffic Act	Mulot	1
10	Possession of narcotic drugs C/Section 3(1)	Lari	3
		Lugale	
		Kagama	
11	Removal of forest produce C/Section 64 (2)	Olegeresirai	1
12	Absconding court proceedings C/Section 131	Enabelbel	1
13	Traffic offenses	Mulot	5
		Rongai	
		Ndamari	
		Nyemancha	
		Malewa	
14	Making a document without authority C/Section 357 (A)	Mulot	1
15	Issuing bad check C/Section 316 (1)	Njoro	1
16	Malicious damage C/Section 339(1)	Sigor	1
17	Procuring female genital mutilation C/Section 29	Mulot	2
		Mulot	
19	Assault causing actual bodily harm Ct/Section 251	Sinende	3
		Gucha	
		Gishoshoi	
20	Cheating C/Section 315	Lower Melili	1
21	Introducing logging tools C/Section 64	Kasarani	2
		Musakwa	
22	Cutting forest produce C/Section 334 (C)	Megeny	5
		Lower Melili	
		Melelo	
		Ngareta	
		Ololunga	
23	Stealing from person C/Section 279 (A)	Yinet	1
24	Personification C/Section 382 (1)	Lolegure	1
25	Stealing by servant C/Section 251	Kabotho	1
26	Obstructing of a public way C/Section 249	Enyerai	1
27	Engaging in hunting for commercial purposes C/Section 98	Githi	1

Appendix D. Male Inmates in Narok Prison by Areas of Crime Commission, January–April, 2019

S/No.	Offense Committed and Section of the Law	Location	Total Number
1	Murder C/Section 203 as read with 204 of PC	Ilmotiok	5
		Melili	
		Olpusimoru	
		Kasbasasian	
		Rosuku	
2	Robbery with violence C/Section 296(2) of PC	Afoo	4
		Mosiro	
		Mosiro	
		Pioneer	
3	Stock theft C/Section 278 of PC	Lower Melili	6
		Olshapani	
		Durumeri	
		Mulot	
		Nkareta	
		Nkareta	
4	Creating disturbance C/Section 95(1) (B) of PC	Ngorengore	5
		Sogoo	
		Nkareta	
		Enabelbel	
		Nkareta	
5	Grevious harm C/Section 234 of the PC	Chemanel	3
		Lower Melili	
		Nairosora	
6	Stealing C/Section 268 as read with Section 275 of the PC	Olokurto	7
		Ngorengore	
		Solai	
		Nyakach	
		Lower Melili	
		Nairosora	
		Nairosora	

7	Defilement C/Section 8 (1) (2) of Sexual Offences Act	Siyapei	17
		Ilmotiok	
		Ntulele	
		Olkalou	
		Olchorro	
		Kembu	
		Ilmotiok	
		Olshapan	
		Kuto	
		Mulot	
		En/Khare	
		Olokirkilai	
		Olokurto	
		Bosumoru	
		Mogondu	
Nairosora			
Malelo			
8	Attempted defilement C/Section 9 (1) (3) Act 3 of 2006	Kisima	1
9	Assault C/Section 251 of PC	Ilmasharian	14
		Olopito	
		Nyatira	
		Ololulunga	
		Shamata	
		Olgilai	
		Ilmotiok	
		Ilesi	
		Lemek	
		Enelerai	
		Sakutiek	
		Chepkube	
		Maji Moto	
		Ntulele	
		Molo	
Sogoo			
Ololulunga			
10	House breaking and stealing C/Section 304 (1) and 279 (B) of PC	Torokiat	4
		Makiwaro	
		Makiwaro	
		Bosmoru	
11	Preparation to commit a felony C/Section 308 (1) of PC	Ololulunga	2
		Othaya	

12	Possession of alcoholic drinks C/Section 27(1) (B)	Mulot	5
		Mulot	
		Lower Melili	
		Chepkube	
		Ololulunga	
13	Cutting down crop of cultivated produce C/Section 334	Mulot	1
14	Failing to produce surety C/Section	Enabelbel	1
15	Unnatural offence C/Sec162(B)	Chemanel	1
16	Arson C/Section 332 Of P.C	Ololmasani	1
17	Causing death by dangerous driving C/Section 46 Traffic Act	Basi Bogetaori	1
18	Incest by a male person C/Section 20 91 of Sexual Offences Act	Bogeche	1
19	Rape C/Section 10 of Sexual Offences Act	Sankutiek	1
20	Child neglect C/Section 127(1)(B) of Children Act	Tabaka	1
21	Malicious Damage to Property C/Section 339(1) of PC	Bondeni	1
22	Breaking into a building and committing a felony C/ Section 306 (A) of PC	Ololulunga	3
		Lower Melili	
		Nasekera	
23	Child trafficking C/Section 3 (5) of Children Act	Ilkerin	4
		Olmesuti	
		Sakutiek	
		Sakutiek	
24	Setting fire to cut down crops C/Section 334 (B)	Enabelbel	1
25	Removing forest produce without permit from the MD C/Section 64 (1) as read with 64 (2) of the FCM Act	Nairosora	5
		Nairosora	
26	Burglary C/Section 304 (2) of PC	Gisambai	5
		Masiba	
		Miharati	
		Olkalau	
		Mau Narok	

The Crime and Violence Prevention Training Project
is funded by the following development partners:

